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5 changed files with 18 additions and 317 deletions

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@ -24,41 +24,12 @@ import (
)
const (
// Default per-PUT body cap. Most callers (ingest parquets, catalog
// manifests) live well under this. The cap is a safety gate, not a
// memory bottleneck — manager.Uploader streams; this just refuses
// reads past the limit so a runaway client can't drain the daemon.
maxPutBytesDefault = 256 << 20 // 256 MiB
// Vector-persistence prefix gets a much larger cap because vectord
// persists single-file LHV1 indexes that exceed 256 MiB above
// ~150K vectors at d=768 (the 500K staffing test's documented gap).
// 4 GiB covers >700K vectors at d=768 with HNSW graph overhead and
// keeps the simple-Put torn-write guarantee from G1P intact (memory
// project_golang_lakehouse.md: "Single Put eliminates the torn-write
// class").
maxPutBytesVectors = 4 << 30 // 4 GiB
// Vector-persistence prefix matched against incoming PUT keys. Keep
// this in sync with internal/vectord/persistor.go's lhv1KeyFor.
vectorsPrefix = "_vectors/"
maxConcurrentPut = 4 // 4-slot semaphore on in-flight PUTs
retryAfterSecs = "5" // Retry-After header on 503
maxPutBytes = 256 << 20 // 256 MiB per Qwen Q1 fix
maxConcurrentPut = 4 // 4-slot semaphore on in-flight PUTs
retryAfterSecs = "5" // Retry-After header on 503
primaryBucket = "primary"
)
// maxPutBytesFor returns the body-cap to apply to a PUT for the given
// key. Vectord LHV1 persistence (under "_vectors/") gets the larger
// cap; everything else stays at the default. Function-level so a
// future operator-driven cap (env, config) can drop in cleanly.
func maxPutBytesFor(key string) int64 {
if strings.HasPrefix(key, vectorsPrefix) {
return maxPutBytesVectors
}
return maxPutBytesDefault
}
func main() {
configPath := flag.String("config", "lakehouse.toml", "path to TOML config")
secretsPath := flag.String("secrets", "/etc/lakehouse/secrets-go.toml", "path to secrets TOML (Go-side; Rust uses /etc/lakehouse/secrets.toml)")
@ -210,14 +181,15 @@ func (h *handlers) handlePut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
// Per-key body cap. Vectord LHV1 persistence under "_vectors/"
// gets a 4 GiB cap; everything else keeps 256 MiB. Up-front
// Content-Length check first per Opus C3 review (manager.Uploader's
// multipart path can bury *http.MaxBytesError in its own error
// types); MaxBytesReader + string-match fallback below cover
// chunked / lying-CL cases.
cap := maxPutBytesFor(key)
if r.ContentLength > cap {
// Up-front Content-Length cap. Per Opus C3 review: the
// manager.Uploader's multipart path runs body reads in goroutines
// and wraps errors in its own types, so *http.MaxBytesError can be
// buried by the time it reaches us — meaning bodies just over the
// 5 MiB multipart threshold could surface as 500 instead of 413.
// Catching Content-Length up front returns 413 deterministically
// when the client honestly declares size; MaxBytesReader + the
// string-match fallback below cover chunked / lying-CL cases.
if r.ContentLength > maxPutBytes {
w.Header().Set("Retry-After", retryAfterSecs)
http.Error(w, "payload too large", http.StatusRequestEntityTooLarge)
return
@ -236,11 +208,11 @@ func (h *handlers) handlePut(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
return
}
// Per-key body cap as MaxBytesReader so chunked-encoding bodies
// also fail-loud at the limit. Defer LIFO order: r.Body.Close
// fires before <-h.putSem, so the body is fully drained before
// the slot frees.
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, cap)
// 256 MiB per-request body cap. Reads beyond this surface as
// *http.MaxBytesError; for chunked-encoding bodies that's the only
// signal we get. Defer LIFO order: r.Body.Close fires before
// <-h.putSem, so the body is fully drained before the slot frees.
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxPutBytes)
defer r.Body.Close()
bucket, err := h.reg.Resolve(primaryBucket)

