Closes Sprint 2 design-bar work (audit reports/scrum/sprint-backlog.md):
S2.1 — ADR-004 documents the pathway-memory data model
S2.2 — pathway port lands with deterministic fixture corpus
and full test coverage on day one
S2.3 — retired traces are excluded from retrieval (test
passes; would fail without the filter)
Mem0-style operations: Add / AddIdempotent / Update / Revise /
Retire / Get / History / Search. Each operation is a method on
Store; persistence is JSONL append-only with corruption recovery
on Replay.
internal/pathway/types.go Trace + event + SearchFilter + sentinel errors
internal/pathway/store.go in-memory state + RWMutex + ops
internal/pathway/persistor.go JSONL append-only log with replay
internal/pathway/store_test.go 20 test funcs covering all 7
Sprint 2 claim rows + concurrency
internal/pathway/persistor_test.go 6 test funcs covering missing-
file, corruption recovery, long-line
handling, parent-dir auto-create,
apply-error skip behavior
Sprint 2 claim coverage row-by-row:
ADD TestAdd_AssignsUIDAndTimestamps + TestAdd_RejectsInvalidJSON
UPDATE TestUpdate_ReplacesContentSameUID + Update_MissingUID_Errors
REVISE TestRevise_LinksToPredecessorViaHistory +
TestRevise_PredecessorMissing_Errors +
TestRevise_ChainOfThree_BackwardWalk
RETIRE TestRetire_ExcludedFromSearch +
TestRetire_StillAccessibleViaGet +
TestRetire_StillAccessibleViaHistory
HISTORY/cycle TestHistory_CycleDetected (injected via internal map),
TestHistory_PredecessorMissing_TruncatesChain,
TestHistory_UnknownUID_ErrorsClean
REPLAY/dup TestAddIdempotent_IncrementsReplayCount (locks the
"replay preserves original content" rule per ADR-004)
CORRUPTION TestPersistor_CorruptedLines_Skipped +
TestPersistor_ApplyError_Skipped
ROUND-TRIP TestPersistor_RoundTrip locks the full Save → fresh
Store → Load → Stats-match contract
Two real bugs caught during testing:
- Add returned the same *Trace stored in the map, so callers
holding a reference saw later mutations. Fixed: clone before
return (matches Get's contract). Same fix in AddIdempotent
+ Revise.
- Test typo: {"v":different} isn't valid JSON; AddIdempotent's
json.Valid rejected it as ErrInvalidContent. Test fixed to
use {"v":"different"}; the validation behavior is correct.
Skipped this commit (next):
- cmd/pathwayd HTTP binary
- gateway routing for /v1/pathway/*
- end-to-end smoke
These add the wire surface; the substrate ships first so the
wire layer can be a pure proxy in the next commit.
Verified:
go test -count=1 ./internal/pathway/ — 26 tests green
just verify — vet + test + 9 smokes 34s
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
16 KiB
Architecture Decision Records — Lakehouse-Go
ADRs from the Go era. Numbered fresh from 001 to start clean lineage.
Where a Rust ADR (numbered 001–021 in the Rust repo's DECISIONS.md)
remains in force, this file references it explicitly. Where a Rust
ADR is superseded, the new ADR records why.
ADR-001: Foundational decisions for the Go rewrite
Date: 2026-04-28 Decided by: J Status: Ratified — Phase G0 unblocked
The six questions that gated Phase G0 (per PRD.md / SPEC.md §8) are all answered.
Decision 1.1 — DuckDB via cgo for the query engine
Decision: queryd uses marcboeker/go-duckdb (cgo bindings to
DuckDB). Pure-Go alternative was rejected.
Rationale: DuckDB reads Parquet natively, supports the SQL surface DataFusion exposed in the Rust era (CTEs, window functions, hybrid joins), and runs in-process with cgo. The alternatives were:
- Hand-rolling a query planner over arrow-go RecordBatches — multi-engineer-month research project; high risk of correctness bugs.
- Running DuckDB as an external process — adds an operational surface and a network hop to every query.
Cgo build complexity is the accepted cost. Single-binary deploy preserved (the cgo dependency embeds at link time).
Supersedes Rust ADR-001 (object storage as source of truth) — no. That ADR remains in force; the change is the engine over the storage, not the storage model.
Decision 1.2 — HTMX for the UI
Decision: Frontend is html/template + HTMX + Alpine.js,
server-rendered by cmd/gateway. React/Vite in a separate repo is the
fallback if UX requirements demand SPA-tier interactivity post-G5.
