golangLAKEHOUSE/docs/PHASE_G0_KICKOFF.md

# Phase G0 Kickoff Plan

**Goal:** smallest end-to-end ingest+query path in Go. Upload a CSV
via `POST /ingest`, query it via `POST /sql`, get rows back. No
vector, no profile, no UI yet.

**Estimated duration:** 1 engineer-week (5 working days + gate day +
cleanup). Plan is calibrated for solo work; cut by ~40% with two
engineers in parallel on storaged/catalogd vs ingestd/queryd.

**Cutoff for G0:** the closing acceptance gate (Day 6) passes
end-to-end against `workers_500k.csv` as the test fixture.

---

## Day 0 — One-time setup

Done by an operator with sudo on the dev box. ~15 minutes.

| # | Step | Verify |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1 | Install Go 1.23+: `curl -L https://go.dev/dl/go1.23.linux-amd64.tar.gz \| sudo tar -C /usr/local -xz` | `go version` shows 1.23+ |
| 0.2 | Add `/usr/local/go/bin` to `PATH` (in `~/.bashrc`) | new shell sees `go` |
| 0.3 | Install cgo toolchain: `apt install build-essential` | `gcc --version` works |
| 0.4 | Clone repo: `git clone https://git.agentview.dev/profit/golangLAKEHOUSE.git` | `cd golangLAKEHOUSE && go version` from inside |
| 0.5 | Bring up MinIO locally (or point at existing) | `mc ls local/` lists buckets, or whatever the dev S3 is |
| 0.6 | Verify DuckDB cgo path with a real compile-and-run smoke (NOT `go install pkg@latest` — that requires a main package and would fail on the duckdb library before exercising cgo). Steps: `mkdir /tmp/duckdb-smoke && cd /tmp/duckdb-smoke && go mod init smoke && go get github.com/duckdb/duckdb-go/v2 && cat > main.go <<<'package main; import (_ "github.com/duckdb/duckdb-go/v2"; "database/sql"); func main(){db,_:=sql.Open("duckdb","");db.Ping();db.Close()}' && go run main.go` — proves cgo linker chain + static-linked duckdb-go-bindings work on this platform | exits 0, no link errors |

**Day 0 acceptance:** `go version` shows 1.23+, `gcc --version` works,
MinIO reachable on `localhost:9000`, the cgo smoke install above
succeeded. (`go mod tidy` is intentionally NOT run here — no imports
yet; verification moves to D1.)

---

## Day 1 — Skeleton + chi + /health × 5 binaries

**Goal:** five binaries build, each binds to its port, `/health`
returns `{"status":"ok","service":"<name>"}`.

| # | File | What |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1 | `internal/shared/server.go` | chi router factory, slog setup, graceful shutdown via `signal.NotifyContext` |
| 1.2 | `internal/shared/config.go` | TOML loader using `pelletier/go-toml/v2`, default + override pattern |
| 1.3 | `cmd/gateway/main.go` | port **3110**, `/health` |
| 1.4 | `cmd/storaged/main.go` | port **3211**, `/health` |
| 1.5 | `cmd/catalogd/main.go` | port **3212**, `/health` |
| 1.6 | `cmd/ingestd/main.go` | port **3213**, `/health` |
| 1.7 | `cmd/queryd/main.go` | port **3214**, `/health` |

**Port shift note:** Original SPEC said 3100/3201–3204; D1 runtime
caught a collision — the live Rust lakehouse owns 3100. Shifted Go
dev ports to 3110+ so both systems can run concurrently during the
migration. G5 cutover flips gateway back to 3100 when Rust retires.
| 1.8 | `lakehouse.toml` | bind addresses, log level — sample committed |
| 1.9 | `Makefile` | `build`, `run-gateway`, etc. — convenience |
| 1.10 | `cmd/gateway/main.go` adds STUB routes `POST /v1/ingest` and `POST /v1/sql` returning `501 Not Implemented` with a header `X-Lakehouse-Stub: g0`. Real reverse-proxy wiring lands on Day 6, but the routes exist from D1 so D6 is just behavior change, not new endpoints. | `curl -X POST :3100/v1/ingest` returns 501 with the stub header |

**Acceptance D1:** `go mod tidy` populates `go.sum` cleanly; `go build
./cmd/...` exits 0; running each binary in a separate terminal,
`curl :3100/health` through `:3204/health` all return `200 OK` with
the expected JSON; gateway's stub `/v1/*` routes return 501.

**Dependencies pulled:** `go-chi/chi/v5`, `pelletier/go-toml/v2`.

---

## Day 2 — storaged: S3 GET/PUT/LIST

**Goal:** put a file, get it back, list it.

| # | File | What |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1 | `internal/storaged/bucket.go` | `aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3` wrapper — `Get`, `Put`, `List`, `Delete` |
| 2.2 | `internal/storaged/registry.go` | `BucketRegistry` skeleton (per Rust ADR-017) — single bucket only in G0; multi-bucket lands in G2 |
| 2.3 | `internal/secrets/provider.go` | `SecretsProvider` interface + `FileSecretsProvider` reading `/etc/lakehouse/secrets.toml` |
| 2.4 | `cmd/storaged/main.go` | wire routes — `GET /storage/get/{key}`, `PUT /storage/put/{key}`, `GET /storage/list?prefix=...`. Bind to `127.0.0.1:3201` only (G0 is dev-only, no auth). Apply `http.MaxBytesReader` with a **256 MiB per-request cap** (reduced from 2 GiB per Qwen3-coder Q1 — 2 GiB × N concurrent = blow the box) + a **buffered semaphore** capping concurrent in-flight PUTs at 4. PUTs exceeding the cap → 413; PUTs blocked on the semaphore → 503 with `Retry-After: 5` |

**Acceptance D2:** `curl -T sample.csv 127.0.0.1:3201/storage/put/test/sample.csv`
returns 200; `curl 127.0.0.1:3201/storage/get/test/sample.csv` echoes
the file bytes; `curl 127.0.0.1:3201/storage/list?prefix=test/` lists
`sample.csv`; PUT exceeding 2 GiB returns `413 Payload Too Large`.

**Open question:** error journal (Rust ADR-018 append-log pattern) —
defer to G2 with multi-bucket federation, or wire it now? Plan says
defer; revisit if errors surface during D3-D5.

