package shared import ( "fmt" "log/slog" "net" "os" "strings" ) // requireLoopbackOrOverride enforces that the bind address is on the // loopback interface unless an explicit env override is set. Closes // the worst case of audit risk R-001 (queryd /sql + DuckDB + non- // loopback bind = RCE-equivalent for anyone who can reach the port) // without committing to an auth model. // // Override env: LH__ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK=1. // When the override fires, we log a structured warn so the choice is // auditable in production logs. // // Cases that pass: // - 127.0.0.1, 127.x.y.z (the /8), [::1], localhost // - explicit-override env set to "1" // // Cases that fail-loud: // - 0.0.0.0, [::], any non-loopback IP // - empty host ":port" (listens on all interfaces) // - unparseable addr // // The function is also useful as a unit-testable predicate; callers // that want to gate something other than Run can call it directly. func requireLoopbackOrOverride(serviceName, addr string) error { if isLoopbackAddr(addr) { return nil } envKey := "LH_" + strings.ToUpper(serviceName) + "_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK" if os.Getenv(envKey) == "1" { slog.Warn("non-loopback bind allowed by env override", "service", serviceName, "addr", addr, "env", envKey, "hint", "audit risk R-001 — see reports/scrum/risk-register.md") return nil } return fmt.Errorf("refusing non-loopback bind %q for %q "+ "(set %s=1 to override; see audit R-001)", addr, serviceName, envKey) } // requireAuthOnNonLoopback closes the audit's R-001 + R-007 worst // case: any binary that's deployed off-loopback MUST have an auth // token configured. An off-loopback bind without auth is the literal // "queryd /sql is RCE-equivalent" failure mode. // // Pairs with requireLoopbackOrOverride: that gate refuses non-loopback // bind unless an explicit env override fires; this gate refuses the // same bind unless auth.token is also set. Together they make the // worst case mechanically impossible. func requireAuthOnNonLoopback(serviceName, addr string, auth AuthConfig) error { if isLoopbackAddr(addr) { return nil } if auth.Token != "" { return nil } return fmt.Errorf("refuse non-loopback bind %q for %q without auth.token configured "+ "(R-001 + R-007 — see ADR-003)", addr, serviceName) } // isLoopbackAddr returns true iff addr's host portion is on the // loopback interface. Covers IPv4 127.0.0.0/8, IPv6 ::1, and // "localhost". Empty host (":port"), empty string, and any // non-parseable addr return false. func isLoopbackAddr(addr string) bool { host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) if err != nil { // Unparseable shape — could be a bare hostname or wholly // malformed. Rejecting protects against future changes that // silently accept new shapes. return false } if host == "" { // ":port" listens on ALL interfaces — explicitly non-loopback. return false } if host == "localhost" { return true } ip := net.ParseIP(host) if ip == nil { // Hostname that isn't "localhost". We don't resolve DNS here // (slow + misleading); reject so deploys must be explicit. return false } return ip.IsLoopback() }