From 939dfddb93054673172ca7a25f601806f6bad38a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: root <root@island37.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 03:14:08 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] llm_team_ui: 4 fixes from 2026-04-30 cross-lineage scrum
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Cross-lineage scrum (Opus 4.7 + Kimi K2.6 + Qwen3-coder via the
local-review-harness chatd) on this codebase surfaced 5 BLOCK-class
issues from Opus + a convergent finding from the harness. This
commit lands the 4 surgical fixes; OB-3 (web app runs as root with
fail2ban-client + systemctl reload nginx + writes to
/etc/nginx/banned_ips.conf) needs an architectural split into a
non-root web tier + a privileged sudo wrapper, deferred for its
own session.

OB-1 — log file open at import crashes app on perm error
  Pre-fix: `_sec_handler = logging.FileHandler("/var/log/llm-team-
  security.log")` raised PermissionError at import time on any
  non-root or fresh-install run, killing the app before Flask
  started — failure was silent (no Flask process to inspect logs
  on).
  Fix: try/except, fall back to StreamHandler(sys.stderr) when
  the path is unwritable. App starts; sec_log events still land
  in journald via stderr. LLM_TEAM_SECURITY_LOG env var lets
  operators override the path.

OB-2 — DB password hardcoded in source (CONVERGENT FINDING)
  The `kbuser` Postgres credential
  `IPbLBA0EQI8u4TeM2YZrbm1OAy5nSwqC` was leaked in source here
  AND in voice-ai/audiosocket_bridge.py + voice-ai/sales_assistant.py.
  Caught independently by harness LLM phase (qwen3.5 local) on
  voice-ai earlier today AND Opus on this file just now. Same
  password, same DB (`knowledge_base`) shared between services,
  three reviewers converged.
  Fix: source from LLM_TEAM_DB_DSN env var, fail loud on unset.
  Operator follow-ups:
    1. Rotate the password in Postgres (still in git history;
       redacting source doesn't un-leak it).
    2. Set LLM_TEAM_DB_DSN in /etc/llm-team-ui.env (mode 0600,
       loaded via systemd EnvironmentFile=).
    3. Same DSN env-var pattern needs applying to
       voice-ai/audiosocket_bridge.py:47 once that branch's
       workspace_context WIP lands.

OB-5 — demo_mode default=True ships public access on first boot
  Pre-fix: `_demo_mode = {"active": True, ...}` + the demo branch
  in login_required let users through without a session. Combined
  with /api/run + /api/imagegen proxies, fresh installs were open
  LLM/compute abuse surface from first boot.
  Fix: default to False; LLM_TEAM_DEMO_MODE=1 env override exists
  for the public devop.live deployment systemd unit so the demo
  doesn't need a manual flip on every restart, but everywhere else
  defaults closed.

OB-4 — EXPLOIT_PATTERNS LAN/admin lockout
  Pre-fix: regex matched on `request.path` + query string against
  patterns like UNION / SELECT / ;-- / <script /admin.php. Admin
  URLs containing those keywords in legitimate ways (e.g. a team
  name "select-rebrand" or a docs link /admin/select_a_mode) hit
  3 violations in 60s and auto-banned the admin's IP. No allowlist.
  Fix: bypass the path-based check for authenticated admins from
  an ALLOWLIST_IPS source. Body/UA checks still apply (the prompt-
  injection-as-DoS WARN in the scrum is separate). Combination
  prevents self-ban without weakening the broader scanner defense.

Plus a .gitignore: /.memory/ — the local-review-harness writes
JSONL findings under <repo>/.memory/ when scanning; harness's own
gitignore is at the harness repo root, not here, so without this
the .memory/ dir would show up as untracked on every harness run
against this tree.

Other Opus WARNs deferred:
- Sentinel feeds attacker-controlled UA into LLM prompt → can
  steer ban verdicts. Fix needs prompt-template hardening or
  output-validation gate.
- CSP `'unsafe-inline'` defeats most XSS protection (would break
  inline scripts; needs HTML refactor).
- _rate_limit unbounded dict + per-worker (needs eviction loop or
  Redis-backed counter).
- auth_login first-time setup gated only by COUNT(*)==0 (needs
  network-source restriction or a setup token).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 .gitignore     |  1 +
 llm_team_ui.py | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index 8b6087b..df2c0cb 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -2,3 +2,4 @@ __pycache__/
 *.pyc
 .env
 *.log
+.memory/
diff --git a/llm_team_ui.py b/llm_team_ui.py
index f1bf4db..6ee3e46 100644
--- a/llm_team_ui.py
+++ b/llm_team_ui.py
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 
 import json
 import os
+import sys
 import time
 import threading
 import secrets
@@ -36,8 +37,23 @@ app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY"] = True
 app.config["SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE"] = "Lax"
 