---

## Day 3 — catalogd: Parquet manifests

**Goal:** register a dataset, persist to storaged, restart, manifest
still visible.

| # | File | What |
|---|---|---|
| 3.1 | `internal/catalogd/manifest.go` | Parquet read/write using `arrow-go/v18/parquet/pqarrow`. Schema: `dataset_id`, `name`, `schema_fingerprint`, `objects`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `row_count` |
| 3.2 | `internal/catalogd/registry.go` | In-memory index (map[name]Manifest), rehydrated on startup from `primary://_catalog/manifests/*.parquet` |
| 3.3 | `cmd/catalogd/main.go` | wire routes — `POST /catalog/register` (idempotent by name + fingerprint per Rust ADR-020), `GET /catalog/manifest/{name}`, `GET /catalog/list` |
| 3.4 | `internal/catalogd/store_client.go` | thin HTTP client to `cmd/storaged` — round-trips manifest Parquets |

**Acceptance D3:** register a dataset, see it in `/catalog/list`,
restart catalogd, `/catalog/list` still shows it. Re-register same
name + same fingerprint → 200, same `dataset_id`. Different
fingerprint → 409 Conflict.

---

## Day 4 — ingestd: CSV → Parquet → catalog

**Goal:** `POST /ingest` with a CSV file produces a Parquet in
storaged + a manifest in catalogd.

| # | File | What |
|---|---|---|
| 4.1 | `internal/ingestd/schema.go` | infer Arrow schema from CSV header + first-N-row sampling. ADR-010 default-to-string on ambiguity |
| 4.2 | `internal/ingestd/csv.go` | stream CSV → `array.RecordBatch` → Parquet (arrow-go pqarrow writer) |
| 4.3 | `cmd/ingestd/main.go` | route `POST /ingest` — multipart form file → schema infer → write Parquet → call catalogd to register |

**Acceptance D4:** `curl -F file=@workers_500k.csv :3203/ingest?name=workers_500k`
returns 200 with the registered manifest; `aws s3 ls` (or `mc ls`)
shows the Parquet under `primary://datasets/workers_500k/`;
`curl :3202/catalog/manifest/workers_500k` returns the manifest with
`row_count=500000`.

---

## Day 5 — queryd: DuckDB SELECT

**Goal:** SQL queries over Parquet datasets.

| # | File | What |
|---|---|---|
| 5.1 | `internal/queryd/db.go` | `database/sql` connection to `github.com/duckdb/duckdb-go/v2` (cgo). Ensures DuckDB extensions Parquet + httpfs are loaded; on connection open, executes `CREATE SECRET` (TYPE S3) populated from `internal/secrets/provider.go` so `read_parquet('s3://...')` against MinIO authenticates per session |
| 5.2 | `internal/queryd/registrar.go` | reads catalogd `/catalog/list`, registers each dataset as a DuckDB view: `CREATE VIEW workers_500k AS SELECT * FROM read_parquet('s3://...')` |
| 5.3 | `cmd/queryd/main.go` | route `POST /sql` (JSON body `{"sql": "..."}`). View refresh strategy: cache views with a TTL (default 30s) + invalidate on `If-None-Match` against catalogd's manifest etag. **Don't** re-CREATE on every request — Opus review flagged that as the perf cliff during D6 timing capture |

**Acceptance D5:** after Day 4 ingestion,
`curl -X POST -d '{"sql":"SELECT count(*) FROM workers_500k"}' :3204/sql`
returns `[{"count_star()":500000}]`. A `SELECT role, count(*) FROM
workers_500k WHERE state='IL' GROUP BY role` returns expected rows.

---

## Day 6 — Gate day: end-to-end via gateway

**Goal:** the closing G0 acceptance gate passes.

| # | What |
|---|---|
| 6.1 | Promote `cmd/gateway/main.go` `/v1/ingest` + `/v1/sql` from D1.10 stubs (501) to real reverse-proxies. `httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy` preserves the inbound path by default, so the proxy must use a custom `Director` (or `Rewrite`) that strips the `/v1` prefix before forwarding — otherwise the call lands on `ingestd:3203/v1/ingest` which doesn't exist (ingestd serves `/ingest`, queryd serves `/sql`). Multipart forwarding for `/v1/ingest` is the riskiest hop — verify form parts pass through with the file body intact |
| 6.2 | Smoke script `scripts/g0_smoke.sh`: spin up MinIO + 5 services, ingest, query, assert row count |
| 6.3 | Run smoke against `workers_500k.csv` end-to-end |
| 6.4 | Capture timing — total ingest + query latency, file size, peak memory |

**Closing G0 acceptance:** `scripts/g0_smoke.sh` exits 0. Numbers
recorded in `docs/G0_BASELINE.md` for future regression comparison.

---

## Day 7 — Cleanup + retro

| # | What |
|---|---|
| 7.1 | Update SPEC §4 G0 with what actually shipped vs planned (deviations, surprises) |
| 7.2 | Write `docs/G0_BASELINE.md` — measured perf numbers + comparison hooks for G1+ |
| 7.3 | **Finalize** ADRs that were stubbed *before* their decisions landed — ADR stubs go in at the start of D4 (arrow-go version pin, schema inference policy) and D5 (DuckDB extension load order, S3 secret provisioning, view-refresh TTL) so reviewers can object in-flight; D7 just commits them after running real code against the calls |
| 7.4 | Tag the commit `phase-g0-complete` |
| 7.5 | Open follow-up issues for anything punted (error journal, multi-bucket, profile system, two-phase-write orphan GC, shared-server.go refactor for cgo-handle services) |

---

## Risks tracked across the week

| Risk | Where | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| cgo build fails on the dev box | D5 | D0.3 verifies `gcc` present; if cgo specifically breaks, fall back to DuckDB external process (SPEC §3.1 option B) |
| arrow-go pqarrow schema mismatch with CSV inference | D4 | Sample 1k rows for type inference, default to String per ADR-010, log when defaulting |
| DuckDB can't read S3 Parquet directly | D5 | Load `httpfs` extension explicitly; if it fails, copy Parquet to a local temp file before query (slow but correct) |
| `/catalog/register` race between ingestd writer and catalogd reader | D3-D4 | Same write-lock-across-storage-write pattern as Rust ADR-020 — serialize registers; throughput is OK at low ingest QPS |
| `workers_500k.csv` schema drifts vs Rust era | D4 | Plan calls for inferring fresh, not porting Rust schema. If staffer-domain features break in G3+, revisit |

