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root
76cb5acb03 phase 1.6: add consent-record endpoint POST /biometric/subject/{id}/consent (Gate 2 backend) 
Backs the candidate-facing consent flow specified in
docs/policies/consent/biometric_consent_template_v1.md §5. Without
this endpoint, no production code path could flip
consent.biometric.status from NeverCollected/Pending to Given —
meaning every photo upload would fail-closed at the consent gate
(403 consent_required) forever, even after counsel signs the
template. This unblocks the post-cutover intake flow.

Endpoint shape:
- POST /biometric/subject/{candidate_id}/consent
- Auth: legal-tier (X-Lakehouse-Legal-Token header)
- Body (JSON): {consent_version_hash, consent_collection_method,
  consent_collection_evidence_path?, operator_of_record}
- consent_collection_method constrained to closed set:
  electronic_signature / paper / click_acceptance — operator
  typo would silently weaken evidentiary defensibility
- consent_version_hash recorded but not gated against allowlist
  at runtime (avoids config-deployment dependency for v2 template
  rotation; counsel validates retroactively against
  consent_versions table)

State-machine semantics (mirrors upload's double-upload guard):
- NeverCollected / Pending → Given (happy path)
- Given → 409 consent_already_given (re-collect requires explicit
  erase + fresh grant under new template version)
- Withdrawn / Expired → 409 consent_post_withdrawal_requires_erase
  (explicit erase preserves audit-chain ordering of the cycle)
- Subject status Withdrawn / Erased / RetentionExpired → 403

Server-side authoritative timestamps:
- given_at = Utc::now() (operator-supplied would be tamperable)
- retention_until = given_at + 540 days (18 months per retention
  schedule v1 §4). If counsel changes the cap, schedule doc + code
  constant CONSENT_RETENTION_DAYS change in the same PR.

Audit row:
- accessor.kind = "biometric_consent_grant"
- accessor.purpose = "version=<hash>;method=<m>;operator=<op>;evidence=<path>"
- fields_accessed = ["consent.biometric.status",
                     "consent.biometric.retention_until"]
- result = "given"
- Transactional: manifest commit before audit append; rollback
  manifest if audit fails.

Tests added (12 new):
- consent_happy_path_flips_status_and_records_audit (full happy
  path + audit row inspection + retention_until math)
- consent_missing_token_rejected
- consent_wrong_token_rejected
- consent_subject_not_found_returns_404
- consent_missing_version_hash_400
- consent_missing_method_400
- consent_invalid_method_400
- consent_missing_operator_400
- consent_already_given_returns_409
- consent_post_withdrawal_requires_erase_returns_409
- consent_subject_inactive_returns_403
- consent_grant_then_upload_is_the_intended_intake_flow
  (end-to-end: grant → upload → verify chain has 2 rows
  consent_grant→biometric_collection in correct order, upload
  row chains off the grant's hmac)

71/71 catalogd lib tests + gateway crate compile clean.

Live verification post-restart:
- /audit/health + /biometric/health both 200
- Live POST returns 400 on missing/malformed body, 404 on ghost
  subject — auth + body parse + subject lookup ordering verified
- strings(target/release/gateway) contains: record_consent symbol,
  biometric_consent_response.v1, biometric_consent_grant,
  consent_already_given, consent_post_withdrawal_requires_erase,
  electronic_signature, /subject/{candidate_id}/consent route

Production posture: gateway running with the new endpoint live.
The candidate-facing consent UI is NOT yet built; that is a
separate session. This endpoint is the backend the UI will call.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-05 13:21:12 -05:00
root
b2c34b80b3 phase 1.6: lock Gate 3b = C, reconcile docs to shipped state, fix double-upload file leak 
Four threads landing together — all driven by the audit J asked for before
production cutover.

(1) Gate 3b DECIDED: Option C (defer classifications). `BiometricCollection.classifications`
    stays `Option<JSON> = None` in v1. `docs/specs/GATE_3B_DEEPFACE_DESIGN.md` status
    flipped from "draft / awaits product" to DECIDED. Consent template + retention
    schedule revised to remove all "automated facial-classification" / "deepface"
    language so disclosed scope matches implemented scope.

(2) Endpoint-path drift reconciled across 3 docs. `PHASE_1_6_BIPA_GATES.md`,
    `BIPA_DESTRUCTION_RUNBOOK.md`, and `biometric_retention_schedule_v1.md` had
    references to legacy `/v1/identity/subjects/*` paths (proposed under a separate
    identityd daemon, never shipped) — corrected to actual shipped routes
    `/biometric/subject/*` (catalogd-local). Schema block in PHASE_1_6_BIPA_GATES
    rewritten to reflect JSON `SubjectManifest.biometric_collection` substrate
    (not the proposed Postgres `subjects` table).

(3) New operational artifacts:
    - `scripts/staffing/verify_biometric_erasure.sh` — checks 4 things post-erasure
      (manifest cleared, uploads dir empty, audit row matches, chain verified).
      Smoke-tested live against WORKER-2.
    - `scripts/staffing/biometric_destruction_report.sh` — monthly anonymized
      destruction-event aggregation. Smoke-tested clean.
    - `scripts/staffing/bundle_counsel_packet.sh` — tarballs the counsel-review
      packet with per-file SHA-256 manifest.
    - `docs/runbooks/LEGAL_AUDIT_KEY_ROTATION.md` — formal rotation procedure
      operationalized after the 2026-05-05 /tmp wipe incident.
    - `docs/counsel/COUNSEL_REVIEW_PACKET_2026-05-05.md` — cover note bundling
      all eng-staged BIPA docs for counsel review with per-doc questions, sign-off
      checklist, recommended review sequence.

(4) Double-upload file leak fixed in `crates/catalogd/src/biometric_endpoint.rs`.
    `verify_biometric_erasure.sh` smoked WORKER-2 and surfaced a stranded photo
    file. Investigation showed the file was 13-byte test-fixture bytes (zero PII,
    no biometric content); audit timeline showed two consecutive uploads followed
    by one erasure — the second upload had silently overwritten manifest.data_path,
    orphaning the first file. Patched `process_upload` to refuse a second upload
    with HTTP 409 + `error: "biometric_already_collected"` when
    `biometric_collection.is_some()` on the manifest. Operator must explicitly
    POST `/biometric/subject/{id}/erase` first.

    Tests: new `second_upload_without_erase_returns_409` (asserts 409 + manifest
    pointer unchanged + first file untouched on disk). Replaced
    `repeated_uploads_grow_the_chain` with `upload_erase_upload_grows_the_chain_cleanly`
    (covers the legitimate re-collection cycle: chain grows to 3 rows). Updated
    `content_type_with_parameters_accepted` to use 2 distinct subjects (was
    using 1 subject with 2 uploads to test ct parsing — would now 409).

    22/22 biometric_endpoint tests + 59/59 catalogd lib tests green post-patch.

Production posture: gateway needs `cargo build --release -p gateway` +
`systemctl restart lakehouse.service` to pick up the new 409 in live traffic.

Counsel calendar is now the only remaining blocker for first real-photo intake.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-05 06:19:40 -05:00
root
848a4583da phase 1.6 Gate 5: erasure endpoint POST /biometric/subject/{id}/erase 
Per docs/runbooks/BIPA_DESTRUCTION_RUNBOOK.md. BIPA-defensible
erasure: clears biometric collection (and optionally full PII record),
unlinks the photo file, records the destruction in the per-subject
HMAC chain. The audit row is the legal proof of compliant destruction
even after the underlying data is gone.

Two scopes:
  biometric_only (default): clears biometric_collection field, unlinks
    the photo, sets consent.biometric.status = withdrawn. Subject
    remains active.
  full: above PLUS sets status = erased and consent.general_pii.status
    = withdrawn. Manifest preserved (proof of destruction); subject
    record is logically erased.

Triggers (recorded but not validated against a closed set):
  retention_expiry | consent_withdrawal | rtbf | court_order

Body shape:
  {
    "trigger": "<token>",
    "trigger_evidence_path": "<optional path>",
    "operator_of_record": "<name>",
    "witness": "<name>",
    "scope": "biometric_only|full"
  }

Response (biometric_erase_response.v1):
  candidate_id, scope, trigger, erased_at, fields_cleared,
  photo_unlinked, photo_unlink_error, status_after,
  biometric_status_after, general_pii_status_after, audit_row_hmac

Order matters for BIPA defensibility:
  1. Snapshot original manifest (rollback target)
  2. Update manifest (logical erasure)
  3. Append audit row (LEGAL proof of intent + scope + operator)
  4. Best-effort secure overwrite + unlink photo file (irreversible last)

If audit append fails, manifest is rolled back to original state and
500 returned — the alternative (manifest erased without legal record)
is exactly the silent-failure mode the spec exists to prevent.

If photo unlink fails AFTER audit commits, the response carries
photo_unlinked=false + the error string; operator must manually shred.
Tracing logs the inconsistency loudly.

Tests: 21 unit tests now pass (10 erasure-specific):
  - missing token / missing subject / 404
  - missing trigger / missing operator / invalid scope (400)
  - biometric_only happy path (file unlinked, fields cleared, audit kind=biometric_erasure)
  - full scope (status=Erased, general_pii withdrawn, audit kind=full_erasure)
  - idempotent on already-erased (audit row records "already_erased" result)
  - no-photo case (photo_unlinked=true with no unlink error)
  - chain links off prior audit row's row_hmac (NOT GENESIS)

Live verification (post-restart):
  - POST /biometric/subject/WORKER-2/erase with consent_withdrawal trigger
    → 200 with all expected fields_cleared + photo_unlinked=true
  - Manifest reflects: biometric_collection=null, consent.biometric.status=withdrawn
  - GET /audit/subject/WORKER-2: chain_verified=true, 4 rows total,
    latest kind=biometric_erasure with operator + trigger in purpose field
  - Cross-runtime parity probe: 6/6 byte-identical post-change

Known follow-up (separate bug): photo upload endpoint overwrites
biometric_collection without handling a prior file's data_path —
multiple uploads for the same candidate orphan earlier files. The
erasure endpoint correctly unlinks what the manifest knows about;
operator must shred orphans manually until the upload endpoint
either rejects re-upload (preferred) or maintains a list.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 05:23:54 -05:00
root
7e0112beb7 retention_sweep: fix stray indent on biometric_collection field 
Cosmetic — the field was added correctly during the BiometricCollection
substrate landing (commit f1fa6e4) but a batch sed left it misindented.
Tests still pass (8/8); only the formatting was off.
 2026-05-03 05:16:49 -05:00
root
3708e6abf1 biometric endpoint: scrum-driven hardening 
Per 2026-05-03 phase_1_6_gate_3a scrum (10 findings, 0 convergent
location-wise but opus + kimi flagged the same audit-failure issue).

Convergent + load-bearing fix:
  Audit-write failure was silently swallowed (returned 200 with empty
  hmac) after photo + manifest persisted. For BIPA defensibility this
  is wrong — a successful response without an audit row is exactly
  the silent-failure mode the spec exists to prevent. Now: full
  transactional rollback. If audit append fails after photo + manifest
  commit, we remove the photo AND revert the manifest to its
  pre-upload state, then return 500 with error="audit_write_failed".

Other real fixes:

  Orphan-file leak (opus WARN): if put_subject fails AFTER the photo
  is written, the file would orphan on disk with no manifest pointer.
  Now removes the photo on manifest-update failure, before returning 500.

  Content-Type parameter handling (opus WARN): real-world clients send
  `image/jpeg; charset=binary` etc. Parser now strips parameters per
  RFC 9110 §8.3 and matches case-insensitively. New regression test
  content_type_with_parameters_accepted exercises both.

  data_path doc/code mismatch (opus WARN): doc said "relative to the
  configured biometric storage root" but code stored absolute path.
  Now stores relative — operators reading the manifest reconstruct
  the absolute path with their own storage_root, manifests are
  portable across deployments. Tests updated.

  Timestamp-nanosecond collision (kimi WARN): added 8-char uuid
  suffix to filename. Sub-microsecond cadence collision was implausible
  but defense-in-depth is cheap.

  Dead code (opus + kimi INFO): removed unused require_legal_auth
  function (process_upload reimplements the auth check inline)
  and the `let _ = ConsentStatus::Given;` no-op type-shape reference.

Skipped (acceptable in v1):
  - qwen BLOCK on image format validation: spec explicitly says "we
    trust the caller; malformed images fail downstream when deepface
    runs in Gate 3b". Documented in the file's module doc-comment.
  - qwen WARN on directory create-then-chmod race: brief window
    between create_dir_all and set_permissions. Mitigation would
    require libc-level umask manipulation; accepted as v1 scope.
  - qwen INFO on constant_time_eq duplication: comment explains the
    cross-import boundary; acceptable short-term per the reviewer.

Tests: 11 unit tests pass (added content_type_with_parameters_accepted).
Live verification post-restart:
  - Content-Type with `; charset=binary` accepted ✓
  - data_path returned as relative `WORKER-2/<ts>_<uuid>.jpg` ✓
  - Chain verified end-to-end (3 rows: validator + 2 biometric) ✓
  - Cross-runtime parity probe still 6/6 byte-identical ✓

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 05:05:12 -05:00
root
f1fa6e4e61 phase 1.6 Gate 3a: photo upload endpoint with consent gate 
Per docs/PHASE_1_6_BIPA_GATES.md §1 Gate 3 (consent-gate substrate).
Deepface classification (Gate 3b) deferred to its own session — needs
Python subprocess design conversation after the 2026-05-02 sidecar drop.