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@ -1,10 +1,6 @@
package main
import (
"testing"
"git.agentview.dev/profit/golangLAKEHOUSE/internal/vectord"
)
import "testing"
func TestValidateKey(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
@ -40,57 +36,3 @@ func TestValidateKey(t *testing.T) {
})
}
}
func TestMaxPutBytesFor(t *testing.T) {
// Vectord LHV1 persistence gets the larger cap so single-file
// indexes above ~150K vectors at d=768 (the 500K staffing test
// gap) can survive a Save without 413. Default cap stays at
// 256 MiB for everything else (parquets, manifests, etc.).
cases := []struct {
name string
key string
want int64
}{
{"vectord LHV1 file", "_vectors/workers_500k.lhv1", maxPutBytesVectors},
{"vectord nested", "_vectors/some/nested/index.lhv1", maxPutBytesVectors},
{"parquet under datasets/", "datasets/workers/abc.parquet", maxPutBytesDefault},
{"catalog manifest", "_catalog/manifests/foo.bin", maxPutBytesDefault},
{"plain key", "x.txt", maxPutBytesDefault},
{"empty key", "", maxPutBytesDefault},
{"key with vectors-ish substring (not prefix)", "datasets/_vectors/x", maxPutBytesDefault},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := maxPutBytesFor(tc.key)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("maxPutBytesFor(%q) = %d, want %d", tc.key, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
// TestVectorPrefixSyncWithVectord locks the prefix value to vectord's
// VectorPrefix constant. If a future refactor renames either side,
// this test surfaces the drift before vectord saves silently bypass
// the larger cap.
func TestVectorPrefixSyncWithVectord(t *testing.T) {
if vectorsPrefix != vectord.VectorPrefix {
t.Errorf("storaged vectorsPrefix=%q out of sync with vectord.VectorPrefix=%q",
vectorsPrefix, vectord.VectorPrefix)
}
}
// TestVectorCapAccommodates500KStaffingTest reads the documented gap
// (memory project_golang_lakehouse.md): "storaged 256 MiB PUT cap
// blocks single-file LHV1 persistence above ~150K vectors at d=768."
// 500K vectors at d=768 with HNSW graph overhead is approximately
// 4.5 GiB resident, ~700 MiB on disk after compression.
// 4 GiB cap covers more than the documented production workload.
func TestVectorCapAccommodates500KStaffingTest(t *testing.T) {
const fiveHundredKVectorsAtD768Disk = 700 << 20 // ~700 MiB conservative estimate
if maxPutBytesVectors < fiveHundredKVectorsAtD768Disk {
t.Errorf("maxPutBytesVectors=%d (%.0f MiB) below documented production "+
"workload of ~700 MiB for 500K vectors at d=768",
maxPutBytesVectors, float64(maxPutBytesVectors)/(1<<20))
}
}

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@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
package shared
import (
"fmt"
"log/slog"
"net"
"os"
"strings"
)
// requireLoopbackOrOverride enforces that the bind address is on the
// loopback interface unless an explicit env override is set. Closes
// the worst case of audit risk R-001 (queryd /sql + DuckDB + non-
// loopback bind = RCE-equivalent for anyone who can reach the port)
// without committing to an auth model.
//
// Override env: LH_<UPPER(serviceName)>_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK=1.
// When the override fires, we log a structured warn so the choice is
// auditable in production logs.
//
// Cases that pass:
// - 127.0.0.1, 127.x.y.z (the /8), [::1], localhost
// - explicit-override env set to "1"
//
// Cases that fail-loud:
// - 0.0.0.0, [::], any non-loopback IP
// - empty host ":port" (listens on all interfaces)
// - unparseable addr
//
// The function is also useful as a unit-testable predicate; callers
// that want to gate something other than Run can call it directly.
func requireLoopbackOrOverride(serviceName, addr string) error {
if isLoopbackAddr(addr) {
return nil
}
envKey := "LH_" + strings.ToUpper(serviceName) + "_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK"
if os.Getenv(envKey) == "1" {
slog.Warn("non-loopback bind allowed by env override",
"service", serviceName,
"addr", addr,
"env", envKey,
"hint", "audit risk R-001 — see reports/scrum/risk-register.md")
return nil
}
return fmt.Errorf("refusing non-loopback bind %q for %q "+
"(set %s=1 to override; see audit R-001)", addr, serviceName, envKey)
}
// isLoopbackAddr returns true iff addr's host portion is on the
// loopback interface. Covers IPv4 127.0.0.0/8, IPv6 ::1, and
// "localhost". Empty host (":port"), empty string, and any
// non-parseable addr return false.
func isLoopbackAddr(addr string) bool {
host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if err != nil {
// Unparseable shape — could be a bare hostname or wholly
// malformed. Rejecting protects against future changes that
// silently accept new shapes.
return false
}
if host == "" {
// ":port" listens on ALL interfaces — explicitly non-loopback.
return false
}
if host == "localhost" {
return true
}
ip := net.ParseIP(host)
if ip == nil {
// Hostname that isn't "localhost". We don't resolve DNS here
// (slow + misleading); reject so deploys must be explicit.
return false
}
return ip.IsLoopback()
}