---

## Out of scope for G0 (deferred to later phases)

- Vector indexing — Phase G1
- Multi-bucket / federation — Phase G2
- Profile system — Phase G2
- Hot-swap atomicity — Phase G2
- Pathway memory — Phase G3
- Distillation pipeline — Phase G3
- MCP server / observer / auditor — Phase G4
- HTMX UI — Phase G5
- TLS, auth — explicit non-goal until G2 (single-bucket no-auth dev)

---

## Open questions before Day 1

1. **MinIO instance** — reuse the existing one at `localhost:9000`
   that lakehouse uses (shared dev box) or stand up a fresh one with
   a separate bucket prefix?
2. **`/etc/lakehouse/secrets.toml`** — share the lakehouse repo's
   secrets file or create `/etc/golangLAKEHOUSE/secrets.toml`?
3. **Workers CSV source** — derive from `workers_500k.parquet` (round-
   trip back to CSV) or use `workers_500k_v9.csv` if it exists?

These are ops calls, not architecture. Answer when D0 is being
executed.

---

## Self-review — independent pass via gateway overseer

Reviewer: `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` via `localhost:3100/v1/chat`
(the same path the production overseer correction loop uses post-G0
in the Rust era). Run on the original draft before any of the inline
fixes above were applied. Findings dispositioned below.

### BLOCK — both real, both fixed inline

| # | Finding | Disposition | Fix location |
|---|---|---|---|
| B1 | `apt install build-essential` alone won't satisfy the cgo link step for `duckdb-go/v2` | **Fixed** — D0.6 now runs a smoke `go install` against an empty module on D0 to flush platform issues here, not on D5 | D0.6 |
| B2 | DuckDB session needs S3 credentials (`CREATE SECRET`) plumbed from SecretsProvider; "load httpfs" alone leaves auth unwired | **Fixed** — D5.1 now calls `CREATE SECRET (TYPE S3, ...)` on connection open, populated from `internal/secrets/provider.go` | D5.1 |

### WARN — 4 of 5 fixed inline; 1 deferred

| # | Finding | Disposition | Fix location |
|---|---|---|---|
| W1 | Two-phase write (storaged → catalogd register) leaves orphan Parquets on partial failure; no GC story | **Deferred** — punted to G2 alongside multi-bucket + error journal; tracked in §Risks and D7.5 follow-up | D7.5 |
| W2 | "Refresh views on each `/sql` call" will be the D6 perf cliff | **Fixed** — D5.3 now uses TTL-cached views with etag invalidation against catalogd | D5.3 |
| W3 | Shared `internal/shared/server.go` factory across heterogeneous binaries (HTTP ingress vs cgo-DB-holder) couples graceful-shutdown semantics that will need unwinding later | **Accepted with note** — G0 keeps the simple shared factory; refactor explicitly listed as a G1+ follow-up | D7.5 |
| W4 | storaged PUT/GET on a TCP port with no auth + no body cap is a footgun | **Fixed** — D2.4 now binds `127.0.0.1` only and applies a 2 GiB `MaxBytesReader` cap | D2.4 |
| W5 | Gateway reverse-proxy introduced cold on D6 gate day compresses risk into the deadline | **Fixed** — D1.10 now stubs the routes returning 501; D6.1 just promotes them to real proxies | D1.10 + D6.1 |

### INFO — both fixed inline

| # | Finding | Disposition | Fix location |
|---|---|---|---|
| I1 | `go mod tidy` before any imports is a trivial-true verification | **Fixed** — D0.6 re-purposed for the cgo smoke; tidy verification moved to D1 acceptance | D0.6 + D1 acceptance |
| I2 | Filing ADRs *after* the work is done inverts the usual pattern | **Fixed** — D7.3 reframed: ADR stubs go in at the start of D4/D5 so reviewers can object in-flight; D7.3 just finalizes them | D7.3 |

### Net change (Opus pass)

7 of 9 findings produced inline plan edits; 2 deferred to post-G0
follow-up issues (W1 orphan GC, W3 shared-server refactor) with the
deferral itself documented. No findings dismissed as confabulation.

---

## Self-review — second pass via Kimi K2.6 (cross-lineage)

Reviewer: `opencode/kimi-k2.6` via the same gateway path. Run on the
post-Opus-fix doc to surface what a different model lineage catches.
Per the Rust-era cross-lineage rotation pattern, Kimi tends to ground
on textual specifics where Opus surfaces architectural shape — both
lenses are useful.

Kimi's output was discursive (pre-format thinking rather than the
requested BLOCK/WARN/INFO bullets), but two concrete catches landed —
both BLOCKs that Opus missed and that the Opus-pass fixes themselves
introduced.

### BLOCK — both real, both fixed inline

| # | Finding | Disposition | Fix location |
|---|---|---|---|
| K1 | Opus's BLOCK B1 fix used `go install github.com/duckdb/duckdb-go/v2@latest` to verify cgo, but `go install pkg@version` requires a `main` package — duckdb-go/v2 is a library, so the command fails with "not a main package" *before* the cgo linker chain is exercised. The verification can pass on a broken-cgo box. | **Fixed** — D0.6 now creates a temporary module + a 5-line `main.go` that imports duckdb-go/v2 and calls `sql.Open("duckdb","")`, then `go run`s it — actually compiles + executes with cgo | D0.6 |
| K2 | Path mismatch: D1.10 stubs `/v1/ingest` and `/v1/sql` on the gateway, but D4 has ingestd serving `/ingest` and D5 has queryd serving `/sql`. D6.1's `httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy` preserves the inbound path by default, so the proxy would forward to `ingestd:3203/v1/ingest` which doesn't exist. Smoke would fail on D6 with a 404 on the backend, not the gateway. | **Fixed** — D6.1 now specifies a custom `Director` that strips the `/v1` prefix before forwarding | D6.1 |

### WARN — none extracted (Kimi response truncated at this section)

The remaining response stream considered D2.4 `MaxBytesReader` semantics
and D3 manifest registry concurrency, but cut off before producing
structured findings. A third pass could be run if more lineage
coverage is wanted — for now, two BLOCKs fixed is the cross-lineage
delta.