Rationale: The existing Lakehouse UIs (/lakehouse/ demo + staffer
console) are mostly server-rendered HTML with vanilla JS that already
fits the HTMX style. Single-binary deploy is preserved (gateway serves
templates + static assets). No build chain beyond go build.
The React fallback is named explicitly so it's not relitigated unless an actual UX requirement triggers it.
Decision 1.3 — Gitea hosts the new repo
Decision: Repo lives at git.agentview.dev/profit/golangLAKEHOUSE
(same Gitea server that hosts the Rust lakehouse).
Rationale: Single source of truth for repo hosting; existing
auditor tooling (lakehouse-auditor systemd service) already speaks
Gitea API; existing credentials work; no new ops surface.
Decision 1.4 — Distillation rebuilt in Go, not ported verbatim
Decision: The distillation v1.0.0 substrate (tag distillation-v1.0.0 at e7636f2 in the Rust repo) is not
bit-identical-ported. The Go reimplementation:
- Ports the LOGIC: SFT export pipeline, contamination firewall (the
quality_scoreenum +SFT_NEVERconstant), category mapping rules, audit-baselines append-only pattern. - Does NOT port the FIXTURES:
tests/fixtures/distillation/acceptance/is rebuilt from scratch in Go with new ground-truth golden files. - Does NOT port the bit-identical reproducibility PROPERTY: that was measured against the Rust implementation. The Go implementation establishes its own reproducibility baseline.
Rationale: Bit-identical reproducibility was a measured property of a specific implementation, not a portable invariant. Re-establishing it in Go means new fixtures, new gates, new audit-baselines. This is honest about what's transferring (logic) versus what's a Rust-era artifact (the specific bit-identical hashes).
Risk: the contamination firewall is the most consequential distillation safety net. The port must be reviewed line-by-line, and the new Go fixtures must include adversarial cases that prove the firewall works in the new implementation. See SPEC §7 acceptance gates.
Decision 1.5 — Pathway memory starts clean; old traces preserved as reference
Decision: Go pathway memory begins with zero traces. The existing
88 Rust traces at
/home/profit/lakehouse/data/_pathway_memory/state.json are NOT loaded
into the Go implementation. They are preserved as a historical record
in the Rust repo and documented at docs/RUST_PATHWAY_MEMORY_NOTE.md.
Rationale: The Rust pathway memory's value compounded over months of scrum cycles. Loading those traces into a Go implementation that hasn't proven its byte-matching contract risks corrupting the new substrate's signal with semantically-mismatched data. Starting clean keeps the Go pathway memory's lineage clean and lets the byte-match correctness be proven on a known input (per SPEC §3.4 G3.4.B).
The historical note records the 88 traces' value (11/11 successful replays at the time of freeze) so the Go implementation has a reference baseline to outperform.
Decision 1.6 — Auditor longitudinal signal restarts
Decision: The Rust auditor's audit_baselines.jsonl
(longitudinal drift signal accumulated across PRs #6–#13) is not
ported to Go. The Go auditor begins a fresh audit_baselines.jsonl
lineage on its first PR.
Rationale: The drift signal is anchored to specific Rust commits, verdict shapes, and Kimi/Haiku/Opus rotation traces. Carrying it into the Go era would be like grafting Rust-PR audit history onto the first Go PR's prologue — confusing more than informative. Restarting gives the Go auditor a clean baseline to measure drift against.
The existing Rust audit_baselines.jsonl stays in the Rust repo as a
historical record.
ADR-002: storaged per-prefix PUT cap (vectord _vectors/ → 4 GiB)
Date: 2026-04-29
Decided by: J
Status: Implemented (commit 423a381)
storaged enforces a 256 MiB per-PUT body cap as DoS protection
(MaxBytesReader + Content-Length check). Keys under _vectors/
(vectord LHV1 persistence) get a raised cap of 4 GiB; everything
else stays at 256 MiB.
Rationale: the 500K staffing test surfaced that single-file LHV1
above ~150K vectors at d=768 hits the 256 MiB cap. manager.Uploader
already streams on the outbound side, so the cap is a safety gate
not a memory bottleneck — raising it for the vector path doesn't
introduce new memory pressure. Per-prefix preserves the safety
gate for routine traffic while opening the documented production
path. Splitting LHV1 across multiple keys was rejected because G1P
specifically shipped the single-Put framed format to eliminate
torn-write — multi-key would re-introduce that failure mode.
Follow-up: if production workloads exceed 4 GiB single-file
LHV1, refactor to operator-driven config (env/TOML) rather than
bumping the constant. The function-level maxPutBytesFor(key) in
cmd/storaged/main.go keeps that drop-in clean.