 # ─── SECURITY LOGGING ─────────────────────────────────────────
-# Dedicated security log for fail2ban and audit trail
-_sec_handler = logging.FileHandler("/var/log/llm-team-security.log")
+# Dedicated security log for fail2ban and audit trail.
+#
+# Cross-lineage scrum 2026-04-30 (Opus BLOCK OB-1): wrapped in
+# try/except. Pre-fix this raised PermissionError at import time
+# when the service user couldn't write /var/log/llm-team-security.log,
+# crashing the app before Flask started. Now falls back to stderr;
+# sec_log still works (ban events still land in journald via stderr),
+# but the app starts. Operator should still create the file with
+# proper perms on production deploy. Path is overridable via
+# LLM_TEAM_SECURITY_LOG env var.
+_LOG_PATH = os.environ.get("LLM_TEAM_SECURITY_LOG", "/var/log/llm-team-security.log")
+try:
+    _sec_handler = logging.FileHandler(_LOG_PATH)
+except (PermissionError, FileNotFoundError, OSError) as _log_err:
+    print(f"[security] WARNING: can't open {_LOG_PATH} ({_log_err}); "
+          f"falling back to stderr.", file=sys.stderr, flush=True)
+    _sec_handler = logging.StreamHandler(sys.stderr)
 _sec_handler.setFormatter(logging.Formatter("%(asctime)s %(message)s"))
 sec_log = logging.getLogger("security")
 sec_log.addHandler(_sec_handler)
@@ -150,8 +166,19 @@ def _check_high_alert_expiry():
 
 # IPs that never get rate-limited (your LAN, localhost)
 ALLOWLIST_IPS = {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "192.168.1.1"}
-# Demo mode state — toggled by admin at runtime
-_demo_mode = {"active": True, "started_by": "boot", "showcase": True}
+# Demo mode state — toggled by admin at runtime.
+#
+# Cross-lineage scrum 2026-04-30 (Opus BLOCK OB-5): pre-fix this
+# defaulted to active=True, meaning fresh installs shipped with
+# public unauthenticated access enabled — login_required let demo
+# users straight through. Combined with /api/run + /api/imagegen
+# proxies, that was an open LLM/compute abuse surface from first
+# boot. Now defaults to active=False; operators flip it on
+# explicitly via the admin UI or LLM_TEAM_DEMO_MODE=1 env override
+# (the env override exists for the demo systemd unit so the public
+# devop.live deployment doesn't need a manual toggle on every restart).
+_DEMO_DEFAULT = os.environ.get("LLM_TEAM_DEMO_MODE", "0") == "1"
+_demo_mode = {"active": _DEMO_DEFAULT, "started_by": "boot" if _DEMO_DEFAULT else "off", "showcase": _DEMO_DEFAULT}
 
 # Routes that demo users CAN trigger (read-like POSTs — enrichment, self-analysis, team runs)
 DEMO_ALLOWED_POSTS = {
@@ -560,8 +587,24 @@ def security_checks():
     # Check high-alert expiry
     _check_high_alert_expiry()
 
-    # Exploit scanner detection — log, alert, track velocity, block
-    if EXPLOIT_PATTERNS.search(path) or EXPLOIT_PATTERNS.search(request.query_string.decode("utf-8", errors="ignore")):
+    # Exploit scanner detection — log, alert, track velocity, block.
+    #
+    # Cross-lineage scrum 2026-04-30 (Opus BLOCK OB-4): pre-fix the
+    # path regex matched on substrings like UNION, SELECT, ;-- and
+    # auto-banned after 3 hits. Admin URLs containing those keywords
+    # in query strings (e.g. an LLM team named "select-rebrand" or a
+    # docs link to /admin/select_a_mode) self-banned the admin's IP.
+    # Now: skip the path-based check for authenticated admins from
+    # an allowlisted IP. The user-agent + body checks (sentinel) still
+    # apply. Allowlisted-IP admins clicking weird URLs no longer
+    # lock themselves out.
+    _skip_exploit_check = False
+    if ip in ALLOWLIST_IPS and session.get("role") == "admin":
+        _skip_exploit_check = True
+    if not _skip_exploit_check and (
+        EXPLOIT_PATTERNS.search(path) or
+        EXPLOIT_PATTERNS.search(request.query_string.decode("utf-8", errors="ignore"))
+    ):
         sec_log.warning("EXPLOIT_SCAN ip=%s path=%s ua=%s", ip, path, ua)
         _track_violation(ip, "exploit_scan")
         send_security_alert(
@@ -1888,7 +1931,18 @@ def get_api_key(provider_name):
     env_map = {"openrouter": "OPENROUTER_API_KEY", "openai": "OPENAI_API_KEY", "anthropic": "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", "ollama_cloud": "OLLAMA_CLOUD_API_KEY"}
     return os.environ.get(env_map.get(provider_name, ""), "")
 
-DB_DSN = "dbname=knowledge_base user=kbuser password=IPbLBA0EQI8u4TeM2YZrbm1OAy5nSwqC host=localhost"
+# Cross-lineage scrum 2026-04-30 (Opus BLOCK OB-2 + harness LLM
+# convergent finding): DB_DSN previously had the password hardcoded
+# in source. Same `kbuser`/`knowledge_base` DSN was leaked in
+# voice-ai's audiosocket_bridge.py + sales_assistant.py — confirmed
+# canonical leak by 3 independent reviewers across 2 sessions. Now
+# sourced from env (set via systemd EnvironmentFile=/etc/llm-team-ui.env).
+# No silent fallback to the leaked literal — fail loud. The leaked
+# password is in git history regardless; rotate it in Postgres.
+DB_DSN = os.environ.get("LLM_TEAM_DB_DSN", "")
+if not DB_DSN:
+    print("[llm-team-ui] WARNING: LLM_TEAM_DB_DSN not set — DB ops will fail. "
+          "Set in systemd EnvironmentFile or shell env.", file=sys.stderr, flush=True)
 
 def get_db():
     return psycopg2.connect(DB_DSN)