What ships:

  shared/types.rs:
    - new BiometricCollection sub-struct: data_path, template_hash,
      collected_at, consent_version_hash, classifications (Option<JSON>)
    - SubjectManifest gains biometric_collection: Option<BiometricCollection>
      with #[serde(default)] so existing on-disk manifests parse and
      re-emit without drift

  catalogd/biometric_endpoint.rs (NEW, ~600 LOC):
    POST /subject/{candidate_id}/photo
      - Auth: X-Lakehouse-Legal-Token, constant-time-eq compared against
        same legal token file as /audit. Same 32-byte minimum.
      - Content-Type: must be image/jpeg or image/png (415 otherwise)
      - Body: raw image bytes, max 10MB
      - 401: missing or wrong token
      - 404: subject not registered
      - 403: consent.biometric.status != "given" (returns current status)
      - 403: subject status in {Withdrawn, Erased, RetentionExpired}
      - 200: writes photo to data/biometric/uploads/<sanitized_id>/<ts>.<ext>
        with mode 0700 dir + 0600 file, updates SubjectManifest with
        BiometricCollection record, appends audit row
        (kind="biometric_collection", purpose="photo_upload"), returns
        UploadResponse with template_hash + audit_row_hmac.

    Logic split: pure async fn process_upload() takes the headers-as-args
    so unit tests exercise every branch without HTTP machinery; the
    axum handler is just glue. 10 tests covering all 4 reject paths +
    happy path + repeated uploads chaining + structural assertion that
    the quarantine path is NOT under data/headshots/ (synthetic faces).

  gateway/main.rs:
    Mounts /biometric on the same condition as /audit — only when the
    SubjectAuditWriter is present AND the legal token loads. Storage
    root configurable via LH_BIOMETRIC_STORAGE_ROOT (default
    ./data/biometric/uploads).

Live verification on the running gateway (post-restart):
  - GET  /biometric/health          → "biometric endpoint ready"
  - POST without token              → 401 auth_failed
  - POST with token, no consent     → 403 consent_required (status=NeverCollected)
  - Flipped WORKER-2 to consent=given, POST → 200 with hash + path
  - File at data/biometric/uploads/WORKER-2/<ts>.jpg, mode 0600
  - Manifest biometric_collection field reflects the upload
  - Audit row chain links cleanly off the prior validator_lookup row
  - GET /audit/subject/WORKER-2 returns chain_verified=true, 2 rows
  - Cross-runtime parity probe still 6/6 byte-identical post-change

Phase 1.6 status table updated: Gate 3a DONE, Gate 3b (deepface)
deferred. Calendar bottleneck remains counsel review of items 1/2/5/6.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 04:55:32 -05:00
root
2222227c16 catalogd parity helper: scrum-driven hardening 
Per 2026-05-03 step_7_8_retention_and_parity scrum (opus). 5 findings,
0 convergent — but two real fixes shipped:

1. WARN parity_subject_audit.rs:argv — replace .expect() panics with
   stderr+exit(2). The parity script captures stdout for byte-compare;
   a Rust panic backtrace lands in stdout (script merges 2>&1) and
   reads as a parity break instead of a usage error. Added die() helper
   that mirrors the Go side's error-exit pattern.

2. INFO parity_subject_audit.rs:5 — doc comment hardcoded the absolute
   path /home/profit/golangLAKEHOUSE/... Replaced with repo-relative
   reference.

INFO findings on retention_sweep argv style + --as-of report path
overwrite were noted but not actioned (style only / acceptable for
the forecast use case).

The major scrum-surfaced bug (Go json.Marshal HTML-escaping <>& while
serde_json keeps them literal) is fixed on the Go side in parallel
commit. Rust side here is correct as-is — serde_json::to_vec doesn't
HTML-escape by default, so no change needed in canonical_json.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 04:29:38 -05:00
root
2413c96817 catalogd: Step 8 — parity_subject_audit binary (Rust side) 
Per docs/specs/SUBJECT_MANIFESTS_ON_CATALOGD.md §5 Step 8.

Cross-runtime parity helper consumed by:
  golangLAKEHOUSE/scripts/cutover/parity/subject_audit_parity.sh

Two modes:

  --known-answer
    Print canonical-JSON + HMAC for a hardcoded fixture row. The Go
    helper at golangLAKEHOUSE/scripts/cutover/parity/subject_audit_helper/
    must produce byte-identical output. Catches algorithm drift
    (canonical-JSON sort order, HMAC algorithm, hex encoding).

  --verify <audit_log_path> --key <key_path>
    Replay the chain on a real production audit log via the live
    SubjectAuditWriter::verify_chain (no re-implementation; the actual
    production verification path). Output: one JSON line with mode,
    count, tip, verified, error.

The helper exercises the SAME verify_chain path the gateway calls, so
algorithm changes in subject_audit.rs automatically flow into the
parity probe.

Live-verified against 5 production audit logs in data/_catalog/subjects;
all 6 parity assertions pass after fixing two real cross-runtime drifts
on the Go side (omitempty trace_id stripping field; time.RFC3339Nano
stripping trailing zero in nanoseconds — both caught by this probe).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 04:16:50 -05:00
root
8fc6238dea catalogd: Step 7 — daily retention sweep binary 
Per docs/specs/SUBJECT_MANIFESTS_ON_CATALOGD.md §5 Step 7:
  "Subjects whose retention.general_pii_until < now AND status != erased
   get marked for review (don't auto-delete; legal needs to approve)."

Per shared::types::BiometricConsent doc-comment (BIPA requirement on
biometric data, max 3 years from last interaction):
  "Implementation MUST enforce daily expiration sweep against this field."

Therefore the sweep checks BOTH retention clocks. Reports overdue
subjects to data/_catalog/subjects/_retention_sweep_<YYYY-MM-DD>.jsonl.

Idempotent: subjects already in {Erased, RetentionExpired} are skipped
so daily runs do not append duplicate rows.

Does NOT mutate subject manifests. Legal/operator owns the action
(extend, flip status, schedule erasure).

CLI:
  retention_sweep                       # dry-run (default), stderr only
  retention_sweep --apply               # also write JSONL report
  retention_sweep --as-of <RFC3339>     # alternate clock for forecast/test
  retention_sweep --storage-root <dir>  # default ./data

Tests: 8 unit tests on is_overdue covering all 5 SubjectStatus values,
both clocks, BIPA-only path, and idempotency on already-flagged
subjects.

Live verification (100 subjects in ./data/_catalog/subjects):
  - now (2026-05-03): 0 overdue (correct — 4-year retention)
  - --as-of 2031-06-01: 100 overdue, 394 days past, jsonl report shape
    verified with biometric fields correctly omitted via
    serde skip_serializing_if when subject has no biometric clock.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 04:05:03 -05:00
root
2a4b316a15 subjects: 2nd scrum fix wave (token min, chain_tip, tampering, rebuild collision warn) 
Second cross-lineage scrum on Steps 5+6 returned 13 distinct findings, 0 convergent.
Three BLOCK-class claims verified as false positives (cache IS written, per-subject
Mutex IS in place, spawn IS safe under writer's lock). Five real fixes shipped:

1. audit_endpoint: legal token min length 16->32 (HMAC-SHA256 best practice, kimi)
2. subject_audit: new chain_tip() returns last hash from full log; audit_endpoint
   now reports chain_root from full chain instead of windowed slice (opus)
3. registry: rebuild loader now warns on sanitize collision (symmetric with
   put_subject's collision guard - opus)
4. audit_endpoint: tampering detection - if manifest expects non-empty chain_root
   but log returns 0 rows, flag chain_verified=false with explicit message (opus)
5. execution_loop::audit_result_state: tightened heuristic - error/denied/not_found
   only classify when no rows/data/results sibling (opus INFO)

Tests: 17 catalogd subject + 6 gateway audit_result_state, all green.
New: audit_result_state_does_not_classify_error_when_data_sibling_present,
     audit_result_state_status_is_authoritative_even_with_data.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 04:00:42 -05:00
root
15cfd76c04 catalogd + gateway: Step 6 — /audit/subject/{id} legal-tier HTTP endpoint 
Implementation of docs/specs/SUBJECT_MANIFESTS_ON_CATALOGD.md §5 Step 6
+ §4 (response shape) + §6 (auth model). The defense-against-EEOC-
discovery surface is live: legal counsel hits one URL with one token,
gets back a signed-by-HMAC-chain audit response naming every PII access
for a subject in a time window.

New module: crates/catalogd/src/audit_endpoint.rs (~340 LOC)
  - AuditEndpointState { registry, writer, legal_token }
  - router() exposes:
      GET /subject/{candidate_id}?from=ISO&to=ISO  (full audit response)
      GET /health                                    (liveness + token check)
  - require_legal_auth() — constant-time-eq compare against the
    X-Lakehouse-Legal-Token header. Avoids timing leaks on the token
    check without pulling in `subtle` for one comparison.
  - Token loaded from /etc/lakehouse/legal_audit.token (env-overridable
    via LH_LEGAL_AUDIT_TOKEN_FILE). Empty file or <16 chars = endpoint
    serves 503 with a clear reason. Token value NEVER logged.
  - Response schema: subject_audit_response.v1 with manifest +
    audit_log (rows + chain verification) + datasets_referenced +
    safe_views_available + completeness_attestation.

New helper on SubjectAuditWriter:
  - read_rows_in_range(candidate_id, from, to) — returns rows in window,
    used by the endpoint to assemble the response without re-reading
    the entire chain.
  - verify_chain() now returns Ok(0) when the audit log file doesn't
    exist (empty = trivially valid). Prevents legitimate "no PII access
    yet for this subject" from showing as integrity=BROKEN in the
    audit response. Caller can detect "log was deleted" via comparison
    to SubjectManifest.audit_log_chain_root (when that mirror lands).

main.rs:
  - Audit endpoint mounted at /audit ONLY when both subject_audit
    writer AND legal token are present. Disabled-by-default keeps the
    surface from accidentally serving in dev/bring-up environments
    without proper credentials.

Tests (9/9 passing):
  - constant_time_eq (correctness on equal/diff/empty/length-mismatch)
  - missing_legal_token_returns_503
  - missing_header_returns_401
  - wrong_token_returns_401
  - correct_token_passes_auth
  - audit_response_assembly_full_path (manifest + 3 rows + chain verify)
  - audit_response_window_filters_rows (time-bounded window)
  - empty_token_file_results_in_disabled_endpoint
  - short_token_file_rejected_at_load (<16 char min)

LIVE end-to-end verification:
  1. Plant signing key + legal token in /tmp/lakehouse_audit/
  2. Restart gateway with LH_SUBJECT_AUDIT_KEY + LH_LEGAL_AUDIT_TOKEN_FILE
     pointing at the test files
  3. /audit/health → 200 "audit endpoint ready"
  4. /audit/subject/WORKER-1 (no token) → 401 "missing X-Lakehouse-Legal-Token"
  5. /audit/subject/WORKER-1 (wrong token) → 401 "X-Lakehouse-Legal-Token mismatch"
  6. /audit/subject/WORKER-1 (correct token) → 200 + full manifest + 0 rows
     + chain_verified=true (empty log path)
  7. POST /v1/validate with candidate_id=WORKER-1 → triggers WorkerLookup.find()
     via the AuditingWorkerLookup wrapper from Step 5
  8. data/_catalog/subjects/WORKER-1.audit.jsonl now exists with 1 row
     (accessor.purpose=validator_worker_lookup, result=not_found,
     prev_chain_hash=GENESIS, valid HMAC)
  9. /audit/subject/WORKER-1 (correct token) → 200 + manifest + 1 row +
     chain_verified=true + chain_rows_total=1 + completeness attestation

The full audit-trail loop (PII access → audit row → chain → audit response)
works end-to-end on the live gateway.

NOT in this commit (future steps):
  - Step 7: Daily retention sweep
  - Step 8: Cross-runtime parity (Go side reads the same shapes)
  - Mirror chain root to SubjectManifest.audit_log_chain_root after
    each append (so tampering detection can use the manifest's
    cached root as ground truth)
  - Live row projection from datasets (currently caller follows up
    via /query/sql against the safe_views named in the response)
  - Ed25519 signature on the response (chain verification IS the v1
    attestation; signing is future hardening per spec §10)

cargo build --release clean. cargo test -p catalogd audit_endpoint
9/9 PASS. Live verification successful.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 03:52:04 -05:00
root
cd8c59a53d gateway: Step 5 — wire SubjectAuditWriter into validator WorkerLookup 
Implementation of docs/specs/SUBJECT_MANIFESTS_ON_CATALOGD.md §5 Step 5.
Every WorkerLookup.find() call from the validator path now produces
one audit row in the per-subject HMAC-chained JSONL. Failures are
non-blocking — validator continues whether audit succeeds or fails.

Approach: decorator pattern. WorkerLookup is a sync trait by design
(validator's contract is "in-memory snapshot, no per-call I/O") and
audit writes are async, so we can't expand the trait. Instead, a
new AuditingWorkerLookup wraps the inner lookup, captures a
tokio::runtime::Handle at construction, and spawns audit writes from
sync find() onto that handle. The chain stays intact under spawn fan-
out because the writer's per-subject Mutex (shipped in the previous
scrum-fix commit) serializes same-subject appends regardless of how
the spawn calls arrive.

Files changed:

  crates/gateway/src/v1/auditing_worker_lookup.rs (NEW, 175 LOC):
    - AuditingWorkerLookup<inner: dyn WorkerLookup, audit: Option<Arc<Writer>>>
    - new() captures Tokio Handle if audit is Some
    - find() runs inner lookup, then spawns audit append with:
        accessor.kind = "validator_lookup"
        accessor.purpose = "validator_worker_lookup"
        fields_accessed = ["exists"] (validator only proves existence
                          of a subject; downstream code reads policy
                          fields separately and would have its own
                          audit if those become PII)
        result = "success" if found, "not_found" otherwise
    - Audit-disabled path (audit: None) is a transparent passthrough
      — zero overhead, no panic, no runtime requirement.

  crates/gateway/src/v1/mod.rs:
    + pub mod auditing_worker_lookup;

  crates/gateway/src/main.rs:
    - Hoisted subject_audit_writer construction OUT of the V1State
      literal (declaration-order constraint: validate_workers needs
      access to the writer). The hoisted Arc is then reused for the
      V1State.subject_audit field.
    - validate_workers now wraps the raw lookup with
      AuditingWorkerLookup::new(raw, subject_audit_writer.clone())

Tests (4/4 passing):
  - find_existing_subject_writes_success_audit_row
  - find_missing_subject_writes_not_found_audit_row (phantom-id case)
  - audit_disabled_means_no_writes_no_overhead (None pathway)
  - many_finds_to_same_subject_produce_intact_chain (30 sequential
    spawns on the same subject — chain verifies all 30, regression
    against the race we fixed in catalogd subject_audit)

Also catches the iterate.rs:324 phantom-ID check transparently —
that codepath calls state.validate_workers.find(...) which now goes
through the wrapper, so every phantom-id rejection logs an audit row
for free.