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@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
package shared
import (
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
)
// Closes audit R-001's worst case (accidental non-loopback deploy)
// at the predicate layer. Run integration coverage lives in the
// existing smoke chain — this file proves the rules.
func TestIsLoopbackAddr(t *testing.T) {
cases := []struct {
name string
addr string
want bool
}{
// Pass cases — every shape we accept.
{"127.0.0.1 standard", "127.0.0.1:3214", true},
{"127.0.0.0/8 mid-range", "127.5.6.7:3214", true},
{"127.255.255.254 edge", "127.255.255.254:3214", true},
{"IPv6 loopback", "[::1]:3214", true},
{"localhost hostname", "localhost:3214", true},
// Reject cases — every shape that should fail-loud.
{"empty addr", "", false},
{"empty host (all interfaces)", ":3214", false},
{"explicit any IPv4", "0.0.0.0:3214", false},
{"explicit any IPv6", "[::]:3214", false},
{"public IPv4", "8.8.8.8:3214", false},
{"private LAN IPv4", "192.168.1.176:3214", false},
{"hostname (not localhost)", "myhost.example.com:3214", false},
{"missing port", "127.0.0.1", false},
{"garbage", "not an addr", false},
}
for _, tc := range cases {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got := isLoopbackAddr(tc.addr)
if got != tc.want {
t.Errorf("isLoopbackAddr(%q) = %v, want %v", tc.addr, got, tc.want)
}
})
}
}
func TestRequireLoopback_AcceptsLoopback(t *testing.T) {
if err := requireLoopbackOrOverride("queryd", "127.0.0.1:3214"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("loopback should pass without env, got %v", err)
}
if err := requireLoopbackOrOverride("vectord", "[::1]:3215"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("IPv6 loopback should pass, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestRequireLoopback_RejectsNonLoopback(t *testing.T) {
cases := []string{
"0.0.0.0:3214",
":3214",
"192.168.1.176:3214",
}
for _, addr := range cases {
t.Run(addr, func(t *testing.T) {
err := requireLoopbackOrOverride("queryd", addr)
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("expected error on %q without override, got nil", addr)
}
// Error message should cite the override env so operators
// can quickly see how to opt in if intentional.
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "LH_QUERYD_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK") {
t.Errorf("error should cite override env, got %q", err.Error())
}
// And reference R-001 so the audit trail is explicit.
if !strings.Contains(err.Error(), "R-001") {
t.Errorf("error should cite R-001, got %q", err.Error())
}
})
}
}
func TestRequireLoopback_OverrideEnvAllowsNonLoopback(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LH_QUERYD_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK", "1")
if err := requireLoopbackOrOverride("queryd", "0.0.0.0:3214"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("override should permit non-loopback, got %v", err)
}
}
func TestRequireLoopback_OverrideEnvOnlyApplies_ExactValue1(t *testing.T) {
// "true", "yes", anything else != "1" should NOT trigger the
// override. Strict matching prevents silent acceptance of typos.
cases := []string{"true", "yes", "TRUE", "01", " 1", ""}
for _, val := range cases {
t.Run("val="+val, func(t *testing.T) {
t.Setenv("LH_QUERYD_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK", val)
err := requireLoopbackOrOverride("queryd", "0.0.0.0:3214")
if err == nil {
t.Fatalf("override value %q should NOT permit non-loopback", val)
}
})
}
}
func TestRequireLoopback_EnvIsPerService(t *testing.T) {
// Setting queryd's override should NOT affect vectord. Each binary
// must opt in explicitly so a single-service exposure decision
// doesn't silently apply to others.
t.Setenv("LH_QUERYD_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK", "1")
// queryd allowed:
if err := requireLoopbackOrOverride("queryd", "0.0.0.0:3214"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("queryd should be allowed, got %v", err)
}
// vectord still rejected:
if err := requireLoopbackOrOverride("vectord", "0.0.0.0:3215"); err == nil {
t.Error("vectord should still be rejected — env is per-service")
}
}
// Sanity: the env override variable name composition. If anyone ever
// renames the prefix or casing, every cmd/<svc>/main.go behavior breaks.
func TestRequireLoopback_OverrideEnvName(t *testing.T) {
// Make sure the env we expect users to set actually triggers the
// path. Helps catch a refactor that changes the prefix without
// updating docs.
defer os.Unsetenv("LH_GATEWAY_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK")
os.Setenv("LH_GATEWAY_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK", "1")
if err := requireLoopbackOrOverride("gateway", "0.0.0.0:3110"); err != nil {
t.Errorf("gateway override env should work, got %v", err)
}
}

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@ -47,16 +47,7 @@ type RegisterRoutes func(r chi.Router)
// want their own slog.Default() should set it before calling Run.
// (Per Kimi review #4: shared library functions shouldn't silently
// mutate package globals.)
//
// Refuses to bind a non-loopback address unless the
// LH_<SERVICE>_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK=1 env is set — closes the accidental
// 0.0.0.0 deploy path for R-001 (queryd /sql is RCE-equivalent off
// loopback, but the gate applies to every binary uniformly).
func Run(serviceName, addr string, register RegisterRoutes) error {
if err := requireLoopbackOrOverride(serviceName, addr); err != nil {
return err
}
logger := slog.New(slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{
Level: slog.LevelInfo,
}))