root fee094f653 gateway/access: wire get_role + is_enabled into HTTP routes
Two of the four #[allow(dead_code)] methods in access.rs were dead
because nothing exposed them externally. access.rs itself is fine —
list_roles, set_role, can_access all have live callers. But get_role
and is_enabled were shaped as public API with no surface to call
them through.

Fix adds two small routes under /access (where the rest of the
access surface lives):

  GET /access/roles/{agent}
    Calls AccessControl::get_role(agent). Returns 404 with a clear
    message when the agent isn't registered so clients distinguish
    "unknown agent" from "access denied." Part of P13-001
    (ops tooling needs per-agent role introspection).

  GET /access/enabled
    Calls AccessControl::is_enabled(). Returns {"enabled": bool}.
    Dashboards + ops tooling poll this to confirm auth posture of
    the running gateway — distinct from /health which answers
    "is the process up" vs "is access enforcement on."

#[allow(dead_code)] removed from both methods — they have live
callers now via these routes, the linter will enforce that going
forward.

Still #[allow(dead_code)] on access.rs: masked_fields + log_query.
Both need cross-crate wiring:
  - masked_fields wants the agent's role + query response columns,
    called in response shaping (queryd returning to gateway path)
  - log_query wants post-execution audit, called after every SQL
    execution on the gateway boundary
Both are P13-001 phase 2 work — need AgentIdentity plumbed through
the /query nested router before the call sites make sense. Flagged
for follow-up.

Workspace warnings still at 0.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-24 14:02:01 -05:00

161 lines
5.2 KiB
Rust

/// Access control: field-level sensitivity enforcement, column masking, query audit.
/// Evaluates policies at query time — not at storage level.
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use shared::types::Sensitivity;
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
/// An agent's role determines what sensitivity levels they can see.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct AgentRole {
pub agent_name: String,
pub role: String, // "recruiter", "admin", "analyst", "agent"
pub allowed_sensitivity: Vec<Sensitivity>, // what they can see unmasked
}
/// A query audit entry.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct QueryAudit {
pub id: String,
pub agent: String,
pub sql: String,
pub datasets_accessed: Vec<String>,
pub pii_fields_accessed: Vec<String>,
pub timestamp: DateTime<Utc>,
pub row_count: usize,
pub allowed: bool,
pub masked_fields: Vec<String>,
}
/// Access control manager.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct AccessControl {
roles: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, AgentRole>>>,
audit_log: Arc<RwLock<Vec<QueryAudit>>>,
enabled: bool,
}
impl AccessControl {
pub fn new(enabled: bool) -> Self {
let ac = Self {
roles: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
audit_log: Arc::new(RwLock::new(Vec::new())),
enabled,
};
ac
}
/// Register default roles.
pub async fn register_defaults(&self) {
let defaults = vec![
AgentRole {
agent_name: "admin".into(),
role: "admin".into(),
allowed_sensitivity: vec![
Sensitivity::Public, Sensitivity::Internal,
Sensitivity::Pii, Sensitivity::Phi, Sensitivity::Financial,
],
},
AgentRole {
agent_name: "recruiter".into(),
role: "recruiter".into(),
allowed_sensitivity: vec![
Sensitivity::Public, Sensitivity::Internal, Sensitivity::Pii,
],
},
AgentRole {
agent_name: "analyst".into(),
role: "analyst".into(),
allowed_sensitivity: vec![
Sensitivity::Public, Sensitivity::Internal, Sensitivity::Financial,
],
},
AgentRole {
agent_name: "agent".into(),
role: "agent".into(),
allowed_sensitivity: vec![
Sensitivity::Public, Sensitivity::Internal,
],
},
];
let mut roles = self.roles.write().await;
for role in defaults {
roles.insert(role.agent_name.clone(), role);
}
}
/// Register or update an agent role.
pub async fn set_role(&self, role: AgentRole) {
self.roles.write().await.insert(role.agent_name.clone(), role);
}
/// Get an agent's role. Called by `GET /access/roles/{agent}`.
pub async fn get_role(&self, agent: &str) -> Option<AgentRole> {
self.roles.read().await.get(agent).cloned()
}
/// List all roles.
pub async fn list_roles(&self) -> Vec<AgentRole> {
self.roles.read().await.values().cloned().collect()
}
/// Check if an agent can see a field with given sensitivity.
pub async fn can_access(&self, agent: &str, sensitivity: &Sensitivity) -> bool {
if !self.enabled { return true; }
match self.roles.read().await.get(agent) {
Some(role) => role.allowed_sensitivity.contains(sensitivity),
None => false, // unknown agent = no access
}
}
/// Determine which fields should be masked for an agent.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn masked_fields(
&self,
agent: &str,
columns: &[shared::types::ColumnMeta],
) -> Vec<String> {
if !self.enabled { return vec![]; }
let role = match self.roles.read().await.get(agent) {
Some(r) => r.clone(),
None => return columns.iter().filter(|c| c.sensitivity.is_some()).map(|c| c.name.clone()).collect(),
};
columns.iter()
.filter(|col| {
if let Some(ref sens) = col.sensitivity {
!role.allowed_sensitivity.contains(sens)
} else {
false
}
})
.map(|col| col.name.clone())
.collect()
}
/// Log a query for audit.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn log_query(&self, audit: QueryAudit) {
self.audit_log.write().await.push(audit);
}
/// Get recent audit entries.
pub async fn recent_audit(&self, limit: usize) -> Vec<QueryAudit> {
let log = self.audit_log.read().await;
let start = log.len().saturating_sub(limit);
log[start..].iter().rev().cloned().collect()
}
/// Reports whether access-control enforcement is active.
/// Called by `GET /access/enabled` — ops tooling / dashboards poll
/// this to confirm the auth posture of the running gateway.
pub fn is_enabled(&self) -> bool {
self.enabled
}
}