NOT in this commit (future steps):
  - Step 6: /audit/subject/{id} HTTP endpoint
  - Step 7: Daily retention sweep
  - Threading X-Lakehouse-Trace-Id from request through to audit row
    (currently audit row's accessor.trace_id is empty)

cargo build --release clean. cargo test -p gateway auditing_worker_lookup
4/4 PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 03:43:40 -05:00
root
e38f3573ff subject manifests Steps 1-4 — fix scrum-flagged BLOCKs and WARNs 
2026-05-03 cross-lineage scrum on the subjects_steps_1_to_4 wave
returned 14 distinct findings, 0 convergent. opus verdict was HOLD
with 3 BLOCKs around the audit-chain integrity. All real. Fixed:

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
BLOCK 1 — opus subject_audit.rs:172 + execution_loop.rs:391
  Concurrency race: append_line is read-modify-write; the gateway
  hook used tokio::spawn fan-out → two concurrent appends to the
  same subject both read the same prev_hash, both compute their
  HMAC from the same prev, second write silently overwrites first
  → row lost AND chain broken.

  Fix:
  - SubjectAuditWriter gains per-subject Mutex map. append() acquires
    the subject's lock for the duration of the read-modify-write.
    Different subjects still parallelize.
  - Gateway hook switches from tokio::spawn to inline await. Per-row
    cost is ~1ms (one object_store put); inline is correct AND cheap.
  - New regression test: 50 concurrent appends to the same subject,
    asserts all 50 land with intact chain.

BLOCK 2 — opus subject_audit.rs:108
  Non-deterministic canonicalization: serde_json serializes struct
  fields in declaration order. Schema evolution (adding/reordering
  fields) silently changes the bytes verify_chain hashes → chain
  breaks even when nothing was actually tampered with.

  Fix:
  - New canonical_json() free fn — recursive value rewrite to sort
    object keys alphabetically (BTreeMap projection), arrays preserve
    order, scalars pass through. Stable across struct evolution.
  - Both append() and verify_chain() now compute HMAC over canonical
    bytes, not declaration-order bytes.
  - New regression tests: alphabetical-key + array-order-preserved.

WARN — opus execution_loop:401
  Audit row's `result` was hardcoded to "success" for every Ok(result)
  including payloads like {"error":"not found"}. Misleads compliance.

  Fix:
  - New audit_result_state() free fn that inspects the payload
    top-level for error/denied/not_found/status signals (per spec
    §3.2 enum). Defaults to "success" only when no error signal.
  - 4 new tests covering each enum case + falsy-signals defense.

WARN — opus registry.rs:735
  Storage-key collision: sanitize_view_name(id) is the disk key,
  but the in-memory HashMap was keyed by raw candidate_id. Two
  distinct ids that sanitize to the same key (e.g. "CAND/1" and
  "CAND_1") would collide on disk while appearing distinct in
  memory; second put silently overwrites first; rebuild loads only
  one.

  Fix:
  - put_subject() / get_subject() / delete_subject() / rebuild()
    all key the in-memory HashMap by sanitize_view_name(id), matching
    the storage key shape.
  - Collision guard: put_subject() refuses (with clear error) when
    the sanitized key matches an EXISTING subject with a DIFFERENT
    raw candidate_id.
  - New regression test: put("CAND/1") then put("CAND_1") errors
    + first subject survives.

WARN — opus backfill_subjects.rs:189
  trim_start_matches strips REPEATED prefixes; the spec wanted
  one-shot semantics. Edge case unlikely in practice but real.

  Fix:
  - Switched to strip_prefix(&prefix).unwrap_or(&cid). One-shot.

INFO — opus subject_audit.rs:131
  Per-byte format!("{:02x}", b) allocates each iteration. Hot path
  on every append.

  Fix:
  - Replaced with const HEX lookup table + push() into preallocated
    String. Same output bytes, no per-byte allocation.

──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
Test summary post-fix:
  catalogd subject_audit: 11/11 PASS (added 4 new — concurrency
                          race regression, parallel-different-subjects,
                          canonical-key sort, canonical-array order)
  catalogd registry subject: 6/6 PASS (added 1 new — collision guard)
  gateway execution_loop subject: 10/10 PASS (added 4 new —
                          audit_result_state enum coverage)

  All 27 subject-related tests green. cargo build --release clean.

The convergent-zero scrum result was misleading on its face — opus
caught real BLOCKs that kimi/qwen missed. Per
feedback_cross_lineage_review.md: opus is the load-bearing reviewer;
single-opus BLOCKs warrant manual verification, which here confirmed
all three were correct.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 03:37:45 -05:00
root
fef1efd2ac gateway: Step 4 — wire SubjectAuditWriter into tool dispatch 
Implementation of docs/specs/SUBJECT_MANIFESTS_ON_CATALOGD.md §5 Step 4.
Every tool result that returns rows referencing a subject now produces
audit rows in the per-subject HMAC-chained JSONL. Failures non-blocking.

Changes:

v1/mod.rs:
  + V1State.subject_audit: Option<Arc<SubjectAuditWriter>>
    (None when key file missing — audit becomes a no-op with warning,
    PII paths still serve)

main.rs:
  + Construct SubjectAuditWriter at startup from
    LH_SUBJECT_AUDIT_KEY env or /etc/lakehouse/subject_audit.key.
    Missing/short key = log warning + leave None (gateway boots, audit
    disabled). Same store as the rest of catalogd.

execution_loop/mod.rs:
  + audit_subject_hits_in() — called after every successful tool
    dispatch. Walks the result JSON, finds candidate_id / worker_id
    fields, fires one SubjectAuditRow per (subject, fields) pair.
    Tokio::spawn so audit latency never adds to tool path.
  + collect_subject_hits() — free fn, recursive JSON walker. Handles:
      "candidate_id":"X"  → audit candidate_id="X"
      "worker_id":42      → audit candidate_id="WORKER-42" (matches
                              backfill convention)
      "worker_id":"42"    → audit candidate_id="WORKER-42" (string form)
    Other fields in the same object become fields_accessed (so audit
    row records "this access surfaced name + phone for candidate X").
    Ignores objects without id fields. Skips empty id strings. Recurses
    through nested objects + arrays.

Tests (6/6 passing — gateway::collect_subject_hits_*):
  - finds_candidate_id_strings (basic case + fields_accessed extraction)
  - prefixes_worker_id_int (int → WORKER-N)
  - handles_worker_id_string (string → WORKER-N)
  - recurses_through_nested_objects (joins / mixed payloads)
  - ignores_objects_without_id_fields (no false positives)
  - skips_empty_id_strings (defensive)

Per spec §3.2: failures are logged, never propagated. Better to leak
an audit row than block a tool response. Operators monitor warning
volume to detect audit-write regressions.

NOT in this commit (future steps):
  - Step 5: Wire validator WorkerLookup similarly (each candidate_id
    resolved by FillValidator gets an audit row)
  - Step 6: /audit/subject/{id} HTTP endpoint
  - Step 7: Daily retention sweep
  - Mirror chain root to SubjectManifest.audit_log_chain_root after
    each append (currently the chain is verifiable via verify_chain()
    even without the manifest mirror; the mirror is an optimization)
  - Thread X-Lakehouse-Trace-Id from request through to audit row

cargo build --release clean. cargo test -p gateway collect_subject_hits
6/6 PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 03:29:24 -05:00
root
bce6dfd1ee catalogd: Step 3 — backfill_subjects binary (BIPA-defensible defaults) 
Implementation of docs/specs/SUBJECT_MANIFESTS_ON_CATALOGD.md §5 Step 3.
Reads a parquet source, creates one SubjectManifest per row with the
spec-defined safe defaults, persists via Registry::put_subject().

Defaults baked in (per spec §2 + §5 Step 5):
  - vertical = unknown                     (HIPAA fail-closed)
  - consent.general_pii = pending_backfill_review  (NOT inferred_existing — BIPA defense)
  - consent.biometric  = never_collected   (no biometric data backfilled)
  - retention.general_pii_until = now + 4 years
  - retention.policy = "4_year_default"

Conservative ergonomics:
  - --limit 1000 by default. --all to do the full source.
  - --dry-run for parse + count + sample without writes.
  - --concurrency 32 (bounded via tokio::sync::Semaphore).
  - Idempotent: skips subjects that already exist in catalog.
  - Progress reports every ~5% (or 5K rows, whichever smaller).

Live verification on workers_500k.parquet:
  --limit 100 dry-run:  parsed 100 rows, sampled WORKER-1..5, 0 writes ✓
  --limit 100 commit:   100 inserted, 0 failed, 100 files in
                        data/_catalog/subjects/ ✓
  --limit 100 re-run:   0 inserted, 100 skipped (idempotent) ✓

Sample manifest (data/_catalog/subjects/WORKER-1.json):
  {
    "schema": "subject_manifest.v1",
    "candidate_id": "WORKER-1",
    "status": "active",
    "vertical": "unknown",
    "consent": {
      "general_pii": {"status": "pending_backfill_review", ...},
      "biometric":   {"status": "never_collected",         ...}
    },
    "retention": {"general_pii_until": "2030-05-02T...", "policy": "4_year_default"},
    "datasets": [{"name": "workers_500k", "key_column": "worker_id", "key_value": "1"}]
  }

NOT in this commit (future steps):
  - Step 4: Wire gateway tool registry to write audit rows on every
    candidate_id returned (uses SubjectAuditWriter from Step 2)
  - Step 5: Wire validator WorkerLookup similarly
  - Step 6: /audit/subject/{id} HTTP endpoint
  - Step 7: Daily retention sweep
  - Backfill the full 500K (operator decision: --all when ready;
    note: 500K JSON files in one dir will slow startup load — may
    want SQLite/single-file backend before that scale)

Operator note: backfill is run-once. To extend to candidates table,
re-run with --dataset candidates --key-column candidate_id (no prefix
since candidate_id is already the canonical token there).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 03:22:54 -05:00
root
d16131bcab catalogd: Step 2 — SubjectAuditWriter with HMAC chain 
Implementation of docs/specs/SUBJECT_MANIFESTS_ON_CATALOGD.md Step 2.
Per-subject append-only audit JSONL with HMAC-SHA256 chain. Local-first
— no Vault, no external anchor (those are v2 if SOC2 Type II becomes
contract-required; v1 deliberately stays small).

shared/types.rs additions:
- AuditAccessor — kind, daemon, purpose, trace_id
- SubjectAuditRow — schema/ts/candidate_id/accessor/fields_accessed/
  result/prev_chain_hash/row_hmac

crates/catalogd/src/subject_audit.rs (NEW):
- SubjectAuditWriter — holds signing key + per-subject latest-hash cache
- from_key_file() — loads key from sealed file, requires ≥32 bytes
- with_inline_key() — for tests + bring-up
- append() — computes HMAC chain link, persists JSONL row, returns new
  chain root (caller mirrors to SubjectManifest.audit_log_chain_root)
- verify_chain() — full re-verification of a subject's audit log,
  catches both prev_hash drift AND row-level HMAC tampering
- scan_latest_hash() — cold-start path, finds prev_hash from JSONL tail
- append_line() — read-modify-write pattern (object stores have no
  native append; same shape as the rest of catalogd's persistence)

Crypto: HMAC-SHA256 via the standard `hmac` crate (added to workspace
+ catalogd deps; not implementing crypto by hand). Output is lowercase
hex matching the rest of the codebase's SHA-256 conventions.

Security choices:
- NO Debug impl on SubjectAuditWriter — auto-deriving Debug would risk
  leaking the signing key into log lines. Tests work around this by
  matching on Result instead of using .unwrap_err().
- Key min length 32 bytes (HMAC-SHA256 block size guidance).
- Failures are NOT swallowed — Result returned, caller decides whether
  to log + continue (per spec §3.2 the gateway tool registry SHOULD
  log + continue rather than block reads).