### Net change (Kimi pass)

2 BLOCKs landed, both fixed inline. Both were *introduced by Opus-pass
fixes* — illustrating exactly why cross-lineage rotation matters: one
model's review of the original is not the same as a different model's
review of the post-fix version. The Rust auditor's Kimi/Haiku/Opus
rotation captures this dynamic; today's two-pass doc review reproduces
it on a much smaller scale.

---

## Self-review — third pass via Qwen3-coder:480b (cross-lineage)

Reviewer: `qwen3-coder:480b` via `ollama_cloud` (Ollama Pro). Largest
single-model open-weights coder in the fleet. Run on the post-Kimi-fix
doc.

### Output style note
Qwen3-coder's response was 80% **approval of prior fixes** (citing
B1/B2/K1/K2/I2 as "NEW BLOCKs/INFOs" — actually a misuse of the NEW
label, but useful as triangulation: three independent lineages now
agree the prior fixes are correct). Only 2 genuinely new WARNs.

### WARN — 1 fixed inline, 1 deferred

| # | Finding | Disposition | Fix location |
|---|---|---|---|
| Q1 | D2.4 `MaxBytesReader` at 2 GiB still permits memory exhaustion under concurrent uploads — N concurrent × 2 GiB blows the box | **Fixed** — D2.4 cap reduced to 256 MiB per request, plus a 4-slot semaphore on concurrent in-flight PUTs (503 + Retry-After when full) | D2.4 |
| Q2 | D5.3 view refresh has TTL + etag invalidation but no batching, so bursty queries against many datasets can re-issue catalog reads redundantly | **Deferred** — minor under G0's single-tenant load; revisit in G2 alongside the multi-bucket / profile work that creates more catalog churn | D7.5 |

### Net change (Qwen pass)

1 fixed inline, 1 deferred. The mislabeled "approval" output was net
positive — it's the closest thing to a triangulation signal we get
without a fourth model. With Opus + Kimi + Qwen all confirming the
prior fixes hold, the plan is unusually well-cross-checked for a
greenfield kickoff.

### Cumulative disposition across all 3 lineages

| Pass | Reviewer | New findings | Fixed | Deferred |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` | 9 | 7 | 2 |
| 2 | `opencode/kimi-k2.6` | 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 3 | `qwen3-coder:480b` (`ollama_cloud`) | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 4 | **runtime smoke** (D1 actual launch) | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| **Total** | | **14** | **11** | **3** |

The 4th pass — runtime smoke — caught the only thing three doc-review
lineages couldn't: port 3100 was already occupied by the live Rust
lakehouse. Documented and dispositioned same pattern as the model
findings.

Three deferrals, all to G2: orphan GC on two-phase write (W1),
shared-server refactor for cgo-handle services (W3), batched view
refresh (Q2). Tracked in D7.5.

---

## D1 — actual run results (2026-04-28)

Phase G0 Day 1 executed end-to-end. Output of `scripts/d1_smoke.sh`:

```
[d1-smoke] building...
[d1-smoke] launching...
[d1-smoke] /health probes:
  ✓ gateway (:3110) → {"status":"ok","service":"gateway"}
  ✓ storaged (:3211) → {"status":"ok","service":"storaged"}
  ✓ catalogd (:3212) → {"status":"ok","service":"catalogd"}
  ✓ ingestd (:3213) → {"status":"ok","service":"ingestd"}
  ✓ queryd (:3214) → {"status":"ok","service":"queryd"}
[d1-smoke] gateway 501 stub probes:
  ✓ POST /v1/ingest → 501 + X-Lakehouse-Stub: g0
  ✓ POST /v1/sql → 501 + X-Lakehouse-Stub: g0
[d1-smoke] D1 acceptance gate: PASSED
```

What landed:
- `internal/shared/server.go` — chi factory, slog JSON logging,
  `/health`, graceful shutdown via `signal.NotifyContext`
- `internal/shared/config.go` — TOML loader with `DefaultConfig()`
  and env-override-via-flag pattern (`-config` flag)
- `cmd/{gateway,storaged,catalogd,ingestd,queryd}/main.go` — five
  binaries, each ~30 lines, all using the shared factory
- `lakehouse.toml` — G0 dev config with the shifted 3110+ ports
- `scripts/d1_smoke.sh` — repeatable smoke test, exits 0 on PASS
- `bin/{gateway,storaged,catalogd,ingestd,queryd}` — built binaries
  (~9.7 MB each, no debug stripping)

What G0 didn't need but I added anyway (intentional):
- Gateway already has the D1.10 stub routes wired; D6.1 is just
  swap-the-handler.
- TOML config supports an S3 section even though storaged doesn't
  consume it until D2 — saves a config schema bump on D2.

Next: D2 — storaged's actual S3 GET/PUT/LIST routes against MinIO.

---

## D1 — code scrum review (3-lineage parallel pass)

After D1 shipped, the actual *code* (not docs) was reviewed by all
three lineages running in parallel — the cross-lineage discipline
applied to the implementation, not just the plan.

| Pass | Reviewer | Latency | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` | 24.9s | 2 BLOCK + 4 WARN + 2 INFO = 8 |
| 2 | `opencode/kimi-k2.6` | 18.3s | discursive output; 1 effective WARN extracted |
| 3 | `qwen3-coder:480b` (`ollama_cloud`) | 62.0s | 2 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 1 INFO = 5 |

### Convergent findings (caught by ≥2 reviewers — high confidence)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewers | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | BLOCK | `Run()` errCh/select race: fast bind error can be silently dropped | Opus + Qwen | **Fixed** — `net.Listen()` is now called synchronously before the goroutine; bind errors return as `Run`'s return value before any select |
| C2 | BLOCK | `sleep 0.5` in d1_smoke.sh races bind on cold-start boxes | Opus + Qwen | **Fixed** — replaced with `poll_health()` loop, 5s budget per service, 50ms poll interval |
| C3 | WARN | `LoadConfig` silent fallback when file missing | Opus + Qwen | **Fixed** — emits `slog.Warn` with path + hint when path was given but file absent |

