Re-scrummed v2 across opus + kimi + gemini. All 3 verdict:
BUILD-WITH-CHANGES. v1 blockers verified RESOLVED. 12 new v2
findings folded as v3 amendments in §12.
Convergent v2 findings (≥2 reviewers):
v3-A1: mTLS CA root must NOT live in identityd (opus + gemini).
v3 fix: Vault PKI for CA, identityd as intermediate.
v3-A2: Dual-control public key registry must be tamper-evident
(opus + gemini). v3 fix: Vault KV with separate access
policies + server-issued nonces for replay protection.
Single-reviewer v3 amendments (10 more):
- B1: Step 8 fallback-to-SQL needs explicit 14-day time bound
- B2: NER drop-on-detect needs Prometheus alerting
- B3: legal-tier notification transport spec'd (signed Slack/email,
no PII in body, failure non-blocking)
- B4: Step 6 human review SLA flagged — ~7 months at 500/day for
~100k unknown rows; operational decision needed
- B5: Memory zeroing in Go is best-effort (Rust uses zeroize crate);
documented as not cryptographic-grade
- B6: purpose_definitions needs versioning + emergency revocation
(purpose_versions + purpose_revocations tables)
- B7: Cache invalidation needs erasure_generation atomicity
(subjects.erasure_generation int; gateway rejects stale-gen
cache hits) — replaces best-effort pub/sub
- B8: 15-min cooling-off period for dual-control issuance to
prevent emergency-bypass culture
- B9: NER calibrated test set with target recall ≥99.5% on
synthetic adversarial PII
- B10: S3 Object Lock in separate AWS account with write-only IAM;
root credentials held by external party
- B11: BIPA infrastructure-as-notice attestation in Phase 1.6 doc
- B12: Backup retention vs ciphertext-deletion erasure window
documented in RTBF runbook
Estimate revised v2 12-15d → v3 17-20d. Worth it — the cost is what
buys "I would build this" from 3 independent senior security
architects across 3 model lineages.
Must-have v3 items (block implementation): A1, A2, B1, B6, B7, B11.
Should-have (ship in Phase 5 if calendar tight): B2-B5, B8-B10, B12.
Re-scrum NOT recommended for v3 — diminishing returns; must-have
items are concrete fixes with clear acceptance criteria.
No code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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