Tests (7/7 passing):
- first_append_uses_genesis_prev_hash
- chain_links_each_append (3-row chain verifies)
- separate_subjects_have_independent_chains (per-subject isolation)
- tamper_detected_on_verify (mutation in middle of chain breaks verify)
- cold_writer_picks_up_existing_chain (process restart preserves chain)
- empty_candidate_id_rejected
- key_too_short_rejected_via_file

NOT in this commit (future steps):
- Step 3: Backfill ETL from workers_500k.parquet (next per J)
- Step 4: Wire gateway tool registry to call append() on every
  candidate_id returned by search_candidates / get_candidate
- Step 5: Wire validator WorkerLookup similarly
- Step 6: /audit/subject/{id} HTTP endpoint
- Step 7: Daily retention sweep
- Mirroring chain root to SubjectManifest.audit_log_chain_root
  (separate concern; do at the call site)

cargo check --workspace clean. cargo test -p catalogd subject_audit
7/7 PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 03:19:18 -05:00
root
d25990982c catalogd: Step 1 — SubjectManifest type + Registry CRUD 
Implementation of docs/specs/SUBJECT_MANIFESTS_ON_CATALOGD.md Step 1.
Mirrors the existing AiView put/get/list/delete pattern. NOT a separate
daemon, NOT new infrastructure — extends catalogd's manifest layer with
a fourth manifest type (subject) alongside dataset/view/tombstone/profile.

shared/types.rs additions:
- SubjectManifest (the wire format from spec §2)
- SubjectStatus enum: pending_consent | active | withdrawn |
  retention_expired | erased
- SubjectVertical enum: unknown | general | healthcare | finance | other
  (default = Unknown for fail-closed routing per spec §2.1)
- ConsentStatus enum: pending_backfill_review | pending_first_contact |
  given | withdrawn | expired
- BiometricConsentStatus enum: never_collected | pending | given |
  withdrawn | expired
- GeneralPiiConsent + BiometricConsent + SubjectConsent
- SubjectRetention (general_pii_until + policy)
- SubjectDatasetRef (name + key_column + key_value pointing at existing
  catalogd dataset manifests)

catalogd/registry.rs additions:
- subjects: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, SubjectManifest>>> field on Registry
- put_subject() — validates dataset refs, persists to
  _catalog/subjects/<id>.json, updates in-memory cache
- get_subject() / list_subjects() / delete_subject() / subjects_count()
- rebuild() now loads subject manifests at startup alongside views +
  profiles + tombstones

Tests (5/5 passing):
- put_subject_with_no_dataset_refs_succeeds
- put_subject_rejects_dangling_dataset_ref (validation works)
- put_subject_with_valid_dataset_ref_succeeds
- subject_round_trips_through_object_store (persistence works)
- delete_subject_removes_in_memory_and_persistence

NOT in this commit (future steps):
- Step 2: SubjectAuditWriter with HMAC chain
- Step 3: Backfill ETL from workers_500k.parquet
- Steps 4-5: Wire gateway tool registry + validator to write audit rows
- Step 6: /audit/subject/{id} HTTP endpoint
- Step 7: Daily retention sweep

cargo check --workspace clean. cargo test -p catalogd subject 5/5 PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 03:13:08 -05:00
root
bb5a3b3f5e execution_loop: align overseer log/KB strings with reverted local route 
Yesterday's revert (d054c0b) changed the API CALL from cloud to local
but missed the LogEntry + KB row that record what model fired. Result:
honest API call to qwen3.5:latest, dishonest log/KB rows saying
"claude-opus-4-7". That's a real audit-trail integrity issue — the
record didn't match reality.

Fixed:
- LogEntry "system" role label (line 663)
- KB row's "model" field (line 685)

Both now correctly show "qwen3.5:latest". Build + restart + smoke
10/10 green. Gateway healthy.

Side note: the only remaining "claude-opus-4-7" mentions in this file
are now in COMMENTS describing the v1 cloud route + the revert
rationale — those are documentation, not log fields. Safe to keep.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 02:03:06 -05:00
root
d054c0b8b1 REVERT cloud routing on hot path — back to local Ollama per PRD line 70 
PRD line 70: "Everything runs locally — no cloud APIs, total data privacy."
Yesterday's PR #13 (feb638e) violated this by routing customer-facing
inference paths to opencode + ollama_cloud + openrouter. Reverting the
hot-path routes only; cloud providers stay configured in providers.toml
for explicit dev-tool opt-in.

Reverted:
- modes.toml staffing_inference: kimi-k2.6 → qwen3.5:latest (local Ollama)
- modes.toml doc_drift_check: gemini-3-flash-preview → qwen3.5:latest
- execution_loop overseer: opencode/claude-opus-4-7 → ollama/qwen3.5:latest
  Was a paid Anthropic call on every overseer escalation; now local + free.

Gateway compiles + restarts clean. Lance smoke 10/10. Live providers list
unchanged (kimi/ollama_cloud/opencode/openrouter all still CONFIGURED;
they just aren't ROUTED to from the staffing inference path anymore).

This stops the API meter on customer requests. Cloud providers remain
opt-in via explicit provider= caller hint, which the scrum tool +
auditor pipeline + bot/propose use deliberately.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 01:57:20 -05:00
root
e9d17f7d5a sanitize: drop over-broad path-missing branch + UTF-8-safe redaction 
Re-scrum of yesterday's sanitizer fix surfaced 2 more real bugs in the
fix itself (opus, both WARN, neither caught by kimi/qwen):

W1 (service.rs:1949) — `mentions_path_missing` standalone branch was
too aggressive. A registry-internal error like "/root/.cargo/.../x.rs:
no such file or directory" would 404 because it triggers without
dataset context. That's a real 500. Dropped the standalone branch;
require dataset context AND missing-shape phrase. Lance's actual
"Dataset at path X was not found" still satisfies it.

W2 (service.rs:2018) — `out.push(bytes[i] as char)` corrupted
multi-byte UTF-8 by casting raw bytes to char (only sound for ASCII
< 128). A path containing user-supplied non-ASCII names produced
Latin-1 mojibake. Rewrote redact_paths to track byte indices and
emit unmatched runs as &str slices via push_str(&s[range]) — preserves
multi-byte sequences verbatim. Step advance is now per-char, not
per-byte, via small utf8_char_len helper.

Two new regression tests:
- is_not_found_does_not_match_unrelated_path_missing
- redact_preserves_multibyte_utf8 (uses 工作 + café in input)

12/12 sanitize tests PASS. Smoke 10/10 PASS. Loop closure for opus
re-scrum on the 2026-05-02 fix bundle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 00:15:23 -05:00
root
ac7c996596 sweep up scrum WARNs — model const, stale config, temp_path entropy, smoke gate 
Four findings deferred from the 2026-05-02 scrum, all 1-5 line fixes:

W1 (kimi WARN @ scrum_master_pipeline.ts:1143) — `gemini-3-flash-preview`
hardcoded twice in MAP and REDUCE phases. Extracted TREE_SPLIT_MODEL +
TREE_SPLIT_PROVIDER constants near the existing config block. Diverging
the two would break tree-split coherence (per-shard digests must come
from the same model the reducer collapses).

W2 (qwen WARN @ providers.toml:30) — stale `kimi-k2:1t` reference in
operator-facing comments after PR #13 noted it's upstream-broken. Reframed
as historical context ("was X here pre-2026-05-03 — that model is broken")
so future operators don't paste-route from the comment.

W3 (opus WARN @ vectord-lance/src/lib.rs:622) — temp_path() entropy was
only pid+nanos, which collide under tokio scheduling when multiple tests
in the same cargo process create temp dirs back-to-back. Added per-process
AtomicU64 sequence counter — guarantees uniqueness regardless of clock.

W4 (opus INFO @ scripts/lance_smoke.sh:38) — `|| echo '{}'` swallowed
curl transport failures (gateway down, network broken, timeout), surfacing
as misleading "no method field" jq errors at the next probe. Now captures
$? separately, gates a "curl reachable" probe, and only falls back to
empty body for the dependent jq parse. Smoke went 9 → 10 probes.

Verified: vectord-lance 7/7 tests PASS, gateway cargo check clean,
lance_smoke.sh 10/10 PASS against live gateway.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-03 00:11:59 -05:00
root
7bb66f08c3 lance: scrum-driven sanitizer + smoke-gate fixes (opus 2026-05-02 BLOCK)
Some checks failed
lakehouse/auditor 9 blocking issues: cloud: claim not backed — "Verified live (post-restart): scale_test_10m doc-fetch 4-15ms across"
Cross-lineage scrum on the lance wave (4 bundles, 33 distinct findings)
surfaced 1 real BLOCK and 2 real WARNs from opus that the kimi/qwen
lineages missed. Per feedback_cross_lineage_review.md, opus is the
load-bearing reviewer; cross-lineage convergence is noise unless verified.

BLOCK fix — sanitize_lance_err path-stripping was unsound:
  err.split("/home/").next().unwrap_or(&err)
returns Some("") when err STARTS with "/home/", erasing the entire
message. Replaced truncation with redact_paths() — a hand-rolled scanner
that walks the input once, replacing path-shaped substrings with
[REDACTED] while preserving surrounding error context. Catches:
- absolute paths under /root/.cargo, /home, /var, /tmp, /etc, /usr, /opt
- relative variants (Lance occasionally strips leading slash —
  observed live "Dataset at path home/profit/lakehouse/data/lance/x
  was not found")
- multiple occurrences in one error
- preserves quote/comma/whitespace terminators

WARN fix #1 — is_not_found heuristic was too broad:
  lower.contains("not found")
caught real 500s like "column not found", "field not found in schema".
Narrowed to require dataset-shape phrasing AND exclude the
column/field/schema patterns explicitly.

WARN fix #2 — lance_smoke.sh `grep -qvE` was an unsound regression gate.
  bash -c "echo '$BODY' | grep -qvE 'pat'"
With -v -q, exits 0 if ANY line lacks the pattern — so a multi-line
body with one leak line + any clean line FALSE-PASSES. Replaced with
the correct "pattern absent" form: `! grep -qE 'pat'`. Also expanded
the pattern set (added /var/, /tmp/) since the scrum surfaced these
as additional leak vectors.

Also unblocks pre-existing pathway_memory test compile error (stale
PathwayTrace init missing 6 Mem0-versioning fields added in 6ac7f61).
Tests filled in with sensible defaults — needed to run sanitize_tests.

10/10 new sanitize tests pass. Smoke 9/9 PASS against rebuilt+restarted
gateway. Live missing-index probe now returns:
  "lance dataset not found: no-such-11205" + HTTP 404
(was: leaked absolute paths + HTTP 500 → leaked absolute and relative
paths post-first-fix → clean message + 404 now.)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 23:34:54 -05:00
root
044650a1da lance-bench: also build doc_id btree post-IVF — match gateway's migrate behavior 
The bench's own measure_random_access_lance uses take(row_position) —
doesn't need the btree. But datasets written by this bench are commonly
queried via /vectors/lance/doc/<name>/<doc_id> downstream, and without
the btree that path falls back to a full table scan. Building inline
keeps bench-produced datasets immediately production-shape and removes
a footgun (the same one that made scale_test_10m's doc-fetch ~100ms
until commit 5d30b3d fixed it via the migrate handler path).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 22:19:16 -05:00
root
5d30b3da89 lance: auto-build doc_id btree in migrate handler (root-cause for 10M doc-fetch slowness) 
scale_test_10m doc-fetch p50 was ~100ms — full table scan over 35GB. Root
cause: the auto-build at service.rs:1492-1503 only fires for IndexMeta-
registered indexes during set_active_profile warming. lance-bench writes
datasets through /vectors/lance/migrate/* directly, bypassing IndexMeta,
so its datasets never get the doc_id btree that ADR-019 depends on.

Fix: build the btree inline at the end of lance_migrate. Costs ~1.2s on
10M rows (+269MB on disk), drops doc-fetch from ~100ms to ~5ms (20x).
Failure is non-fatal — logs a warning and the dataset stays queryable.

Verified live (post-restart): scale_test_10m doc-fetch 4-15ms across
5 calls, smoke 9/9 PASS, vectord-lance 7/7 unit tests PASS.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 21:38:00 -05:00
root
7594725c25 lance backend: 4-pack — bug fix + smoke + tests + 10M re-bench
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Surfaced by the 2026-05-02 audit (vectord-lance + lance-bench + glue
existed and worked but had no tests, no smoke, leaked server paths
on missing-index search, and the ADR-019 10M re-bench was deferred).

## 1. Fix: missing-index search returned 500 + leaked filesystem path

Pre-fix:
  $ POST /vectors/lance/search/no-such-index
  HTTP 500
  Dataset at path home/profit/lakehouse/data/lance/no-such-index was
  not found: Not found: home/profit/lakehouse/data/lance/no-such-index/
  _versions, /root/.cargo/registry/src/index.crates.io-...-1949cf8c.../
  lance-table-4.0.0/src/io/commit.rs:364:26, ...

Post-fix:
  HTTP 404
  lance dataset not found: no-such-index

Added `sanitize_lance_err()` in crates/vectord/src/service.rs that:
  - maps "not found" / "no such file" patterns → 404 (was 500)
  - strips /home/ and /root/.cargo/ paths from any error body
Applied to all 5 lance handlers: search, get_doc, build_index,
append, migrate. The store_for() handle is cheap-and-stateless;
the actual disk hit happens inside the operation, which is where
the leak originated.

## 2. scripts/lance_smoke.sh — first regression gate

9-probe smoke against the live HTTP surface. Exercises only read
paths (no state mutation in CI). Specifically locks the sanitizer
fix — a future regression that re-introduces the path leak fires
the smoke immediately. 9/9 PASS against the live :3100 today.

## 3. Unit tests on vectord-lance/src/lib.rs (was: zero tests)

7 tests covering the public LanceVectorStore API:
  - fresh_store_reports_no_state — handle is lazy
  - migrate_then_count_and_fetch — Parquet → Lance round-trip
  - get_by_doc_id_missing_returns_none — Ok(None) vs Err contract
    that lets the HTTP handler return 404 cleanly
  - append_grows_count_and_new_rows_fetchable — ADR-019's
    structural-difference claim verified at the unit level
  - append_dim_mismatch_errors — guards against silently breaking
    search by accepting inconsistent-dim rows
  - search_returns_nearest — exact-vector match → top-1
  - stats_reports_post_migrate_state — locks the field shape

7/7 PASS. cargo test -p vectord-lance --lib green.

## 4. 10M re-bench (deferred from ADR-019)

reports/lance_10m_rebench_2026-05-02.md captures the numbers driven
against the live :3100 over data/lance/scale_test_10m (33GB / 10M
vectors, IVF_PQ confirmed via response method tag).

Headline:
  Search cold (10 diverse queries):   median ~32ms, mean ~46ms
  Search warm (5x same query):        ~20ms p50
  Doc fetch (5x same id):             ~100ms p50

Search latency at 10M is acceptable for batch / async workloads,
too slow for sub-10ms voice/recommendation paths. ADR-019's "Lance
pulls ahead at 10M" claim remains unverified-but-not-refuted — at
this scale HNSW doesn't operationally exist (10M × 768d × 4 bytes =
30GB just for vectors).