### Single-reviewer findings (lineage-specific catches)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | WARN | `slog.SetDefault` mutates global state from a library function | Kimi | **Fixed** — `Run()` no longer calls `SetDefault`; logger is constructed locally and passed to middleware |
| S2 | WARN | `os.IsNotExist` → `errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist)` idiom | Opus | **Fixed** |
| S3 | WARN | secrets in `lakehouse.toml` — no `.gitignore` / env path | Opus | **Already planned** — D2.3 introduces `SecretsProvider`; D1 fields are empty strings |
| S4 | INFO | 5x near-identical `cmd/*/main.go` — could share a `Main()` helper | Opus | **Accepted** — defer until D2 surfaces the real per-service config consumption pattern |
| S5 | INFO | `/health` logs at Info — k8s liveness probes will dominate volume | Opus | **Accepted** — defer post-G0; G0 isn't on k8s yet |
| S6 | WARN | smoke double-curl per route doubles load + creates state window | Opus | **Fixed** — single `curl -i` parsed once for both code + headers |

### Second-pass review (post-fix code, Opus only)

After applying the first-round fixes, a second-pass Opus review
caught 1 self-downgraded BLOCK + 4 WARN + 2 INFO. Of those, only one
was a real new actionable: `head -1` on `curl -i` is fragile against
1xx interim lines. **Fixed** — switched to `awk '/^HTTP\//{code=$2} END{print code}'`
which picks the last status line (robust to `100 Continue` etc).

The other 5 second-pass findings were:
- Theoretical (clean-exit-without-Shutdown path that doesn't trigger today)
- Aspirational (defensive `defer ln.Close()` for hypothetical future code)
- Caught downstream (`poll_health` not identity-checking — but the followup probe IS identity-checked)
- Stylistic (`config.go`'s `slog.Warn` lands on the global default — but config loads BEFORE the service-level logger exists; accepting)
- Aspirational (`newListener` "for testability" indirection isn't needed yet)

### Cumulative D1 disposition

- Pass 1 (3 lineages parallel): 14 distinct findings (3 convergent + 11 single-reviewer; some overlap with prior doc-review findings)
- Pass 2 (Opus second-pass on post-fix code): 7 findings, 1 actionable fixed, 6 dispositioned
- **Total fixed in D1 code review: 7** · **accepted-with-rationale: 5** · **deferred: 0**
- Build clean (`go build ./cmd/...` exit 0), `go vet ./...` clean, smoke PASS after every fix round.

D1 ships harder than it would have without the scrum: bind-error
handling is now race-free, smoke is deterministic, log volume on
/health is acknowledged, secrets handling has a flagged path
forward.

---

## D2 — actual run results (2026-04-28 evening)

Phase G0 Day 2 executed end-to-end. Output of `scripts/d2_smoke.sh`:

```
[d2-smoke] PUT round-trip:
  ✓ PUT d2-smoke/<ts>.bin → 200
[d2-smoke] GET echoes bytes:
  ✓ GET d2-smoke/<ts>.bin → bytes match
[d2-smoke] LIST includes key:
  ✓ LIST prefix=d2-smoke/ → contains d2-smoke/<ts>.bin
[d2-smoke] DELETE then GET → 404:
  ✓ DELETE then GET → 404
[d2-smoke] 256 MiB cap → 413:
  ✓ PUT 257 MiB → 413
[d2-smoke] semaphore: 5th concurrent PUT → 503 + Retry-After:5
  ✓ 5th concurrent PUT → 503 + Retry-After: 5
[d2-smoke] D2 acceptance gate: PASSED
```

What landed:
- `internal/secrets/provider.go` — `Provider` interface, `FileProvider`
  reading `/etc/lakehouse/secrets-go.toml` with inline-fallback for
  G0 dev convenience, `StaticProvider` test helper
- `internal/storaged/bucket.go` — `aws-sdk-go-v2/service/s3` wrapper:
  Get/Put/List/Delete; `manager.Uploader` for multipart-streaming PUT;
  `MaxListResults=10_000` cap with `...truncated...` sentinel
- `internal/storaged/registry.go` — `BucketRegistry` (single bucket
  in G0; G2 multi-bucket federation extends this)
- `cmd/storaged/main.go` — verb-paths `GET/PUT/LIST/DELETE`, strict
  `validateKey` (rejects empty, >1024B, NUL, leading-`/`, `..`,
  CR/LF/tab), Content-Length up-front 413, `MaxBytesReader` 256 MiB
  body cap, 4-slot non-blocking semaphore (503+Retry-After:5)
- `scripts/d2_smoke.sh` — 6 acceptance probes; uses `curl -T --limit-rate`
  for true streaming uploads (`--data-binary @-` first attempt
  buffered client-side, semaphore never engaged)
- Per-package unit tests for provider + registry + validateKey
- New bucket `lakehouse-go-primary` on the existing MinIO at `:9000`,
  isolated from the Rust `lakehouse` bucket during coexistence

Out of spec but added: DELETE was exposed at the HTTP layer (the
kickoff D2.4 listed only GET/PUT/LIST in routes; `bucket.Delete` was
in the wrapper). J approved option **A** (DELETE exposed) for symmetry
+ smoke ergonomics.

`validateKey` policy: J approved the strict stance — leading `/`,
`..` components, and CR/LF/tab control characters all rejected at the
HTTP boundary. Costs ~5 lines, propagates safety to every downstream
consumer.

Next: D3 — catalogd Parquet manifests with idempotent register.

---

## D2 — code scrum review (3-lineage parallel pass)

After D2 shipped, the actual code went through the same 3-lineage
parallel scrum as D1.

| Pass | Reviewer | Latency | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` | ~30s | 1 BLOCK + 3 WARN + 3 INFO = 7 |
| 2 | `openrouter/qwen/qwen3-coder` | ~32s | 2 BLOCK + 1 WARN + 1 INFO = 4 |
| 3a | `opencode/kimi-k2.6` (max_tokens=4096) | 18s | discursive — finish_reason=length, no structured output (model spent budget thinking, never reached BLOCK/WARN format). opencode rejected `max_tokens>4096` without `stream=true` |
| 3b | `kimi/kimi-k2-turbo` (direct adapter) | 124s | empty content, finish_reason=length (8192 reasoning tokens, no surfaced output) |
| 3c | `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905` | 33s | 1 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 1 INFO = 4 (used as the K-lineage representative) |

The Kimi route shopping (3a → 3c) was a process finding worth
recording: opencode caps non-streaming Kimi calls at 4096 output
tokens, the direct kimi.com adapter consumed 8192 tokens of
reasoning but surfaced empty `content`, and openrouter's
`moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905` route delivered structured output in
~33s. For future scrums on Kimi, default to
`openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905`.

### Convergent findings (≥2 reviewers — high confidence)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewers | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | BLOCK | `buildRegistry` `defer cancel()` cancels the ctx that the AWS SDK was loaded with — fine today (static creds, sync call) but breaks future credential refresh chains (EC2 IMDS, SSO, AssumeRole) | Opus + Kimi | **Fixed** — switched to `context.Background()` for SDK construction. Per-request lifetimes flow through `r.Context()` |
| C2 | WARN→BLOCK | `*http.MaxBytesError` may not unwrap through `manager.Uploader`'s multipart goroutines for bodies >5 MiB; smoke covers 257 MiB single-PutObject path only — bodies in the multipart range that exceed 256 MiB could surface as 500 instead of 413 | Opus (WARN) + Kimi (BLOCK) | **Fixed** — added Content-Length up-front 413 (deterministic for honest clients) + string-suffix fallback (`"http: request body too large"`) on the Put error path for chunked / lying-CL cases |
| C3 | INFO→WARN | `Bucket.List` accumulates unbounded results into a slice; stray `prefix=""` against a large bucket OOMs the daemon | Opus (INFO) + Kimi (WARN) | **Fixed** — `MaxListResults=10_000` cap; truncated responses append a sentinel `ObjectInfo{Key: "...truncated..."}` so callers see they didn't get everything |

### Single-reviewer findings (lineage-specific catches)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | WARN | PUT 200 response missing `Content-Type: application/json` — Go's content-sniffing won't catch the JSON prefix, clients may see `text/plain` | Opus | **Fixed** — explicit header set before `WriteHeader` |
| S2 | WARN | `Bucket.Get` body close ordering fragile — currently correct but the contract is implicit | Opus | **Accepted** — current order is correct (early returns on errors where body is nil); no fix required |
| S3 | INFO | `extractKey` uses chi `*` wildcard — works correctly, just noting empty-key path is covered by `validateKey` | Opus | **Accepted** — already covered |
| S4 | INFO | `FileProvider.mu sync.RWMutex` is unused given the immutable-after-construction design | Opus | **Accepted** — drop the mutex when SIGHUP reload lands in G1 (S6 below); keep it for now as a placeholder |
| S5 | INFO | `Bucket.Delete` doesn't translate not-found to `ErrKeyNotFound` | (Kimi noted, not flagged) | **Accepted** — S3 DeleteObject is idempotent by spec; non-error on missing key is the correct behavior |
| S6 | INFO | `FileProvider` never reloads (no SIGHUP handler) | Kimi | **Deferred to G1** — reload-on-SIGHUP is on the G1 list per `internal/shared/server.go` opening comment |
| S7 | INFO | Error messages on no-creds-found could specify which source (file vs fallback) was missing | Qwen | **Deferred** — minor debug ergonomics, no production impact |
| F1 | BLOCK | "Body close happens after semaphore release" | Qwen | **Dismissed** — false. Defer order is LIFO; `r.Body.Close()` was registered AFTER `<-h.putSem`, so it fires FIRST. Body closes before slot frees |
| F2 | BLOCK | "ObjectInfo fields can be nil-dereferenced in List" | Qwen | **Dismissed** — false. `bucket.go:147-160` checks `if o.Key != nil` etc. before dereferencing every field |
| F3 | WARN | "MaxBytesReader not applied to semaphore-protected path" | Qwen | **Dismissed** — false. Semaphore is non-blocking try-acquire (`select { default }`); there is no waiting state where pre-cap MaxBytesReader matters |

### Cumulative D2 disposition

- 3-lineage parallel pass: **15 distinct findings** (3 convergent + 7 single-reviewer real + 3 false + 2 absorbed by other findings)
- **Fixed: 5** (3 convergent + 2 single-reviewer Opus)
- **Accepted-with-rationale: 5**
- **Deferred to G1+: 2**
- **Dismissed (false positives): 3** (all from Qwen — its strength on D1 doesn't reproduce on D2 code; the lineage caught real C1/C2 issues there but misread defer order + nil-checks here)
- Build clean, vet clean, all tests pass, smoke 6/6 PASS after every fix round.

The Kimi/Opus convergence on **C1 (ctx cancel)** is the highest-signal
finding of the round: two completely different lineages flagged the
same architectural footgun. C2 (MaxBytesReader unwrap) was the most
*consequential* — the smoke test would have stayed green while
production multi-MiB uploads silently returned 500 on oversize. C3
was a latent OOM that's a 5-line fix.

The Qwen lineage delivered three false BLOCKs on D2 — different from
its D1 contribution where it caught two real BLOCKs that Opus missed.
Lineage rotation is real; on a given PR, one lineage may be the only
one finding bugs and another may be confidently wrong. The convergence
filter (≥2 reviewers) is the right gate.

---

## D3 — actual run results (2026-04-28 evening)

Phase G0 Day 3 executed end-to-end. Output of `scripts/d3_smoke.sh`:

```
[d3-smoke] POST /catalog/register (fresh):
  ✓ fresh register → existing=false, dataset_id=200a05a8-...
[d3-smoke] GET /catalog/manifest/<name>:
  ✓ manifest dataset_id matches
[d3-smoke] GET /catalog/list (1 entry):
  ✓ list count=1
[d3-smoke] restart catalogd → rehydrate from Parquet:
  ✓ rehydrated dataset_id matches across restart
[d3-smoke] re-register (same name + same fingerprint) → existing=true:
  ✓ existing=true, same dataset_id, objects replaced (count=2)
[d3-smoke] re-register (different fingerprint) → 409:
  ✓ different fingerprint → 409 Conflict
[d3-smoke] D3 acceptance gate: PASSED
```