ADR-003: Inter-service auth posture — Bearer token + IP allowlist
Date: 2026-04-29 Decided by: J + Claude Status: Decided — wiring deferred to Sprint 1
Decision: When inter-service auth is needed (the moment any
binary binds non-loopback or the deployment crosses a trust
boundary), the auth model is a Bearer token loaded from
secrets-go.toml plus a configurable IP allowlist. Both layers
required: the token authenticates the caller; the allowlist
narrows the network surface.
Status today (G0): zero auth middleware. Every binary binds
127.0.0.1 by default; commit 6af0520 (R-001 partial fix) refuses
non-loopback bind unless the per-service LH_<SVC>_ALLOW_NONLOOPBACK=1
env override is set. The override-and-no-auth combination is the
worst case — this ADR locks in what we'll require before any
production override fires.
What gets implemented when auth lands
-
secrets-go.tomladds a[auth]section:[auth] token = "..." # 32+ random bytes, hex-encoded allowed_ips = ["10.0.0.0/8", "127.0.0.1/32"] # CIDR list -
internal/shared/auth.goships a single chi middleware:func RequireAuth(cfg AuthConfig) func(http.Handler) http.Handler- Empty
cfg.Token→ middleware is a no-op (G0 dev mode). - Non-empty token → reject 401 unless request has
Authorization: Bearer <token>matching constant-time. - Non-empty
allowed_ips→ reject 403 unlessr.RemoteAddr(orX-Forwarded-Forfirst hop, configurable) is in CIDR set. /healthexempt — load balancers + monitors need it open.
- Empty
-
Every
cmd/<svc>/main.goadds one line:r.Use(shared.RequireAuth(cfg.Auth))Mounted before
register(r)so it covers every route the binary exposes after/health. -
shared.Runstartup gate: if bind is non-loopback ANDcfg.Auth.Token == "", refuse to start. The implicit "localhost is the auth layer" guarantee becomes explicit when crossing the loopback boundary.
Alternatives considered
| Option | Why rejected |
|---|---|
| mTLS | Strongest but heaviest — every binary needs cert provisioning, rotation tooling, and cert-aware client wiring. Overkill for inter-service traffic that already passes through a single gateway. Reconsider when Lakehouse-Go runs across machines. |
| JWT with short TTL | Buys nothing over Bearer here — there's no third-party identity provider, no claim hierarchy worth modelling. Pure token has the same security properties at half the wire complexity. |
| No auth, IP-allowlist only | One stolen IP allowlist entry → full access. Token + IP is defense in depth; either alone is too weak. |
| OAuth2 via external IdP | Rejected for G0–G3 timeline. No external IdP commitment. Revisit if Lakehouse-Go ever serves end-user requests directly (today everything fronts through the staffing co-pilot which has its own session model). |
Constant-time comparison + token hygiene
Token comparison must use crypto/subtle.ConstantTimeCompare —
naive == is vulnerable to timing attacks against an attacker who
can issue many requests and measure round-trip. Token rotation is
operator-driven via secrets-go.toml edit + restart; G0 doesn't
need rotate-without-restart.
What this ADR does NOT do
- Does not implement the middleware. Code lands in Sprint 1.
- Does not require token in G0 dev. Empty token → no-op. Smokes
- proof harness keep working without setting tokens.
- Does not address gateway → end-user auth. Gateway terminates inter-service auth at its inbound; if end-users hit gateway from a browser, that's a different ADR (likely cookie/session, fronted by a reverse proxy that handles user auth).
How this closes audit findings
- R-001 (queryd /sql RCE-equivalent off-loopback): the bind gate prevents accidental exposure today; this ADR specifies the guardrail when intentional exposure is needed.
- R-007 (zero auth middleware): answered by the design above; R-007 stays open until the middleware is implemented but is no longer "design TBD."
- R-010 (no CORS posture): orthogonal to inter-service auth,
but the
RequireAuthmiddleware sits at the right layer to add CORS handling later (browsers don't reach inter-service routes in the current design, so CORS is also Sprint 1+ when end-user requests start landing).
ADR-004: Pathway memory data model — Mem0-style versioned traces
Date: 2026-04-29
Decided by: J + Claude
Status: Decided — substrate landing in internal/pathway/
Decision: Pathway memory is an append-only event log of opaque
traces with Mem0-style semantics: Add / Update / Revise / Retire /
History / Search. Each trace has a UID; revisions chain backward
via predecessor_uid so the full history is reconstructible.