Real finding: doc-fetch at 10M is 300x slower than the 100K number
ADR-019 cited (311μs → ~100ms). Likely cause: scalar btree index
on doc_id may not be built for this dataset. Follow-up to
investigate whether forcing build_scalar_index brings it back to
the load-bearing O(1) range. Captured in the report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 20:06:56 -05:00
root
98b6647f2a gateway: IterateResponse echoes trace_id + enable session_log_path
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Closes the 2026-05-02 cross-runtime parity gap: Go's
validator.IterateResponse carried trace_id back to callers; Rust's
didn't. A caller pivoting from response → Langfuse → session log
worked on Go but failed on Rust because the join key wasn't visible
in the response body.

## Changes

crates/gateway/src/v1/iterate.rs:
  - IterateResponse + IterateFailure gain `trace_id: Option<String>`
    (skip-serializing-if-none preserves backward-compat for any
    consumer parsing the response without the field)
  - Both return sites populated with the resolved trace_id

lakehouse.toml:
  - [gateway].session_log_path set to /tmp/lakehouse-validator/sessions.jsonl
    — same path Go validatord writes to. The two daemons now co-write
    one unified longitudinal log; rows tag daemon="gateway" vs
    daemon="validatord" so producers stay distinguishable in DuckDB
    queries. Append-write is atomic at the row sizes both runtimes
    produce, so concurrent writes from both daemons are safe.

## Verification

Post-restart of lakehouse.service:
  POST /v1/iterate with X-Lakehouse-Trace-Id: rust-fix1-test
    → response.trace_id = "rust-fix1-test" ✓ (was: field absent)
    → sessions.jsonl latest row daemon=gateway, session_id=rust-fix1-test ✓ (was: no row)

Cross-runtime drive — same prompt to Rust :3100 and Go :4110:
  Rust:  trace_id=unified-rust-001, daemon=gateway, accepted
  Go:    trace_id=unified-go-001,   daemon=validatord, accepted
  Same file, distinct daemons, one query covers both:
    SELECT daemon, COUNT(*) FROM read_json_auto('sessions.jsonl', format='nd') GROUP BY daemon
    → gateway: 2, validatord: 19

All 4 parity probes still 6/6 + 12/12 + 4/4 + 2/2 against live
:3100 + :4110 stacks. Cargo test 4/4 PASS for v1::iterate module.

## Architecture invariant

The "unified longitudinal log" thesis is now demonstrated. Operators
running both runtimes in production point both daemons at the same
session_log_path and DuckDB queries naturally span both producers.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 06:24:41 -05:00
root
57bde63a06 gateway: trace-id propagation + coordinator session JSONL (Rust parity)
Some checks failed
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Cross-runtime parity with the Go-side observability wave (commits
d6d2fdf + 1a3a82a in golangLAKEHOUSE). The two layers J flagged:
the LIVE per-call view (Langfuse) and the LONGITUDINAL forensic view
(JSONL queryable via DuckDB). Hard correctness gate (FillValidator
phantom-rejection) was already in place; this is the observability
on top.

## Trace-id propagation

X-Lakehouse-Trace-Id header constant declared in
crates/gateway/src/v1/iterate.rs (matches Go's shared.TraceIDHeader
byte-for-byte). When set on an inbound /v1/iterate request, the
handler reuses it; the chat + validate self-loopback hops forward
the same header so chatd's trace emit nests under the parent rather
than minting a fresh top-level trace per call.

ChatTrace gains a parent_trace_id field. emit_chat_inner skips the
trace-create event when parent is set, only emits the
generation-create which attaches to the existing trace tree. Result:
an iterate session with N retries shows in Langfuse as ONE tree, not
N+1 disconnected traces.

emit_attempt_span (new) writes one Langfuse span per iteration
attempt with input={iteration, model, provider, prompt} and
output={verdict, raw, error}. WARNING level on non-accepted
verdicts. The returned span id is stamped on the corresponding
SessionRecord attempt for cross-log correlation.

## Coordinator session JSONL

crates/gateway/src/v1/session_log.rs — new writer matching Go's
internal/validator/session_log.go schema byte-for-byte:
  - SessionRecord with schema=session.iterate.v1
  - SessionAttemptRecord per retry
  - SessionLogger.append: tokio Mutex serialized append-only
  - Best-effort posture (slog.Warn on error, never blocks request)

iterate.rs builds + appends a row on EVERY code path:
  - accepted: write_session_accepted with grounded_in_roster bool
    derived from validate_workers WorkerLookup (matches Go's
    handlers.rosterCheckFor("fill") semantics)
  - max-iter-exhausted: write_session_failure
  - infra-error: write_infra_error (so a missing /v1/iterate event
    never silently disappears from the longitudinal log)

[gateway].session_log_path config field (empty = disabled).
Production: /var/lib/lakehouse/gateway/sessions.jsonl. Operators who
want a unified longitudinal stream can point both Rust and Go
loggers at the same path — write-append is safe at the row sizes we
produce.

## Cross-runtime parity probe

crates/gateway/src/bin/parity_session_log: tiny stdin/stdout helper
that round-trips a fixture through SessionRecord serde.
golangLAKEHOUSE/scripts/cutover/parity/session_log_parity.sh feeds
4 fixtures through both helpers and diffs the rows after stripping
timestamp + daemon (the two fields that legitimately differ between
producers).

Result: **4/4 byte-equal** including the unicode-prompt fixture
("Café résumé ⭐ 你好"). Schema parity holds. The non-trivial-equal
guard in the probe rejects the case where both sides fail
identically — protecting against a regression where one side
silently stops producing valid JSON.

## Verification

- cargo test -p gateway --lib: 90/90 PASS (3 new session_log tests
  including concurrent-append safety)
- cargo check --workspace: clean
- session_log_parity.sh: 4/4 fixtures byte-equal
- Both runtimes can append to the same path; DuckDB sees one stream
- The Go-side validatord smoke remains 5/5 (unchanged)

## Architecture invariant

Don't propose to "wire trace-id propagation in Rust" or "add Rust
session log" — both are now shipped on the demo/post-pr11-polish
branch. The longitudinal log + Langfuse tree together cover the
multi-call observability concern J flagged 2026-05-02.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 05:39:29 -05:00
root
ba928b1d64 aibridge: drop Python sidecar from hot path; AiClient → direct Ollama
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The "drop Python sidecar from Rust aibridge" item from the
architecture_comparison decisions tracker. Universal-win cleanup —
removes 1 process + 1 runtime + 1 hop from every embed/generate
request, with no behavior change.

## What was on the hot path before

  gateway → AiClient → http://:3200 (FastAPI sidecar)
                          ├── embed.py    → http://:11434 (Ollama)
                          ├── generate.py → http://:11434
                          ├── rerank.py   → http://:11434 (loops generate)
                          └── admin.py    → http://:11434 (/api/ps + nvidia-smi)

The sidecar's hot-path code (~120 LOC across embed.py / generate.py /
rerank.py / admin.py) was pure pass-through: each route translated
its request body to Ollama's wire format and returned Ollama's
response in a sidecar envelope. Zero logic, one full HTTP hop of
overhead.

## What's on the hot path now

  gateway → AiClient → http://:11434 (Ollama directly)

Inline rewrites in crates/aibridge/src/client.rs:
- embed_uncached: per-text loop to /api/embed; computes dimension
  from response[0].length (matches the sidecar's prior shape)
- generate (direct path): translates GenerateRequest → /api/generate
  (model, prompt, stream:false, options:{temperature, num_predict},
  system, think); maps response → GenerateResponse using Ollama's
  field names (response, prompt_eval_count, eval_count)
- rerank: per-doc loop with the same score-prompt the sidecar used;
  parses leading number, clamps 0-10, sorts desc
- unload_model: /api/generate with prompt:"", keep_alive:0
- preload_model: /api/generate with prompt:" ", keep_alive:"5m",
  num_predict:1
- vram_snapshot: GET /api/ps + std::process::Command nvidia-smi;
  same envelope shape as the sidecar's /admin/vram so callers keep
  parsing
- health: GET /api/version, wrapped in a sidecar-shaped envelope
  ({status, ollama_url, ollama_version})

Public AiClient API is unchanged — Request/Response types untouched.
Callers (gateway routes, vectord, etc.) require zero updates.

## Config changes

- crates/shared/src/config.rs: default_sidecar_url() bumps to
  :11434. The TOML field stays `[sidecar].url` for migration compat
  (operators with existing configs don't need to rename anything).
- lakehouse.toml + config/providers.toml: bumped to localhost:11434
  with comments explaining the 2026-05-02 transition.

## What stays Python

sidecar/sidecar/lab_ui.py (385 LOC) + pipeline_lab.py (503 LOC) are
dev-mode Streamlit-shape UIs for prompt experimentation. Not on the
runtime hot path; continue running for ad-hoc work. The
embed/generate/rerank/admin routes inside sidecar can be retired,
but operators who want to keep the sidecar process running for the
lab UI face no breakage — those routes still call Ollama and work.

## Verification

- cargo check --workspace: clean
- cargo test -p aibridge --lib: 32/32 PASS
- Live smoke against test gateway on :3199 with new config:
    /ai/embed     → 768-dim vector for "forklift operator" ✓
    /v1/chat      → provider=ollama, model=qwen2.5:latest, content=OK ✓
- nvidia-smi parsing tested via std::process::Command path
- Live `lakehouse.service` (port :3100) NOT yet restarted — deploy
  step is operator-driven (sudo systemctl restart lakehouse.service)

## Architecture comparison update

(Captured separately in golangLAKEHOUSE/docs/ARCHITECTURE_COMPARISON.md
decisions tracker.) The "drop Python sidecar" line moves from _open_
to DONE. The Rust process model now has 1 mega-binary instead of
1 mega-binary + 1 sidecar process — a small but real reduction in
ops surface.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 04:59:47 -05:00
root
654797a429 gateway: pub extract_json + parity_extract_json bin (cross-runtime probe)
Some checks failed
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Supports the 2026-05-02 cross-runtime parity probe at
golangLAKEHOUSE/scripts/cutover/parity/extract_json_parity.sh which
feeds identical model-output strings through both runtimes' extract_json
and diffs results.

## Changes
- crates/gateway/src/v1/iterate.rs: extract_json gains `pub` + a
  comment pointing at the Go counterpart and the parity probe path
- crates/gateway/src/lib.rs: NEW thin lib facade re-exporting the
  modules so sub-binaries can reuse them. main.rs is unchanged
  (still uses local mod declarations)
- crates/gateway/src/bin/parity_extract_json.rs: NEW ~30-LOC binary
  that reads stdin, calls extract_json, prints {matched, value} JSON

## Probe result (logged in golangLAKEHOUSE)
12/12 match across fenced blocks, nested objects, unicode, escaped
quotes, top-level array, malformed JSON. Both runtimes' algorithms
are genuinely equivalent.

Substrate gate the probe enforces: `cargo test -p gateway extract_json`
PASS before any parity comparison runs. So a future divergence in
the live extract_json fires either as a Rust test failure (live
behavior changed) or a probe diff (Go behavior changed) — never
silently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-05-02 04:44:11 -05:00
root
150cc3b681 aibridge: LRU embed cache - 236x RPS gain on warm workloads. Per architecture_comparison.md universal-win for Rust side. Cache key (model,text), default 4096 entries, in-process inside gateway. Load test: 128 RPS -> 30k+ RPS, p50 78ms -> 129us.
Some checks failed
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 2026-05-01 04:45:20 -05:00
root
8de94eba08 cleanup: bump qwen2.5 → qwen3.5:latest in active defaults
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stronger local rung is now the small-model-pipeline tier-1 default
across both Rust legacy + Go rewrite (cf. golangLAKEHOUSE phase 1).
same JSON-clean property as qwen2.5, more capacity. ollama still
serves both side-by-side; rollback is a 4-line revert if a workload
regresses.

active-default sites:
- lakehouse.toml [ai] gen_model + rerank_model → qwen3.5:latest
- mcp-server/observer.ts diagnose call (Phase 44 /v1/chat path) → qwen3.5:latest
- mcp-server/index.ts model roster doc → qwen3.5:latest first
- crates/vectord/src/rag.rs ContinuableOpts + RagResponse.model → qwen3.5:latest

skipped: execution_loop/mod.rs comments describing historic qwen2.5
tool_call quirks — those are documentation of past behavior, not
active defaults. data/_catalog/profiles/*.json are runtime-generated
(gitignored), not in scope for tracked changes.

cargo check -p vectord: clean. no behavioral change in the audit
pipeline — same JSON-clean local model, same think=Some(false)
posture, just stronger upstream.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-30 00:10:57 -05:00
root
d475fc7fff infra: replace gpt-oss with Ollama Pro + OpenCode Zen across hot paths 
Ollama Pro plan went live today (39-model fleet on the same
OLLAMA_CLOUD_KEY) and OpenCode Zen was already wired in the gateway
but not consumed. Routing every gpt-oss call site to faster /
stronger replacements:

| Site | gpt-oss → replacement | Why |
|---|---|---|
| ollama_cloud default | gpt-oss:120b → deepseek-v3.2 | newest DeepSeek revision; live-probed `pong` |
| openrouter default | openai/gpt-oss-120b:free → x-ai/grok-4.1-fast | already the scrum LADDER's PRIMARY |
| modes.toml staffing_inference | openai/gpt-oss-120b:free → kimi-k2.6 | coding-specialized, on Ollama Pro |
| modes.toml doc_drift_check | gpt-oss:120b → gemini-3-flash-preview | speed leader for factual checks |
| scrum_master_pipeline tree-split MAP+REDUCE | gpt-oss:120b → gemini-3-flash-preview | latency-dominated path (5-20× per file) |
| bot/propose.ts CLOUD_MODEL | gpt-oss:120b → deepseek-v3.2 | same Ollama key, faster |
| mcp-server/observer.ts overseer label fallback | gpt-oss:120b → claude-opus-4-7 | matches new overseer model |
| crates/gateway/src/execution_loop overseer escalation | ollama_cloud/gpt-oss:120b → opencode/claude-opus-4-7 | frontier reasoning matters here — fires only after local self-correct fails twice; Zen pay-per-token cost is bounded |

Verification:
- `cargo check -p gateway --tests` — clean
- Live probes through localhost:3100/v1/chat:
  - `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` → "pong"
  - `gemini-3-flash-preview` (ollama_cloud) → "pong"
  - `kimi-k2.6` (ollama_cloud) → "pong"
  - `deepseek-v3.2` (ollama_cloud) → "Pong! 🏓"

Notes:
- kimi-k2:1t still upstream-broken (HTTP 500 on Ollama Pro probe today,
  matches yesterday's memory). Replacement table never picks it.
- The Rust changes need a `systemctl restart lakehouse.service` to
  take effect on the running gateway. TS callers reload on next run.
- aibridge/src/context.rs still has gpt-oss:{20b,120b} in its window-
  size lookup table; harmless and kept for callers that pass it
  explicitly as an override.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-28 06:13:30 -05:00
root
6366487b45 ops: persist runtime fixes — iterate.rs unused state, catalog cleanup 
Two load-bearing runtime changes that were never committed:

1. crates/gateway/src/v1/iterate.rs — `state` → `_state` on the unused
   route-state parameter. Cleared the one cargo workspace warning.
   Fix was made earlier this session but the working-tree change
   never made it into a commit.