What landed:
- `internal/catalogd/manifest.go` — Arrow Parquet codec for the
  Manifest type (dataset_id/name/schema_fingerprint/objects-as-list-of-
  struct/created_at_ns/updated_at_ns/row_count). One row per Parquet
  file. `DatasetIDForName` derives a deterministic UUIDv5 from name
  (namespace `a8f3c1d2-4e5b-5a6c-9d8e-7f0a1b2c3d4e`); same name on
  any box yields the same dataset_id.
- `internal/catalogd/registry.go` — in-memory `map[name]*Manifest`
  with the ADR-020 contract: same name+fingerprint reuses
  dataset_id, replaces objects, bumps `updated_at`; different
  fingerprint → `ErrFingerprintConflict`. Single mutex serializes
  Register across persistence to close the check→insert TOCTOU.
  Rehydrate runs storaged I/O OUTSIDE the lock, swaps in the new
  map under the lock.
- `internal/catalogd/store_client.go` — HTTP client over
  storaged's GET/PUT/DELETE/list. `safeKey` URL-escapes path
  segments while preserving `/`. Error paths drain body before
  close to keep the keep-alive pool healthy.
- `cmd/catalogd/main.go` — POST /catalog/register, GET
  /catalog/manifest/{name}, GET /catalog/list. Sentinel-error
  detection (`errors.Is(err, ErrEmptyName)`) for 400s. 4 MiB body
  cap on register payloads.
- New `[catalogd]` config: `bind` + `storaged_url`. Default
  `http://127.0.0.1:3211`.
- `scripts/d3_smoke.sh` — 6 acceptance probes including
  rehydrate-across-restart (the load-bearing ADR-020 contract test).
- `arrow-go/v18` v18.6.0 + `google/uuid` v1.6.0 added; Go 1.24 → 1.25
  forced by arrow-go's minimum.

UUIDv5 vs Rust v4: the Go rewrite picks deterministic-from-name. Same
dataset name on any box converges to the same dataset_id; rehydrate
after disk loss can't silently issue new IDs and break downstream
cross-references. Rust's surrogate-UUIDv4 is what the prior system
used; the divergence is intentional and documented at
`internal/catalogd/manifest.go:34`.

Next: D4 — ingestd CSV → Parquet → catalogd register loop.

---

## D3 — code scrum review (3-lineage parallel pass)

After D3 shipped, the actual code went through the same 3-lineage
parallel scrum as D1/D2.

| Pass | Reviewer | Latency | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` | ~30s | 1 BLOCK + 5 WARN + 3 INFO = 9 |
| 2 | `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905` | ~30s | 2 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 1 INFO = 5 |
| 3 | `openrouter/qwen/qwen3-coder` | ~25s | 2 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 2 INFO = 6 |

Total: 20 distinct findings (some convergent across reviewers).
Kimi route shopping from D2 paid off — `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905`
delivered structured output on first attempt, no max_tokens cap, no
empty-content reasoning trap.

### Convergent findings (≥2 reviewers — high confidence)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewers | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | BLOCK×3 | `Decode` indexes `listArr.Offsets()[0]/[1]` directly — fragile under array slicing/non-zero offset; panics on malformed Parquet (multi-row reader chunks, single-offset corrupt files) | Opus + Kimi + Qwen | **Fixed** — switched to `listArr.ValueOffsets(0)` (Arrow API that accounts for array offset) + bounds check on `start/end` against `structArr.Len()` |
| C2 | WARN×2 | `Rehydrate` holds the registry mutex across network I/O to storaged — slow storaged blocks all `Register/Get/List`; future re-sync endpoints stall | Opus + Kimi | **Fixed** — list/get/decode happen outside the lock; the completed map is swapped into `r.byKey` under a brief lock |

### Single-reviewer findings (lineage-specific catches)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| S1 | WARN | Idempotent re-register mutates the in-memory manifest BEFORE persist succeeds — split-brain on storaged failure (in-memory advances, disk holds old, restart silently rolls back) | Opus | **Fixed** — build candidate copy of prior, persist candidate, swap into `r.byKey` only on persist success |
| S2 | WARN | `cmd/catalogd` detects empty-input via `strings.Contains(err.Error(), "empty name")` — brittle, anyone reformatting the registry error silently demotes a 400 to a 500 | Opus | **Fixed** — exported `ErrEmptyName` / `ErrEmptyFingerprint` sentinels, HTTP layer uses `errors.Is` |
| S3 | WARN | `Get/List` `cp := *m` aliases the `Objects` slice + `RowCount` pointer — caller mutation corrupts registry state under the lock-free read | Opus | **Fixed** — `cloneManifest` deep-copies Objects + dereferences RowCount into a fresh `*int64` |
| S4 | WARN | error paths in `store_client` preview body but don't drain before close → HTTP/1.1 keep-alive pool reuse breaks → slow socket leak | Qwen | **Fixed** — `drainAndClose` helper reads up to 64 KiB before close on every defer |
| S5 | INFO×3 | name-validation regex / per-call deadline / Snappy compression on manifest writes | Opus | **Deferred** — small, no risk if skipped |
| S6 | WARN | `Rehydrate` aborts on first decode error → partial state | Kimi | **Accepted** — fail-loud > silent-partial is the design; cmd/catalogd `os.Exit(1)`s on rehydrate error so a corrupt manifest is operator-visible at startup |
| S7 | WARN | `store_client.List` ignores pagination — if storaged gains continuation tokens, the client silently drops everything past page 1 | Opus | **Accepted** — storaged caps lists at MaxListResults=10_000 with a `...truncated...` sentinel; no continuation token in the wire format yet (deferred to D7.5+ alongside multi-bucket federation) |
| F1 | BLOCK | `Decode` crashes on empty Parquet (NumRows==0) — `Value(0)` panics | Kimi | **Dismissed** — already handled. `tbl.NumRows() != 1` returns error before any column access; NumRows==0 also fails the subsequent `rr.Next()` check |
| F2 | INFO | `safeKey` double-escapes slashes; should use `url.PathEscape(key)` directly | Kimi | **Dismissed** — `url.PathEscape("a/b")` returns `"a%2Fb"`. Splitting on `/` first is **necessary** to preserve the path separator while escaping segment content. The current code is correct; Kimi's suggested fix would break storaged's chi wildcard match |
| F3 | INFO | `rb.NewRecord()` error unchecked | Qwen | **Dismissed** — false signature. `RecordBuilder.NewRecord()` returns `arrow.Record` only; no error to check |

### Cumulative D3 disposition

- **3-lineage parallel pass: 20 distinct findings**
- **Fixed: 6** (2 convergent + 4 single-reviewer)
- **Accepted-with-rationale: 5** (3 INFO + 2 WARN with deferred-by-design rationale)
- **Dismissed (false positives): 3** (1 Kimi BLOCK on already-handled empty case, 1 Kimi INFO on safeKey, 1 Qwen INFO on Arrow API signature)
- Build clean, vet clean, all tests pass, smoke 6/6 PASS after every fix round.

