Audit-driven follow-up to the Rust scrum review on the 3 untested
HIGH-risk packages. Both the audit (reports/scrum/risk-register.md)
and the scrum (tests/real-world/runs/scrum_mojxb5bw/) independently
flagged these files as the highest-leverage missing test coverage.
internal/shared/server_test.go — 8 test funcs
newListener: valid addr, invalid addr (non-numeric port, port
out of range, port-already-in-use surfacing as net.OpError).
Empty-addr-is-valid: documents the net.Listen quirk that "" binds
an OS-picked port — future readers don't need to relitigate.
HealthResponse marshal: JSON shape stable, round-trip clean.
/health handler reconstructed via httptest.Server: status 200,
Content-Type application/json, body fields stable.
RegisterRoutes callback: contract verified (callback is invoked
with a real chi.Router, mounted route reachable end-to-end).
Run bind-failure surface: synchronous error, not a goroutine swallow
— the contract Run depends on per the race-safe-startup comment.
internal/shared/config_test.go — 6 test funcs
DefaultConfig G0 port pinning: every binary's default bind locked
in (3110/3211-3216) so a refactor can't silently flip a port.
LoadConfig empty path: returns DefaultConfig, no error.
LoadConfig missing file: returns DefaultConfig, logs warn (the warn
line shows up in test output, captured-but-not-asserted).
LoadConfig valid TOML: partial overrides land, unspecified sections
keep defaults (TOML decoder leave-alone behavior).
LoadConfig invalid TOML: returns wrapped 'parse config' error.
LoadConfig unreadable file: skipped under root (root reads 0000);
captures the read-error wrap path for non-root contexts.
internal/storeclient/client_test.go — 14 test funcs
safeKey table-driven: plain segments, single slash, empty, trailing
slash, space (→ %20), apostrophe (→ %27), unicode (→ %C3%A9),
deep nesting. Locks URL-escape contract per scrum suggestion.
recordingServer helper backs Put/Get/Delete/List against
httptest.Server: verifies method, path, body bytes round-trip.
ErrKeyNotFound on 404 (errors.Is round-trip).
Non-OK status wraps body preview into the error chain.
Delete accepts both 200 and 204 (S3 vs compatible-store quirk).
List parses JSON shape and surfaces query-string prefix.
Context cancellation propagates through Put as context.Canceled.
internal/queryd/db_test.go — 5 test funcs (with subtests)
sqlEscape table-driven: 8 cases including empty, all-quotes,
nested apostrophes (the case from the scrum suggestion).
redactCreds table-driven: 6 cases — both keys, single keys,
empty, multi-occurrence, placeholder-collision (lossy but safe).
buildBootstrap statement order: INSTALL → LOAD → CREATE SECRET.
buildBootstrap endpoint schemes: http strips + USE_SSL false,
https keeps SSL true, no-scheme defaults SSL true (prod ambient).
buildBootstrap URL_STYLE: 'path' vs 'vhost' branch.
buildBootstrap escapes credential quotes: future SSO-token-with-
apostrophe doesn't break out of the SQL string literal — the
belt holds when the suspenders snap.
Real finding caught by my own test:
net.Listen("tcp", "") succeeds (OS-picked port) — captured as
TestNewListener_EmptyAddrIsValid so the quirk is documented.
Verified:
go test -short ./... — every internal/ package now has tests
(no more 'no test files' lines for shared/storeclient).
just verify — vet + test + 9 smokes green in 33s.
just proof contract — 53/0/1 green (no harness regression).
Closes:
R-002 internal/shared zero tests HIGH
R-003 internal/storeclient zero tests HIGH
R-008 queryd/db.go untested MED (sqlEscape, redactCreds,
CREATE SECRET formation)
Composite scrum score should move from 43 → ~46 / 60 — the three
HIGH/MED risks closed, internal/shared and internal/storeclient
become "tested + load-bearing" instead of "untested + load-bearing."
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Phase G0 Day 5 ships queryd: in-memory DuckDB with custom Connector
that runs INSTALL httpfs / LOAD httpfs / CREATE OR REPLACE SECRET
(TYPE S3) on every new connection, sourced from SecretsProvider +
shared.S3Config. SetMaxOpenConns(1) so registrar's CREATE VIEWs and
handler's SELECTs serialize through one connection (avoids cross-
connection MVCC visibility edge cases).
Registrar.Refresh reads catalogd /catalog/list, runs CREATE OR
REPLACE VIEW "name" AS SELECT * FROM read_parquet('s3://bucket/key')
per manifest, drops views for removed manifests, skips on unchanged
updated_at (the implicit etag). Drop pass runs BEFORE create pass so
a poison manifest can't block other manifest refreshes (post-scrum
C1 fix).
POST /sql with JSON body {"sql":"…"} returns
{"columns":[{"name":"id","type":"BIGINT"},…], "rows":[[…]],
"row_count":N}. []byte → string conversion so VARCHAR rows
JSON-encode as text. 30s default refresh ticker, configurable via
[queryd].refresh_every.
Cross-lineage scrum on shipped code:
- Opus 4.7 (opencode): 1 BLOCK + 4 WARN + 4 INFO
- Kimi K2-0905 (openrouter): 2 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 1 INFO
- Qwen3-coder (openrouter): 2 BLOCK + 1 WARN + 1 INFO
Fixed (4):
C1 (Opus + Kimi convergent): Refresh aborts on first per-view error
→ drop pass first, collect errors, errors.Join. Poison manifest
no longer blocks the rest of the catalog from re-syncing.
B-CTX (Opus BLOCK): bootstrap closure captured OpenDB's ctx →
cancelled-ctx silently fails every reconnect. context.Background()
inside closure; passed ctx only for initial Ping.
B-LEAK (Kimi BLOCK): firstLine(stmt) truncated CREATE SECRET to 80
chars but those 80 chars contained KEY_ID + SECRET prefix → log
aggregator captures credentials. Stable per-statement labels +
redactCreds() filter on wrapped DuckDB errors.
JSON-ERR (Opus WARN): swallowed json.Encode error → silent
truncated 200 on unsupported column types. slog.Warn the failure.
Dismissed (4 false positives):
Qwen BLOCK "bootstrap not transactional" — DuckDB DDL is auto-commit
Qwen BLOCK "MaxBytesReader after Decode" — false, applied before
Kimi BLOCK "concurrent Refresh + user SELECT deadlock" — not a
deadlock, just serialization, by design with 10s timeout retry
Kimi WARN "dropView leaves r.known inconsistent" — current code
returns before the delete; the entry persists for retry
Critical reviewer behavior: 1 convergent BLOCK between Opus + Kimi
on the per-view error blocking, plus two independent single-reviewer
BLOCKs (B-CTX, B-LEAK) that smoke could never have caught. The
B-LEAK fix uses defense-in-depth: never pass SQL into the error
path AND redact known cred values from DuckDB's own error message.
DuckDB cgo path: github.com/duckdb/duckdb-go/v2 v2.10502.0 (per
ADR-001 §1) on Go 1.25 + arrow-go. Smoke 6/6 PASS after every
fix round.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
root