2. data/_catalog/manifests/564b00ae-cbf3-4efd-aa55-84cdb6d2b0b7.json —
   DELETED. This was the dead manifest for `client_workerskjkk`, a
   typo dataset whose parquet was deleted but whose catalog entry
   stayed registered. Every SQL query failed schema inference on the
   missing file before reaching its target table — that's the bug
   that made /system/summary report 0 workers and the demo show zero
   bench. Deleting the manifest keeps the fix on disk; committing
   the deletion keeps it in git so a fresh checkout doesn't regress.

3. data/_catalog/manifests/32ee74a0-59b4-4e5b-8edb-70c9347a4bf3.json
   — runtime catalog metadata update from the successful_playbooks_live
   write path. Ride-along change.

Reports under reports/distillation/phase[68]-*.md are auto-regenerated
by the audit cycle each run; skipping those.
 2026-04-28 06:01:04 -05:00
root
6ed48c1a69 gateway+validator: /v1/health reports honest worker count for production
Some checks failed
lakehouse/auditor 12 blocking issues: cloud: claim not backed — "Verified live (current synthetic data):"
Adds `fn len() -> usize` (default 0) to the WorkerLookup trait. The
InMemoryWorkerLookup overrides with HashMap size; ParquetWorkerLookup
constructs an InMemoryWorkerLookup so it inherits the count.

/v1/health now reports `workers_count` (exact integer) alongside
`workers_loaded` (derived bool: count > 0). The previous placeholder
true was a known caveat in the prior commit's body — this closes it.

Production switchover use case: J swaps workers_500k.parquet → real
Chicago contractor data, restarts the gateway, and verifies the
swap with one curl:

  curl http://localhost:3100/v1/health | jq .workers_count

Expected: matches the row count of the new file. Mismatch (or 0)
means the file is missing / unreadable / had a schema mismatch and
the gateway fell back to the empty InMemoryWorkerLookup. Operator
catches the drift before traffic reaches the validators.

Verified live (current synthetic data):
  workers_count: 500000   (matches workers_500k.parquet row count)
  workers_loaded: true

When the Chicago data lands, the same curl is the single source of
truth that the new dataset is hot. Removes the
restart-and-pray failure mode.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 08:07:18 -05:00
root
74ad77211f gateway: /v1/health — production operational status endpoint 
Adds GET /v1/health that returns a JSON snapshot of subsystem state
so operators (and load balancers, and the lakehouse-auditor
service) can verify the gateway is fully booted before routing
traffic. Phase 42-45 closures are now production-deployable; this
endpoint is the canary that proves it.

Returns 200 always — fields are observed-state, not pass/fail
gates. Monitoring tools evaluate the booleans + counts against
their own thresholds.

Shape:
  {
    "status": "ok",
    "workers_loaded": bool,
    "providers_configured": {
      "ollama_cloud": bool, "openrouter": bool, "kimi": bool,
      "opencode": bool, "gemini": bool, "claude": bool,
    },
    "langfuse_configured": bool,
    "usage_total_requests": N,
    "usage_by_provider": ["ollama_cloud", "openrouter", ...]
  }

Verified live:
  curl http://localhost:3100/v1/health
  → 4 providers configured (kimi, ollama_cloud, opencode, openrouter)
  → 2 not configured (claude, gemini — keys not wired)
  → langfuse_configured: true
  → workers_loaded: true (500K-row workers_500k.parquet snapshot)

Caveat: workers_loaded is a placeholder true — WorkerLookup trait
doesn't have a len() method yet, so we can't honestly report row
count from the runtime probe. The boot log line "loaded workers
parquet snapshot rows=N" is the source of truth on count. Future
follow-up: add `fn len(&self) -> usize` to WorkerLookup so /v1/health
can report the exact figure.

Pre-production checklist context: J flagged production switchover
incoming — synthetic profiles will be replaced with real Chicago
data soon. /v1/health gives the operator a single curl to verify
the gateway sees the new data after the parquet swap (boot log +
this endpoint).

Hot-swap reload (POST /v1/admin/reload-workers) deferred to a
follow-up — requires V1State.validate_workers to wrap in RwLock
or ArcSwap so write traffic doesn't block the steady-state
read path.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 08:05:52 -05:00
root
6cafa7ec0e vectord: Phase 45 closure — /doc_drift/scan + doc_drift_corrections.jsonl writes 
Phase 45 (doc-drift detection + context7 integration) was mostly
already shipped in prior sessions: DocRef struct, doc_drift module,
/doc_drift/check + /doc_drift/resolve endpoints, mcp-server's
context7_bridge.ts, boost exclusion in compute_boost_for_filtered
_with_role. The two missing pieces this commit lands:

1. POST /vectors/playbook_memory/doc_drift/scan — batch scan across
   ALL active playbooks. Iterates the snapshot, filters out retired
   + already-flagged + no-doc_refs, runs check_all_refs on the rest,
   flags drifted entries via PlaybookMemory::flag_doc_drift.

2. Per-detection write to data/_kb/doc_drift_corrections.jsonl. One
   row per drifted playbook with playbook_id + scanned_at +
   drifted_tools[] + per_tool[] + recommended_action. Downstream
   consumers (overview model, operator dashboard, scrum_master
   prompt enrichment) read this file to surface "this playbook
   compounded the wrong way" signals to humans.

Idempotent by design:
- Already-flagged entries with no resolved_at are counted as
  `already_flagged` and skipped (no double-flag, no duplicate row).
- Re-scanning after resolve_doc_drift() unflags an entry brings it
  back into the eligible set on the next scan.

Aggregate response shape:
  {
    "scanned": N,                    // playbooks with doc_refs we checked
    "newly_flagged": N,              // drift detected this scan
    "already_flagged": N,            // skipped (still under review)
    "skipped_retired": N,
    "skipped_no_refs": N,            // pre-Phase-45 playbooks
    "drifted_by_tool": {tool: count},
    "corrections_written": N,
  }

Verified live:
  POST /doc_drift/scan
    → scanned=4, newly_flagged=4, drifted_by_tool={docker:4, terraform:1},
      corrections_written=4
  POST /doc_drift/scan (re-run)
    → scanned=0, newly_flagged=0, already_flagged=6 (idempotent)
  data/_kb/doc_drift_corrections.jsonl
    → 5 rows total (existing seed + this scan)

Phase 45 closure status:
  DocRef + PlaybookEntry.doc_refs       ✅ prior session
  doc_drift module + check_all_refs     ✅ prior session
  /doc_drift/check + /resolve           ✅ prior session
  mcp-server/context7_bridge.ts         ✅ prior session
  boost exclusion in compute_boost_*    ✅ prior session
  /doc_drift/scan + corrections.jsonl   ✅ THIS COMMIT

The 0→85% thesis stays valid against external doc drift. Popular
playbooks can no longer compound the wrong way as Docker / Terraform
/ React / etc. patch their docs — the scan flags drift, the boost
filter excludes the playbook, the operator reviews the corrections
.jsonl, and a revise call (Phase 27) supersedes the stale entry
with corrected operation/approach.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 08:00:50 -05:00
root
98db129b8f gateway: /v1/iterate — Phase 43 v3 part 3 (generate → validate → retry loop) 
Closes the Phase 43 PRD's "iteration loop with validation in place"
structurally. Single endpoint that wraps the 0→85% pattern any
caller can post against without re-implementing it.

POST /v1/iterate
  {
    "kind":"fill" | "email" | "playbook",
    "prompt":"...",
    "system":"...",                 (optional)
    "provider":"ollama_cloud",
    "model":"kimi-k2.6",
    "context":{...},                (target_count/city/state/role/...)
    "max_iterations":3,             (default 3)
    "temperature":0.2,              (default 0.2)
    "max_tokens":4096               (default 4096)
  }
→ 200 + IterateResponse  (artifact accepted)
   {artifact, validation, iterations, history:[{iteration,raw,status}]}
→ 422 + IterateFailure   (max iter reached)
   {error, iterations, history}

The loop:
1. Generate via gateway-internal HTTP loopback to /v1/chat with the
   given provider/model. Model output is the model's free-form text.
2. Extract a JSON object from the output — handles fenced blocks
   (```json ... ```), bare braces, and prose-with-embedded-JSON.
   On no extractable JSON: append "your response wasn't valid JSON"
   to the prompt and retry.
3. POST the extracted artifact to /v1/validate (server-side reuse of
   the FillValidator/EmailValidator/PlaybookValidator stack from
   Phase 43 v3 part 2).
4. On 200 + Report: success — return artifact + history.
5. On 422 + ValidationError: append the specific error JSON to the
   prompt as corrective context and retry. This is the "observer
   correction" piece in PRD shape, simplified — the validator's own
   structured error IS the feedback signal.
6. Cap at max_iterations.

Verified end-to-end with kimi-k2.6 via ollama_cloud:
  Request:  fill 1 Welder in Toledo, model picks W-1 (actually
            Louisville, KY — wrong city)
  iter 0:   model emits {fills:[W-1,"W-1"]} → 422 Consistency
            ("city 'Louisville' doesn't match contract city 'Toledo'")
  iter 1:   prompt now includes the error → model emits same answer
            (didn't pick a different worker — model lacks roster
            access; would need hybrid_search upstream)
  max=2:    422 IterateFailure with full history

The negative test demonstrates the LOOP MECHANICS work:
- Generation → validation → retry-with-error-context → cap
- The model's failure trace is queryable; downstream tooling can
  inspect history[] to see exactly where each iteration broke
- A production executor would do hybrid_search to find Toledo
  workers before posting; /v1/iterate is the validation+retry
  layer downstream

JSON extractor handles three shapes:
- Fenced: ```json {...} ```  (preferred — explicit signal)
- Bare:   plain text + {...} + plain text
- Multi:  picks the first balanced {...}

Unit tests cover all three plus the no-JSON fallback.

Phase 43 closure status:
  v1: scaffolds                   ✅ (older commit)
  v2: real validators             ✅ 00c8408
  v3 part 1: parquet WorkerLookup ✅ ebd9ab7
  v3 part 2: /v1/validate         ✅ 86123fc
  v3 part 3: /v1/iterate          ✅ THIS COMMIT

The "0→85% with iteration" thesis is now testable in production.
Staffing executors can compose hybrid_search → /v1/iterate (with
validation) and converge on validation-passing artifacts in 1-2
iterations on average.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 07:56:43 -05:00
root
5d93a715c3 gateway: Phase 44 part 3 — split AiClient so vectord routes through /v1/chat 
Builds two AiClient instances at boot:

- `ai_client_direct = AiClient::new(sidecar_url)` — direct sidecar
  transport. Used by V1State (gateway's own /v1/chat ollama_arm
  needs this — calling /v1/chat from itself would self-loop) and
  by the legacy /ai proxy.

- `ai_client_observable = AiClient::new_with_gateway(sidecar_url,
  ${gateway_host}:${gateway_port})` — routes generate() through
  /v1/chat with provider="ollama". Used by:
    vectord::agent (autotune background loop)
    vectord::service (the /vectors HTTP surface — RAG, summary,
                       playbook synthesis, etc.)

Net result: every LLM call from a vectord module now lands in
/v1/usage and Langfuse traces. The autotune agent's hourly cycle
becomes observable; /vectors RAG calls show provider+model+latency
in the usage report. Phase 44 PRD's gate ("/v1/usage accounts for
every LLM call in the system within a 1-minute window") is now
satisfied for the gateway-hosted services.

Cost: one localhost HTTP hop per vectord-originated LLM call. At
~1-3ms RTT for in-process loopback, negligible against the LLM
call's own 30-90s wall-clock.

Phase 44 part 4 (deferred):
- Standalone consumers that build their own AiClient (test
  harnesses, bot/propose, etc) — the TS-side already migrated in
  part 1 + the regression guard at scripts/check_phase44_callers.sh
  catches new direct callers. Rust standalone harnesses (if any
  surface) follow the same pattern: construct via new_with_gateway
  to opt into observability.
- Direct sidecar callers in standalone tools (scripts/serve_lab.py
  is one) — Python-side; out of Rust scope.

Verified:
  cargo build --release -p gateway              compiles
  systemctl restart lakehouse                   active
  /v1/chat sanity                               PONG, finish=stop

When the autotune agent next cycles or any /vectors RAG endpoint
fires, /v1/usage will show the provider=ollama tick — first
real-world data should land within the next agent cycle.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 07:53:18 -05:00
root
7b88fb9269 aibridge: Phase 44 part 2 — opt-in /v1/chat routing for AiClient.generate() 
The Phase 44 PRD's "AiClient becomes a thin /v1/chat client" was a
chicken-and-egg problem: the gateway's own /v1/chat ollama_arm calls
AiClient.generate() to reach the sidecar. If AiClient unconditionally
routed through /v1/chat, gateway → /v1/chat → ollama → AiClient →
/v1/chat would loop forever.

Solution: opt-in routing.
- `AiClient::new(base_url)` — direct-sidecar, gateway-internal use
  (gateway's own /v1/chat handlers, ollama::chat in mod.rs)
- `AiClient::new_with_gateway(base_url, gateway_url)` — routes
  generate() through ${gateway_url}/v1/chat with provider="ollama"
  so the call lands in /v1/usage + Langfuse traces

Shape translation in generate_via_gateway():
  GenerateRequest {prompt, system, model, temperature, max_tokens, think}
    → /v1/chat {messages: [system?, user], provider:"ollama", ...}
  /v1/chat response choices[0].message.content + usage.{prompt,completion}_tokens
    → GenerateResponse {text, model, tokens_evaluated, tokens_generated}

embed(), rerank(), and admin methods (health, unload_model, etc.) stay
direct-to-sidecar — no /v1/embed equivalent yet, no point round-trip.

Transitive migration: aibridge::continuation::generate_continuable
goes through TextGenerator::generate_text() → AiClient.generate(), so
every caller of generate_continuable inherits the routing decision
made at AiClient construction. Phase 21's continuation loop, hot-
path JSON emitters, etc. all gain observability for free when the
construction site opts in.

Verified end-to-end:
  curl /v1/chat with the exact JSON shape AiClient sends
    → "PONG-AIBRIDGE", finish=stop, 27/7 tokens
  /v1/usage after the call
    → requests=1, by_provider.ollama.requests=1, tokens tracked

Phase 44 part 3 (next):
- Migrate vectord's AiClient construction site so vectord modules
  (rag, autotune, harness, refresh, supervisor, playbook_memory)
  flow through /v1/chat. Currently the gateway's main.rs constructs
  one AiClient via `new()` and shares it via V1State; vectord
  inherits direct-sidecar transport. Migration requires constructing
  a SEPARATE AiClient with `new_with_gateway` for vectord's state
  bag (V1State.ai_client must stay direct to avoid the self-loop).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 07:51:04 -05:00
root
86123fce4c gateway: /v1/validate endpoint — Phase 43 v3 part 2 
Closes the Phase 43 PRD's "any caller can validate" surface. The
validator crate (FillValidator + EmailValidator + PlaybookValidator
+ WorkerLookup) is now reachable over HTTP at /v1/validate.

Request/response:
  POST /v1/validate
    {"kind":"fill"|"email"|"playbook", "artifact":{...}, "context":{...}?}
  → 200 + Report on success
  → 422 + ValidationError on validation failure
  → 400 on bad kind

Boot-time wiring (main.rs):
- Load workers_500k.parquet into a shared Arc<dyn WorkerLookup>
- Path overridable via LH_WORKERS_PARQUET env
- Missing file: warn + fall back to empty InMemoryWorkerLookup so the
  endpoint stays live (validators just fail Consistency on every
  worker-existence check, which is the correct behavior when the
  roster isn't configured)
- Boot log line: "workers parquet loaded from <path>" or
  "workers parquet at <path> not found"
- Live boot timing: 500K rows loaded in ~1.4s

V1State gains `validate_workers: Arc<dyn validator::WorkerLookup>`.
The `_context` JSON key is auto-injected from `request.context` so
callers can either embed `_context` directly in `artifact` or split
it cleanly via the `context` field.

Verified live (gateway + 500K worker snapshot):
  POST {kind:"fill", phantom W-FAKE-99999}    → 422 Consistency
                                                 ("does not exist in
                                                  worker roster")
  POST {kind:"fill", real W-1, "Anyone"}      → 200 OK + Warning
                                                 ("differs from
                                                  roster name 'Donald
                                                  Green'")
  POST {kind:"email", body has 123-45-6789}   → 422 Policy ("SSN-
                                                shaped sequence")
  POST {kind:"nonsense"}                       → 400 Bad Request

The "0→85% with iteration" thesis can now run end-to-end on real
staffing data: an executor emits a fill_proposal, posts to
/v1/validate, gets a structured ValidationError on phantom IDs or
inactive workers, observer-corrects, retries. Closure of that loop
in a scrum harness is the next commit (separate scope).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 07:40:27 -05:00
root
ebd9ab7c77 validator: Phase 43 v3 — production WorkerLookup backed by workers_500k.parquet
Some checks failed
lakehouse/auditor 13 blocking issues: cloud: claim not backed — "Verified end-to-end:"
Closes the Phase 43 v2 loose end. The validator scaffolds (FillValidator,
EmailValidator) take Arc<dyn WorkerLookup> at construction; this commit
ships the parquet-snapshot impl that production code wires in.

Schema mapping (workers_500k.parquet → WorkerRecord):
  worker_id (int64)     → candidate_id = "W-{id}"   (matches what the
                                                     staffing executor
                                                     emits)
  name (string)         → name (already concatenated upstream)
  role (string)         → role
  city, state (string)  → city, state
  availability (double) → status: "active" if >0 else "inactive"

Workers_500k has no `status` column; we derive from `availability`
since 0.0 means vacationing/suspended/etc in this dataset's
convention. Once Track A.B's `_safe` view ships with proper status,
flip the loader to read it directly — schema mapping is in one
function (load_workers_parquet), so the swap is trivial.

In-memory snapshot model:
- Loads all 500K rows at startup → ~75MB resident
- Sync .find() — no per-call I/O on the validation hot path
- Refresh = call load_workers_parquet again to rebuild
- Caller-driven refresh (no auto-watch) — operators pick the cadence

Why workers_500k and not candidates.parquet:
candidates.parquet has the right shape (string candidate_id, status,
first/last_name) but lacks `role` — and the staffing executor matches
the W-* convention from workers_500k_v8 corpus. So the production
data path goes through workers_500k. The schema mismatch between the
two parquets is documented in `reports/staffing/synthetic-data-gap-
report.md` (gap A); resolution is operator's call.

Errors are typed (LookupLoadError):
- Open: file not found / permission
- Parse: invalid parquet
- MissingColumn: schema doesn't have required field
- BadRow: row missing worker_id or name
Schema check happens before iteration, so a wrong-shape file fails
loud immediately rather than silently building an empty lookup.

Verification:
  cargo build -p validator                       compiles
  cargo test  -p validator                       33 pass / 0 fail
                                                 (was 31; +2 for parquet)
  load_real_workers_500k smoke test              passes against the
                                                 live 500K-row file:
                                                 W-1 resolves, status +
                                                 role + city/state all
                                                 populated.

Phase 43 v3 part 2 (next):
- /v1/validate gateway endpoint that takes a JSON artifact + dispatches
  to FillValidator/EmailValidator/PlaybookValidator with a shared
  WorkerLookup loaded from the parquet at gateway startup.
- That closes the "any caller can validate" surface; execution-loop
  wiring (Phase 43 PRD's "generate → validate → correct → retry")
  becomes a thin wrapper on top of /v1/validate.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 07:36:40 -05:00
root
454da15301 auditor + aibridge: 6 fixes from Opus 4.7 self-audit on PR #11
Some checks failed
lakehouse/auditor 16 blocking issues: cloud: claim not backed — "Verified end-to-end:"
The kimi_architect auditor on commit 00c8408 ran with auto-promotion
to claude-opus-4-7 (diff > 100k chars), produced 10 grounded
findings, 1 BLOCK + 6 WARN + 3 INFO. This commit lands 6 of them; 3
are skipped (false positives or out-of-scope cleanup deferred).

LANDED:

1. kimi_architect.ts:144  empty-parse cache poisoning. When parseFindings
   returns 0 findings (markdown shape changed, prompt too big, regex
   missed every block), the verdict was still persisted with empty
   findings, and the 24h TTL cache short-circuited every subsequent
   audit with a useless "0 findings" hit. Fix: only persist when
   findings.length > 0; metrics still appended unconditionally.

2. kimi_architect.ts:122  outage negative-cache. When callKimi throws
   (network error, gateway 502, rate limit), we returned skipFinding
   but didn't note the outage anywhere. Every audit cycle within the
   24h TTL hammered the dead upstream. Fix: write a sentinel file
   `<verdict>.outage` on failure with 10-min TTL; future calls within
   that window short-circuit immediately.

3. kimi_architect.ts:331  mkdir(join(p, "..")) -> dirname(p). The
   "/.." idiom resolved correctly via Node path normalization but
   was non-idiomatic and breaks if the path ever has trailing dots.
   Both Haiku and Opus self-audits flagged it.

4. inference.ts:202  N=3 consensus latency double/triple-count.
   `totalLatencyMs += run.latency_ms` summed across THREE parallel
   `Promise.all` calls — wall-clock is bounded by the slowest, not
   the sum. Renamed to `maxLatencyMs` using `Math.max`. Telemetry now
   reports actual wall-clock instead of 3x reality.

5. continuation.rs:198,199,230,231  i64/u64 -> u32 saturating cast.
   `resp.tokens_evaluated as u32` truncates bits when source > u32::MAX
   instead of saturating. Fix: u32::try_from(...).unwrap_or(u32::MAX)
   wraps the cast in a real saturate. Applied to both the empty-retry
   loop and the structural-completion continuation loop.

SKIPPED:

- BLOCK at Cargo.lock:8911 "validator-not-in-workspace" — confabulation.
  The diff Opus saw was truncated mid-line; validator IS in
  Cargo.toml workspace members. Real-world MAX_DIFF_CHARS=180k
  edge case to watch as we feed more big diffs.
- WARN at kimi_architect.ts:248 regex absolute-path edge case — minor,
  doesn't affect grounding rate observed so far.
- INFO at inference.ts:606 "dead reconstruction loop" — Opus misread.
  The Promise.all worker fills `summaries[]`; the second loop builds
  a sequential `scratchpad` string from those. Two distinct
  operations, not redundant.

Verification:
  bun build auditor/checks/{kimi_architect,inference}.ts   compiles
  cargo check -p aibridge                                  green
  cargo build --release -p gateway                          green
  systemctl restart lakehouse.service lakehouse-auditor.service  active

Next audit cycle (~90s after push) will run on the new diff and
exercise the negative-cache + dirname + maxLatencyMs paths.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 07:10:43 -05:00
root
00c8408335 validator: Phase 43 v2 — real worker-existence + PII + name-consistency checks
Some checks failed
lakehouse/auditor 16 blocking issues: cloud: claim not backed — "Verified end-to-end:"
The Phase 43 scaffolds (FillValidator, EmailValidator) shipped with
TODO(phase-43 v2) markers for the actual cross-roster checks. This is
those checks landing.

The PRD calls for "the 0→85% pattern reproduces on real staffing
tasks — the iteration loop with validation in place is what made
small models successful." Worker-existence is the load-bearing check:
when the executor emits {candidate_id: "W-FAKE", name: "Imaginary"},
schema-only validation passes, and only roster lookup catches it.

Architecture:

- New `WorkerLookup` trait + `WorkerRecord` struct in lib.rs. Sync by
  design — validators hold an in-memory snapshot, no per-call I/O on
  the validation hot path. Production wraps a parquet snapshot;
  tests use `InMemoryWorkerLookup`.
- Validators take `Arc<dyn WorkerLookup>` at construction so the
  same shape covers prod + tests + future devops scaffolds.
- Contract metadata travels under JSON `_context` key alongside the
  validated payload (target_count, city, state, role, client_id for
  fills; candidate_id for emails). Keeps the Validator trait
  signature stable and lets the executor serialize context inline.

FillValidator (11 tests, was 4):
- Schema (existing)
- Completeness — endorsed count == target_count
- Worker existence — phantom candidate_id fails Consistency
- Status — non-active worker fails Consistency
- Geo/role match — city/state/role mismatch with contract fails
  Consistency
- Client blacklist — fails Policy
- Duplicate candidate_id within one fill — fails Consistency
- Name mismatch — Warning (not Error) since recruiters sometimes
  send roster updates through the proposal layer

EmailValidator (11 tests, was 4):
- Schema + length (existing)
- SSN scan (NNN-NN-NNNN) — fails Policy
- Salary disclosure (keyword + $-amount within ~40 chars) — fails
  Policy. Std-only scan, no regex dep added.
- Worker name consistency — when _context.candidate_id resolves,
  body must contain the worker's first name (Warning if missing)
- Phantom candidate_id in _context — fails Consistency
- Phone NNN-NNN-NNNN does NOT trip the SSN detector (verified by
  test); the SSN scanner explicitly rejects sequences embedded in
  longer digit runs

Pre-existing issue (NOT from this change, NOT fixed here):
crates/vectord/src/pathway_memory.rs:927 has a stale PathwayTrace
struct initializer that fails `cargo check --tests` with E0063 on
6 missing fields. `cargo check --workspace` (production) is green;
only the vectord test target is broken. Tracked for a separate fix.

Verification:
  cargo test -p validator      31 pass / 0 fail (was 13)
  cargo check --workspace      green

Next: wire `Arc<dyn WorkerLookup>` into the gateway execution loop
(generate → validate → observer-correct → retry, bounded by
max_iterations=3 per Phase 43 PRD). Production lookup impl loads
from a workers parquet snapshot — Track A gap-fix B's `_safe` view
is the right source once decided, raw workers_500k otherwise.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 06:56:28 -05:00
root
bc698eb6da gateway: OpenCode (Zen + Go) provider adapter 
Wires opencode.ai as a /v1/chat provider. One sk-* key reaches 40
models across Anthropic, OpenAI, Google, Moonshot, DeepSeek, Zhipu,
Alibaba, Minimax — billed against either the user's Zen balance
(pay-per-token premium models) or Go subscription (flat-rate
Kimi/GLM/DeepSeek/etc.). The unified /zen/v1 endpoint routes both;
upstream picks the billing tier based on model id.

Notable adapter quirks:

- Strip "opencode/" prefix on outbound (mirrors openrouter/kimi
  pattern). Caller can use {provider:"opencode", model:"X"} or
  {model:"opencode/X"}.
- Drop temperature for claude-*, gpt-5*, o1/o3/o4 models. Anthropic
  and OpenAI's reasoning lineage rejects temperature with 400
  "deprecated for this model". OCChatBody now serializes temperature
  as Option<f64> with skip_serializing_if so omitting it produces
  clean JSON.
- max_tokens.filter(|&n| n > 0) catches Some(0) — defensive after
  the same trap bit kimi.rs (empty env -> Number("") -> 0 -> 503).
- 600s default upstream timeout; reasoning models on big audit
  prompts legitimately take 3-5 min. Override OPENCODE_TIMEOUT_SECS.

Key handling:
- /etc/lakehouse/opencode.env (0600 root) loaded via systemd
  EnvironmentFile. Same pattern as kimi.env.
- OPENCODE_API_KEY env first, file scrape as fallback.

Verified end-to-end:
  opencode/claude-opus-4-7   -> "I'm Claude, made by Anthropic."
  opencode/kimi-k2.6         -> PONG-K26-GO
  opencode/deepseek-v4-pro   -> PONG-DS-V4
  opencode/glm-5.1           -> PONG-GLM
  opencode/minimax-m2.5-free -> PONG-FREE

Pricing reference (per audit @ ~14k in / 6k out):
  claude-opus-4-7   ~$0.22  (Zen)
  claude-haiku-4-5  ~$0.04  (Zen)
  gpt-5.5-pro       ~$1.50  (Zen)
  gemini-3-flash    ~$0.03  (Zen)
  kimi-k2.6 / glm / deepseek / qwen / minimax / mimo: covered by Go
  subscription ($10/mo, $60/mo cap).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 06:40:55 -05:00
root
ff5de76241 auditor + gateway: 2 fixes from kimi_architect's first real run 
Acted on 2 of 10 findings Kimi caught when auditing its own integration
on PR #11 head 8d02c7f. Skipped 8 (false positives or out-of-scope).

1. crates/gateway/src/v1/kimi.rs — flatten OpenAI multimodal content
   array to plain string before forwarding to api.kimi.com. The Kimi
   coding endpoint is text-only; passing a [{type,text},...] array
   returns 400. Use Message::text() to concat text-parts and drop
   non-text. Verified with curl using array-shape content: gateway now
   returns "PONG-ARRAY" instead of upstream error.

2. auditor/checks/kimi_architect.ts — computeGrounding switched from
   readFileSync to async readFile inside Promise.all. Doesn't matter
   at 10 findings; would matter at 100+. Removed unused readFileSync
   import.

Skipped findings (with reason):
- drift_report.ts:18 schema bump migration concern: the strict
  schema_version refusal IS the migration boundary (v1 readers
  explicitly fail on v2; not a silent corruption risk).
- replay.ts:383 ISO timestamp precision: Date.toISOString always
  emits "YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ss.sssZ" (ms precision). False positive.
- mode.rs:1035 matrix_corpus deserializer compat: deserialize_string
  _or_vec at mode.rs:175 already accepts both shapes. Confabulation
  from not seeing the deserializer in the input bundle.
- /etc/lakehouse/kimi.env world-readable: actually 0600 root. Real
  concern would be permission-drift; not a code bug.
- callKimi response.json hang: obsolete; we use curl now.
- parseFindings silent-drop: ergonomic concern, not a bug.
- appendMetrics join with "..": works for current path; deferred.
- stubFinding dead-type extension: cosmetic.

Self-audit grounding rate at v1.0.0: 10/10 file:line citations
verified by grep. 2 of 10 actionable bugs landed. The other 8 were
correctly flagged as concerns but didn't earn a code change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 06:16:23 -05:00
root
643dd2d520 gateway: direct Kimi For Coding provider adapter (api.kimi.com) 
Wires kimi-for-coding (Kimi K2.6 underneath) as a first-class /v1/chat
provider so consumers can target it via {provider:"kimi"} or model
prefix kimi/<model>. Bypasses the upstream-broken kimi-k2:1t on Ollama
Cloud and the rate-limited moonshotai/kimi-k2.6 path through OpenRouter.

Adapter shape mirrors openrouter.rs (OpenAI-compatible Chat Completions).
Differences from generic OpenAI providers:

- api.kimi.com is a SEPARATE account system from api.moonshot.ai and
  api.moonshot.cn. sk-kimi-* keys are NOT interchangeable across them.
- Endpoint is User-Agent-gated to "approved" coding agents (Kimi CLI,
  Claude Code, Roo Code, Kilo Code, ...). Requests from generic clients
  return 403 access_terminated_error. Adapter sends User-Agent:
  claude-code/1.0.0. Per Moonshot TOS this is a tampering-class action
  that may result in seat suspension; J authorized 2026-04-27 with
  awareness of the risk.
- kimi-for-coding is a reasoning model — reasoning_content counts
  against max_tokens. Default 800-token budget yields empty visible
  content with finish_reason=length. Code-review workloads need
  max_tokens >= 1500.
- Default 600s upstream timeout (vs 180s for openrouter.rs) — code
  audits with full file context legitimately take 3-5 minutes.
  Override via KIMI_TIMEOUT_SECS env.

Key handling:
- /etc/lakehouse/kimi.env (0600 root) loaded via systemd EnvironmentFile
- KIMI_API_KEY env first, then file scrape as fallback
- /etc/systemd/system/lakehouse.service NOT included in this commit
  (system file outside repo); operator must add EnvironmentFile=-
  /etc/lakehouse/kimi.env to the lakehouse.service unit

NOT in scrum_master_pipeline LADDER. The 9-rung ladder is for
unattended automatic recovery; placing Kimi there would hammer a
TOS-gated endpoint with hostility-policy potential. Kimi is
addressable via /v1/chat for explicit invocations only — auditor
integration in a follow-up commit.

Verification:
  cargo check -p gateway --tests          compiles
  curl /v1/chat provider=kimi             200 OK, content="PONG"
  curl /v1/chat model="kimi/kimi-for-coding"  200 OK (prefix routing)
  Kimi audit on distillation last-week    7/7 grounded findings
                                          (reports/kimi/audit-last-week-full.md)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 05:35:58 -05:00
root
d77622fc6b distillation: fix 7 grounding bugs found by Kimi audit 
Kimi For Coding (api.kimi.com, kimi-for-coding) ran a forensic audit on
distillation v1.0.0 with full file content. 7/7 flags verified real on
grep. Substrate now matches what v1.0.0 claimed: deterministic, no
schema bypasses, Rust tests compile.

Fixes:
- mode.rs:1035,1042  matrix_corpus Some/None -> vec![..]/vec![]; cargo
                     check --tests now compiles (was silently broken;
                     only bun tests were running)
- scorer.ts:30       SCORER_VERSION env override removed - identical
                     input now produces identical version stamp, not
                     env-dependent drift
- transforms.ts:181  auto_apply wall-clock fallback (new Date()) ->
                     deterministic recorded_at fallback
- replay.ts:378      recorded_run_id Date.now() -> sha256(recorded_at);
                     replay rows now reproducible given recorded_at
- receipts.ts:454,495  input_hash_match hardcoded true was misleading
                       telemetry; bumped DRIFT_REPORT_SCHEMA_VERSION 1->2,
                       field is now boolean|null with honest null when
                       not computed at this layer
- score_runs.ts:89-100,159  dedup keyed only on sig_hash made
                            scorer-version bumps invisible. Composite
                            sig_hash:scorer_version forces re-scoring
- export_sft.ts:126  (ev as any).contractor bypass emitted "<contractor>"
                     placeholder for every contract_analyses SFT row.
                     Added typed EvidenceRecord.metadata bucket;
                     transforms.ts populates metadata.contractor;
                     exporter reads typed value

Verification (all green):
  cargo check -p gateway --tests   compiles
  bun test tests/distillation/     145 pass / 0 fail
  bun acceptance                   22/22 invariants
  bun audit-full                   16/16 required checks

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-27 05:34:31 -05:00
root
20a039c379 auditor: rebuild on mode runner + drop tree-split (use distillation substrate)
Some checks failed
lakehouse/auditor 13 blocking issues: cloud: claim not backed — "Invariants enforced (proven by tests + real run):"
Architectural simplification leveraging Phase 5 distillation work:
the auditor no longer pre-extracts facts via per-shard summaries
because lakehouse_answers_v1 (gold-standard prior PR audits + observer
escalations corpus) supplies cross-PR context through the mode runner's
matrix retrieval. Same signal, ~50× fewer cloud calls per audit.

Per-audit cost:
  Before: 168 gpt-oss:120b shard summaries + 3 final inference calls
  After:  3 deepseek-v3.1:671b mode-runner calls (full retrieval included)

Wall-clock on PR #11 (1.36MB diff):
  Before: ~25 minutes
  After:  88 seconds (3/3 consensus succeeded)

Files:
  auditor/checks/inference.ts
    - Default MODEL kimi-k2:1t → deepseek-v3.1:671b. kimi-k2 is hitting
      sustained Ollama Cloud 500 ISE (verified via repeated trivial
      probes; multi-hour outage). deepseek is the proven drop-in from
      Phase 5 distillation acceptance testing.
    - Dropped treeSplitDiff invocation. Diff truncates to MAX_DIFF_CHARS
      and goes straight to /v1/mode/execute task_class=pr_audit; mode
      runner pulls cross-PR context from lakehouse_answers_v1 via
      matrix retrieval. SHARD_MODEL retained for legacy callCloud
      compatibility (default qwen3-coder:480b if it ever runs).
    - extractAndPersistFacts now reads from truncated diff (no
      scratchpad post-tree-split-removal).

  auditor/checks/static.ts
    - serde-derived struct exemption (commit 107a682 shipped this; this
      commit is the rest of the auditor rebuild it landed alongside)
    - multi-line template literal awareness in isInsideQuotedString —
      tracks backtick state across lines so todo!() inside docstrings
      doesn't trip BLOCK_PATTERNS.

  crates/gateway/src/v1/mode.rs
    - pr_audit native runner mode added to VALID_MODES + is_native_mode
      + flags_for_mode + framing_text. PrAudit framing produces strict
      JSON {claim_verdicts, unflagged_gaps} for the auditor to parse.

  config/modes.toml
    - pr_audit task class with default_model=deepseek-v3.1:671b and
      matrix_corpus=lakehouse_answers_v1. Documents kimi-k2 outage
      with link to the swap rationale.

Real-data audit on PR #11 head 1b433a9 (which is the PR with all the
distillation work + auditor rebuild itself):
  - Pipeline ran to completion (88s for inference; full audit ~3 min)
  - 3/3 consensus runs succeeded on deepseek-v3.1:671b
  - 156 findings: 12 block, 23 warn, 121 info
  - Block findings are legitimate signal: 12 reviewer claims like
    "Invariants enforced (proven by tests + real run):" that the
    truncated diff can't directly verify. The auditor is correctly
    flagging claim-vs-diff divergence — exactly its job.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-26 23:32:44 -05:00
root
d1d97a045b v1: fire observer /event from /v1/chat alongside Langfuse trace
Some checks failed
lakehouse/auditor 1 blocking issue: todo!() macro call in tests/real-world/scrum_master_pipeline.ts
Observer at :3800 already collects scrum + scenario events into a ring
buffer that pathway-memory + KB consolidation read from. /v1/chat now
posts a lightweight {endpoint, source:"v1.chat", input_summary,
output_summary, success, duration_ms} event there too — fire-and-forget
tokio::spawn, observer-down doesn't block the chat response.

Now any tool routed through our gateway (Pi CLI, Archon, openai SDK
clients, langchain-js) shows up in the same ring buffer the scrum loop
reads, ready for the same KB-consolidation analysis. Independent of the
existing langfuse-bridge that polls Langfuse — this path is immediate.

Verified: GET /stats shows {by_source: {v1.chat: N}} grows by 1 per
chat call, both for direct curl and for Pi CLI invocations.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-26 18:01:52 -05:00
root
540a9a27ee v1: accept OpenAI multimodal content shape (array-of-parts)
Some checks failed
lakehouse/auditor 1 blocking issue: todo!() macro call in tests/real-world/scrum_master_pipeline.ts
Modern OpenAI clients (pi-ai, openai SDK 6.x, langchain-js, the official
agents) send `messages[].content` as an array of content parts:
`[{type:"text", text:"..."}, {type:"image_url", ...}]`. Our gateway
typed `content` as plain `String` and 422'd those calls.

Fix: `Message.content` is now `serde_json::Value` so requests
deserialize regardless of shape. `Message::text()` flattens
content-parts arrays (concat'd `text` fields, non-text parts skipped)
for places that need a plain string — Ollama prompt assembly, char
counts, the assistant's own response synthesis. `Message::new_text()`
constructs string-content messages without writing the wrapper at
each call site. Forwarders (openrouter) clone content through
verbatim so providers see exactly what the client sent.

Verified end-to-end: Pi CLI (`pi --print --provider openrouter`)
landed a clean 1902-token request through `/v1/chat/completions`,
routed to OpenRouter as `openai/gpt-oss-120b:free`, response in
1.62s, Langfuse trace `v1.chat:openrouter` recorded with provider
tag. Same path that any tool using the official openai SDK takes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
 2026-04-26 17:56:46 -05:00