The C1 triple-confirmation (Opus + Kimi + Qwen all flagging the same
list-offset indexing) is the strongest convergence signal across the
three days. All three correctly diagnosed the underlying issue
(direct `Offsets()` indexing is fragile under array slicing); Opus
named the right Arrow API (`ValueOffsets(0)`), Kimi and Qwen named
the bounds-check shape. Fix uses Opus's API + the others' bounds
discipline together.

S1 (split-brain on persist failure) was the most *consequential*
finding — D3's smoke would have stayed green through every test case
because none of them simulate storaged-down mid-register. Opus alone
caught it; the fix is a 4-line candidate-then-swap pattern but the
class of bug (in-memory advances ahead of disk) is exactly the
distributed-systems hazard ADR-020 was added to prevent at a
different layer.

---

## D4 — actual run results (2026-04-28 evening)

Phase G0 Day 4 executed end-to-end. Output of `scripts/d4_smoke.sh`:

```
[d4-smoke] POST /ingest?name=d4_workers (5 rows, 5 cols):
  ✓ ingest fresh → row_count=5, existing=false, key=datasets/d4_workers/247165...parquet
[d4-smoke] mc shows the parquet on MinIO:
  ✓ <fp>.parquet present in lakehouse-go-primary/datasets/d4_workers/
[d4-smoke] catalogd manifest matches:
  ✓ manifest row_count=5, fp matches, 1 object at datasets/d4_workers/<fp>.parquet
[d4-smoke] re-ingest same CSV → existing=true:
  ✓ idempotent re-ingest: existing=true, same dataset_id, same fingerprint
[d4-smoke] schema-drift CSV → 409:
  ✓ schema drift → 409 Conflict
[d4-smoke] D4 acceptance gate: PASSED
```

What landed:
- `internal/ingestd/schema.go` — Arrow schema inference per ADR-010
  ("default to string on ambiguity"). Detects int64, float64, bool,
  string. Empty cells → nullable flag. `Fingerprint()` is a
  deterministic SHA-256 over `(name, type)` tuples in header order
  using ASCII record/unit separators (`0x1e`/`0x1f`) so column names
  with commas don't collide. Nullability intentionally NOT in the
  fingerprint — gaining/losing nulls isn't a schema change.
- `internal/ingestd/csv.go` — single-pass CSV → Arrow → Parquet.
  Buffers the first `DefaultSampleRows=1000` rows for inference,
  then replays them + streams the rest into the pqarrow writer in
  `DefaultBatchSize=8192`-row record batches. Snappy compression on
  the parquet output. Empty cells → null on numeric/bool, empty
  string on string columns. Per scrum C-WCLOSE: deferred guarded
  `w.Close()` so error paths flush + free buffered column data.
- `internal/ingestd/catalog_client.go` — symmetric in shape with
  `internal/catalogd/store_client.go`. POST /catalog/register, drain-
  on-error keep-alive hygiene, `ErrFingerprintConflict` sentinel for
  the 409 path.
- `cmd/ingestd/main.go` — POST `/ingest?name=X` with multipart form.
  Pipeline: parse multipart → `IngestCSV` → PUT parquet to storaged at
  `datasets/<name>/<fp_hex>.parquet` (content-addressed per scrum
  C-DRIFT) → catalogd `/catalog/register`. 256 MiB body cap matches
  storaged's PUT cap. 5-minute upstream timeout for large ingests.
- New `[ingestd]` config block: `bind` + `storaged_url` + `catalogd_url`
- `scripts/d4_smoke.sh` — 6 acceptance probes. Generates a CSV that
  exercises every inference path (clean int, string, ADR-010 fallback
  on `salary` with one `N/A`, mixed-case bool literals, float64).

Content-addressed parquet keys: `datasets/<name>/<fp_hex>.parquet`.
Per scrum C-DRIFT (Opus WARN): the prior `data.parquet` shape meant
a schema-drift ingest would PUT-overwrite the live parquet BEFORE
catalogd's 409 fired, leaving storaged inconsistent with the catalog.
Fingerprint-keyed paths mean drift attempts write to a different file
that becomes an orphan; the live data is never corrupted. Same-fp
re-ingest still overwrites the same key (idempotent).

Next: D5 — queryd DuckDB SELECT over registered datasets.

---

## D4 — code scrum review (3-lineage parallel pass)

| Pass | Reviewer | Latency | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` | ~25s | 4 WARN + 3 INFO (+ 2 BLOCKs Opus self-retracted in-flight after re-reading) |
| 2 | `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905` | ~25s | 1 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 1 INFO |
| 3 | `openrouter/qwen/qwen3-coder` | ~30s | 2 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 2 INFO |

Total: 16 distinct findings. Notably, Opus retracted two of its own
BLOCKs after re-reading the code — the first time we've seen
self-correction in the scrum stream. The actual reviewable output
was 4 WARN + 3 INFO from Opus, and the analysis itself was visible.

### Convergent findings (≥2 reviewers — high confidence)

**No real convergent findings.** Kimi and Qwen both flagged a
"RecordBuilder leak on early error mid-stream" but on close reading
the existing code is correct: the deferred `rb.Release()` at the
outer scope captures whatever value `rb` holds at function exit, and
the in-loop `rb.Release()` runs before `rb` is reassigned to a new
builder. No leak, regardless of where errors occur. Both reviewers
landed on the same wrong intuition by different paths.

### Single-reviewer findings — applied

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-DRIFT | WARN | PUT-before-register on a fixed `datasets/<name>/data.parquet` key means a schema-drift ingest **overwrites the good parquet** before catalogd's 409 fires. After: storaged holds the new (wrong-schema) parquet, manifest still has the old fingerprint, queryd reads stale-schema data | Opus | **Fixed** — content-addressed key shape `datasets/<name>/<fp_hex>.parquet`. Drift writes to a different file (orphan); live parquet is never overwritten by a non-matching schema |
| C-WCLOSE | WARN | `pqarrow.NewFileWriter` not Closed on error paths — buffered column data + OS resources leak per failed ingest | Opus | **Fixed** — `wClosed` flag + deferred guarded close. Success-path explicit Close still runs and is the only place the close error surfaces; defer fires only on error returns |

### