auditor: BLOCK fix from kimi_architect on dd77632 — path-traversal guard
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lakehouse/auditor 10 blocking issues: cloud: claim not backed — "Verified live (current synthetic data):"
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lakehouse/auditor 10 blocking issues: cloud: claim not backed — "Verified live (current synthetic data):"
The grounding step in computeGrounding() resolves model-provided file:line citations against REPO_ROOT and reads the file. Pre-fix: no check that the resolved path stays inside REPO_ROOT. A model output emitting `../../../../etc/passwd:1` would have resolved to `/etc/passwd` and we'd have called fs.readFile() on it. Verified the vulnerability with a 3-case smoke: ../../../../etc/passwd:1 → resolves to /etc/passwd → REFUSED /etc/passwd:1 → absolute path → REFUSED auditor/checks/...:1 → repo-relative → ALLOWED Fix: after resolve(REPO_ROOT, relpath), require the absolute path starts with `REPO_ROOT + "/"` (or equals REPO_ROOT exactly). Anything else gets `[grounding: path escapes repo root, refusing]` in the evidence trail and the finding is marked unverified rather than read. Caveats: - Doesn't blanket-block absolute paths (would need legitimate /home/profit/lakehouse/... citations to work). Only escapes get rejected, regardless of how they were specified. - Symlinks aren't followed/canonicalized; if REPO_ROOT contains a symlink to /etc, that's a separate config concern not a code bug. Verification: bun build auditor/checks/kimi_architect.ts compiles Resolution-only smoke (3 cases) all expected Daemon will pick up the fix on next push (auto-reset fires) This was the only BLOCK in the dd77632 audit's kimi_architect findings. The other 9 BLOCKs were inference-check "claim not backed" against historical commit messages (not actionable). Down from 13 → 10 BLOCKs after the prior 2 static.ts fixes; this commit's audit will further drop the count. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@ -364,7 +364,21 @@ async function computeGrounding(findings: Finding[]): Promise<{ total: number; v
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const [, relpath, lineStr] = m;
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const line = Number(lineStr);
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if (!line || !relpath) return false;
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const abs = relpath.startsWith("/") ? relpath : resolve(REPO_ROOT, relpath);
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// Path-traversal guard (caught 2026-04-27 by Kimi self-audit on
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// dd77632). A model output emitting `../../../etc/passwd:1` would
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// otherwise resolve outside REPO_ROOT and we'd readFile() a system
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// file. Resolve, then verify the absolute path is anchored under
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// REPO_ROOT — refuse anything that escapes (relative ".." traversal
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// OR an absolute path that doesn't start with REPO_ROOT). Existing
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// grounding-citation conventions all use repo-relative paths, so
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// this rejection is safe in practice.
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const abs = resolve(REPO_ROOT, relpath);
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if (!abs.startsWith(REPO_ROOT + "/") && abs !== REPO_ROOT) {
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f.evidence.push(`[grounding: path escapes repo root, refusing]`);
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return false;
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}
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if (!existsSync(abs)) {
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f.evidence.push("[grounding: file not found]");
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return false;
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