Persistence is JSONL append-only with full-replay on load;
corruption recovery skips bad lines without halting startup.
Operations
| Op | Effect |
|---|---|
Add(content, tags...) |
New UID, stored fresh, replay_count=1. |
AddIdempotent(uid, content, tags...) |
If UID exists → replay_count++. Else → Add with that UID. |
Update(uid, content) |
In-place content replacement (same UID). Bumps updated_at_ns. NOT a revision — same trace, new content. |
Revise(predecessorUID, content, tags...) |
New UID with predecessor_uid set. Old trace stays accessible via History. Failure modes: predecessor missing → error; predecessor retired → still allowed (revisions of retired traces are valid). |
Retire(uid) |
Sets retired=true. Excluded from Search by default; still accessible via Get and History. |
Get(uid) |
Returns the trace (including if retired); error on missing. |
History(uid) |
Walks predecessor_uid chain backward, returns slice [self, parent, grandparent, ...]. Cycle-detected via visited-set; returns error on cycle (which only happens if persistence file was hand-edited). |
Search(filter) |
Returns matching traces. Default excludes retired; opt in via IncludeRetired: true. Filters: tag-match, content-substring, time range. |
Why Mem0-style + Why these specific ops
- Mem0 (memory pattern from the OpenAI Memories paper / Mem0 lib) is the canonical "agent memory" interface for the same reason Markdown is the canonical text format: it's the lowest-common- denominator that the entire ecosystem assumes. Adopting it lets agent loops written against any Mem0-aware substrate work here.
- Update vs Revise are deliberately separate. Update is "I noticed a typo in my note." Revise is "I now believe something different than I did when I wrote this; preserve the old belief for audit." Conflating them loses the audit trail.
- Retire vs Delete is deliberate. Retire stops a trace from surfacing in search but preserves it for history reconstruction. Delete (which we don't expose) would break references.
Trace data shape
type Trace struct {
UID string // UUID v4 unless caller provides one
Content json.RawMessage // opaque, schema is caller's contract
PredecessorUID string // empty if root revision
CreatedAtNs int64
UpdatedAtNs int64
Retired bool
ReplayCount int // ≥1 for any stored trace
Tags []string // for Search
}
Content is opaque JSON (not a struct) so callers can store any
shape — the data model doesn't constrain semantics. Callers add
their own validators on top.
Persistence
JSONL append-only log under _pathway/<store_name>.jsonl. Each
mutation appends one JSON line:
{"op":"add", "trace":{...}}
{"op":"update", "uid":"…", "content":"…"}
{"op":"revise", "trace":{…}} # trace.PredecessorUID is set
{"op":"retire", "uid":"…"}
{"op":"replay", "uid":"…"} # idempotent re-add hit
On startup, replay every line in order, building in-memory state. A malformed line logs a warn and is skipped; load continues. Corruption tolerance is non-optional — partial state is better than no state for an agent substrate.
Compaction is a future concern. A 100K-trace log replays in seconds; below that scale, JSONL append is the simplest correct choice. When compaction lands, the format will be: snapshot file (full state JSON) + tail JSONL since snapshot. Detect snapshot, load it, then replay tail.
Cycle safety
UIDs are generated server-side via uuid.New() (existing dep —
catalogd uses it). New UID for every Add and Revise. The data
model itself can't form cycles — every Revise points at an
EXISTING uid, and the new uid didn't exist a moment ago.
History walks defensively anyway: visited-set tracks UIDs seen this walk; if we encounter a duplicate, return error. Protects against corruption (manual edit, bug in a future op) without constraining the happy path.
Storage location
JSONL file path is configurable per store. Default:
/var/lib/lakehouse/pathway/<name>.jsonl for prod; tests use
t.TempDir(). Persistence is OPTIONAL — empty path means
in-memory only (matches vectord G1's pattern).
What this ADR does NOT do
- No HTTP surface decision. Whether
cmd/pathwaydis its own binary or routes get added tocmd/vectordis the next ADR's concern. The substrate is a pure library either way. - No vector index integration. Pathway traces can carry a
vector embedding in
Content(caller decides), but this ADR doesn't define how the substrate integrates withvectord's HNSW indexes. That's the staffing co-pilot's design problem when those layers compose. - No agent-loop semantics. "When does an agent ADD vs REVISE?" is a workflow decision, not a substrate decision.
(Future ADRs from ADR-005 onward will be added as the Go implementation accrues design decisions — e.g. observer fail-safe semantics, distillation rebuild, gRPC adapter wire format, etc.)