Network-callable Mem0-style trace memory at :3217, fronted by gateway
/v1/pathway/*. Closes the ADR-004 wire-up: store substrate landed in
2a6234f, this lands the HTTP surface + [pathwayd] config + acceptance
gate.
Smoke proves the architecturally distinctive properties: Revise →
History walks the predecessor chain backward (audit trail), Retire
excludes from Search default but stays Get-able, AddIdempotent bumps
replay_count without replacing — and all survive kill+restart via
JSONL log replay.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Implements the auth posture from ADR-003 (commit 0d18ffa). Two
independent layers — Bearer token (constant-time compare via
crypto/subtle) and IP allowlist (CIDR set) — composed in shared.Run
so every binary inherits the same gate without per-binary wiring.
Together with the bind-gate from commit 6af0520, this mechanically
closes audit risks R-001 + R-007:
- non-loopback bind without auth.token = startup refuse
- non-loopback bind WITH auth.token + override env = allowed
- loopback bind = all gates open (G0 dev unchanged)
internal/shared/auth.go (NEW)
RequireAuth(cfg AuthConfig) returns chi-compatible middleware.
Empty Token + empty AllowedIPs → pass-through (G0 dev mode).
Token-only → 401 Bearer mismatch.
AllowedIPs-only → 403 source IP not in CIDR set.
Both → both gates apply.
/health bypasses both layers (load-balancer / liveness probes
shouldn't carry tokens).
CIDR parsing pre-runs at boot; bare IP (no /N) treated as /32 (or
/128 for IPv6). Invalid entries log warn and drop, fail-loud-but-
not-fatal so a typo doesn't kill the binary.
Token comparison: subtle.ConstantTimeCompare on the full
"Bearer <token>" wire-format string. Length-mismatch returns 0
(per stdlib spec), so wrong-length tokens reject without timing
leak. Pre-encoded comparison slice stored in the middleware
closure — one allocation per request.
Source-IP extraction prefers net.SplitHostPort fallback to
RemoteAddr-as-is for httptest compatibility. X-Forwarded-For
support is a follow-up when a trusted proxy fronts the gateway
(config knob TBD per ADR-003 §"Future").
internal/shared/server.go
Run signature: gained AuthConfig parameter (4th arg).
/health stays mounted on the outer router (public).
Registered routes go inside chi.Group with RequireAuth applied —
empty config = transparent group.
Added requireAuthOnNonLoopback startup check: non-loopback bind
with empty Token = refuse to start (cites R-001 + R-007 by name).
internal/shared/config.go
AuthConfig type added with TOML tags. Fields: Token, AllowedIPs.
Composed into Config under [auth].
cmd/<svc>/main.go × 7 (catalogd, embedd, gateway, ingestd, queryd,
storaged, vectord, mcpd is unaffected — stdio doesn't bind a port)
Each call site adds cfg.Auth as the 4th arg to shared.Run. No
other changes — middleware applies via shared.Run uniformly.
internal/shared/auth_test.go (12 test funcs)
Empty config pass-through, missing-token 401, wrong-token 401,
correct-token 200, raw-token-without-Bearer-prefix 401, /health
always public, IP allowlist allow + reject, bare IP /32, both
layers when both configured, invalid CIDR drop-with-warn, RemoteAddr
shape extraction. The constant-time comparison is verified by
inspection (comments in auth.go) plus the existence of the
passthrough test (length-mismatch case).
Verified:
go test -count=1 ./internal/shared/ — all green (was 21, now 33 funcs)
just verify — vet + test + 9 smokes 33s
just proof contract — 53/0/1 unchanged
Smokes + proof harness keep working without any token configuration:
default Auth is empty struct → middleware is no-op → existing tests
pass unchanged. To exercise the gate, operators set [auth].token in
lakehouse.toml (or, per the "future" note in the ADR, via env var).
Closes audit findings:
R-001 HIGH — fully mechanically closed (was: partial via bind gate)
R-007 MED — fully mechanically closed (was: design-only ADR-003)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds main_test.go for each of the 6 cmd binaries that lacked them
(storaged already had main_test.go; that's where the pattern came
from). Each test file focuses on the cmd-specific surface — route
mounts, body caps, decode/validation paths — without re-testing
internal package logic that's covered elsewhere.
cmd/catalogd/main_test.go — 6 funcs
TestRoutesMounted: chi.Walk asserts /catalog/{register,manifest/*,list}
TestHandleRegister_BodyTooLarge: 5 MiB body → 4xx
TestHandleRegister_MalformedJSON: 400
TestHandleRegister_EmptyName_400: ErrEmptyName surfaces as 400
TestHandleGetManifest_404 + TestHandleList_EmptyShape
cmd/embedd/main_test.go — 8 funcs
stubProvider implements embed.Provider deterministically
TestRoutesMounted, MalformedJSON_400, EmptyTextRejected_400 (per
scrum O-W3), UpstreamError_502 (provider error → 502, not 500),
HappyPath_ProviderEcho, BodyTooLarge (4xx range), TestItoa
(covers the no-strconv helper)
cmd/gateway/main_test.go — 4 funcs
TestMustParseUpstream_HappyPaths: 3 valid URLs
TestMustParseUpstream_FailureExits: re-execs the test binary in a
subprocess with env flag (standard pattern for testing os.Exit
callers); subprocess invokes mustParseUpstream("127.0.0.1:3211")
[missing scheme]; expects exit non-zero. Same pattern for garbage.
TestUpstreamConfigKeys_DocumentedShape: locks the 6 _url keys
cmd/ingestd/main_test.go — 7 funcs
Stubs both storaged and catalogd via httptest.Server so the cmd
layer can be exercised without bringing the full chain up.
TestHandleIngest_MissingNameQueryParam: 400 with "name" in body
TestHandleIngest_MalformedMultipart: 400
TestHandleIngest_MissingFormFile: 400 (valid multipart, wrong field)
TestHandleIngest_BodyTooLarge: 4xx
TestEscapeKeyPath: 6-case URL-escape table (apostrophe, space, etc.)
TestParquetKeyPath_Format: locks the datasets/<n>/<fp>.parquet shape
per scrum C-DRIFT (any rename breaks idempotent re-ingest)
cmd/queryd/main_test.go — 6 funcs
Tests pre-DB paths (decode, body cap, empty SQL); db.QueryContext
itself needs DuckDB so it's covered by GOLAKE-040 in the proof
harness, not unit tests. handlers.db = nil here is intentional.
TestHandleSQL_EmptySQL_400: 3 cases (empty, whitespace, mixed-WS)
TestMaxSQLBodyBytes_Reasonable: locks the 64 KiB constant in a
sane range so a refactor can't blow it open
TestPrimaryBucket_Constant: locks "primary" — secrets lookup uses
this; rename = silent secret-resolution failure at boot
cmd/vectord/main_test.go — 14 funcs
All 6 routes verified mounted. handlers.persist = nil = pure
in-memory mode; persistence is GOLAKE-070 in the proof harness.
Coverage of every error branch in handleCreate/Add/Search/Delete:
missing index → 404, dim mismatch → 400, empty items → 400,
empty id → 400, malformed JSON → 400, body too large → 4xx,
happy create → 201, happy list → 200.
One real finding caught during writing:
Body-cap rejection is sometimes 413 (typed MaxBytesError survives
unwrap) and sometimes 400 (decoder wraps it as a generic decode
error). Both are valid client-error contracts; the contract isn't
"exactly 413" but "fails loud as 4xx, never silent 200 or 5xx."
Tests assert 4xx range. The proof harness's
proof_assert_status_4xx already had this shape — just bringing
the unit tests in line with it.
Verified:
go test -count=1 -short ./cmd/... — all 7 packages green
just verify — vet + test + 9 smokes 35s
Closes audit risk R-005 (6/7 cmd/main.go untested). Combined with
the proof harness's wiring coverage, every cmd-level handler now
has both unit-test and integration-test coverage of the wiring
layer. R-005 → CLOSED.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bridges the missing piece for the staffing co-pilot: text inputs to
vectord-shaped vectors. Standalone cmd/embedd on :3216 fronted by
gateway at /v1/embed. Pluggable embed.Provider interface (G2 ships
Ollama; OpenAI/Voyage swap in via the same interface in G3+).
Wire format:
POST /v1/embed {"texts":[...], "model":"..."} // model optional
→ 200 {"model","dimension","vectors":[[...]]}
Default model: nomic-embed-text (768-d). Ollama returns float64;
provider converts to float32 at the boundary so vectors flow through
vectord/HNSW without re-conversion.
Acceptance smoke 5/5 PASS — including the architectural payoff:
end-to-end embed → vectord add → search by re-embedded text returns
recall=1 at distance 5.96e-8 (float32 precision noise on identical
unit vectors). The staffing co-pilot pipeline (text → vector →
similarity search) is now functional end-to-end.
All 9 smokes (D1-D6 + G1 + G1P + G2) PASS deterministically.
Cross-lineage scrum on shipped code:
- Opus 4.7 (opencode): 0 BLOCK + 4 WARN + 3 INFO
- Kimi K2-0905 (openrouter): 0 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 1 INFO
- Qwen3-coder (openrouter): "No BLOCKs" (3 tokens)
Fixed (2 — 1 convergent + 1 single-reviewer):
C1 (Opus + Kimi convergent WARN): per-text 60s timeout × N-text
batch was up to N×60s with no batch-level cap. One stuck Ollama
call would stall the whole handler indefinitely. Fix:
context.WithTimeout(r.Context(), 60s) wraps the entire batch.
O-W3 (Opus WARN): empty strings in texts went to Ollama unchecked,
producing version-dependent garbage. Fix: reject "" with 400 at
the handler boundary so callers get a deterministic answer
instead of an upstream-conditional 502.
Deferred (4): drainAndClose 64KiB cap (matches G0 pattern), no
concurrency limit on /embed (single-tenant G2), missing Accept
header (exotic-proxy concern), MaxBytesError string-match
redundancy (paranoia layer kept consistent across codebase).
Zero false positives this round — Qwen returned 3 tokens "No BLOCKs"
and the other two reviewers' findings were all real.
Setup confirmed: Ollama 0.21.0 on :11434 with nomic-embed-text loaded.
Per-text /api/embeddings used (forward-compat with 0.21+); newer
0.4+ /api/embed batch endpoint can swap in via the Provider interface.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
First G1+ piece. Standalone vectord service with in-memory HNSW
indexes keyed by string IDs and optional opaque JSON metadata.
Wraps github.com/coder/hnsw v0.6.1 (pure Go, no cgo). New port
:3215 with /v1/vectors/* routed through gateway.
API:
POST /v1/vectors/index create
GET /v1/vectors/index list
GET /v1/vectors/index/{name} get info
DELETE /v1/vectors/index/{name}
POST /v1/vectors/index/{name}/add (batch)
POST /v1/vectors/index/{name}/search
Acceptance smoke 7/7 PASS — including recall=1 on inserted vector
w-042 (cosine distance 5.96e-8, float32 precision noise), 200-
vector batch round-trip, dim mismatch → 400, missing index → 404,
duplicate create → 409.
Two upstream library quirks worked around in the wrapper:
1. coder/hnsw.Add panics with "node not added" on re-adding an
existing key (length-invariant fires because internal
delete+re-add doesn't change Len). Pre-Delete fixes for n>1.
2. Delete of the LAST node leaves layers[0] non-empty but
entryless; next Add SIGSEGVs in Dims(). Workaround: when
re-adding to a 1-node graph, recreate the underlying graph
fresh via resetGraphLocked().
Cross-lineage scrum on shipped code:
- Opus 4.7 (opencode): 0 BLOCK + 4 WARN + 3 INFO
- Kimi K2-0905 (openrouter): 2 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 1 INFO
- Qwen3-coder (openrouter): "No BLOCKs" (4 tokens)
Fixed (4 real + 2 cleanup):
O-W1: Lookup returned the raw []float32 from coder/hnsw — caller
mutation would corrupt index. Now copies before return.
O-W3: NaN/Inf vectors poison HNSW (distance comparisons return
false for both < and >, breaking heap invariants). Zero-norm
under cosine produces NaN. Now validated at Add time.
K-B1: Re-adding with nil metadata silently cleared the existing
entry — JSON-omitted "metadata" field deserializes as nil,
making upsert non-idempotent. Now nil = "leave alone"; explicit
{} or Delete to clear.
O-W4: Batch Add with mid-batch failure left items 0..N-1
committed and item N rejected. Now pre-validates all IDs+dims
before any Add.
O-I1: jsonItoa hand-roll replaced with strconv.Itoa — no
measured allocation win.
O-I2: distanceFn re-resolved per Search → use stored i.g.Distance.
Dismissed (2 false positives):
K-B2 "MaxBytesReader applied after full read" — false, applied
BEFORE Decode in decodeJSON
K-W1 "Search distances under read lock might see invalidated
slices from concurrent Add" — false, RWMutex serializes
write-lock during Add against read-lock during Search
Deferred (3): HTTP server timeouts (consistent G0 punt),
Content-Type validation (internal service behind gateway), Lookup
dim assertion (in-memory state can't drift).
The K-B1 finding is worth pausing on: nil metadata on re-add is
the kind of API ergonomics bug only a code-reading reviewer
catches — smoke would never detect it because the smoke always
sends explicit metadata. Three lines changed in Add; the resulting
API matches what callers actually expect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Last day of Phase G0. Gateway promotes the D1 stub endpoints into
real reverse-proxies on :3110 fronting storaged + catalogd + ingestd
+ queryd. /v1 prefix lives at the edge — internal services route on
/storage, /catalog, /ingest, /sql, with the prefix stripped by a
custom Director per Kimi K2's D1-plan finding.
Routes:
/v1/storage/* → storaged
/v1/catalog/* → catalogd
/v1/ingest → ingestd
/v1/sql → queryd
Acceptance smoke 6/6 PASS — every assertion goes through :3110, none
direct to backing services. Full ingest → storage → catalog → query
round-trip verified end-to-end. The smoke's "rows[0].name=Alice"
assertion is the architectural payoff: five binaries, six HTTP
routes, one round-trip through one edge.
Cross-lineage scrum on shipped code:
- Opus 4.7 (opencode): 1 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 2 INFO
- Kimi K2-0905 (openrouter): 1 BLOCK + 3 WARN + 1 INFO (3 false positives, all from one wrong TrimPrefix theory)
- Qwen3-coder (openrouter): 5 completion tokens — "No BLOCKs."
Fixed (2, both Opus single-reviewer):
O-BLOCK: Director path stripping fails if upstream URL has a
non-empty path. The default Director's singleJoiningSlash runs
BEFORE the custom code, so an upstream like http://host/api
produces /api/v1/storage/... after the join — then TrimPrefix("/v1")
is a no-op because the string starts with /api. Fix: strip /v1
BEFORE calling origDirector. New TestProxy_SubPathUpstream regression
locks this in. Today: bare-host URLs only, dormant — but moving
gateway behind a sub-path in prod would have silently 404'd.
O-WARN2: url.Parse is permissive — typo "127.0.0.1:3211" (no scheme)
parses fine, produces empty Host, every request 502s. mustParseUpstream
fail-fast at startup with a clear message naming the offending
config field.
Dismissed (3, all Kimi, same false TrimPrefix theory):
K-BLOCK "TrimPrefix loops forever on //v1storage" — false, single
check-and-trim, no loop
K-WARN "no upper bound on repeated // removal" — same false theory
K-WARN "goroutines leak if upstream parse fails while binaries
running" — confused scope; binaries are separate OS processes
launched by the smoke script
D1 smoke updated (post-D6): the 501 stub probes are gone (gateway no
longer stubs /v1/ingest and /v1/sql). Replaced with proxy probes that
verify gateway forwards malformed requests to ingestd and queryd. Launch
order changed from parallel to dep-ordered (storaged → catalogd →
ingestd → queryd → gateway) since catalogd's rehydrate now needs
storaged, queryd's initial Refresh needs catalogd.
All six G0 smokes (D1 through D6) PASS end-to-end after every fix
round. Phase G0 substrate is complete: 5 binaries, 6 routes, 25 fixes
applied across 6 days from cross-lineage review.
G1+ next: gRPC adapters, Lance/HNSW vector indices, Go MCP SDK port,
distillation rebuild, observer + Langfuse integration.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
root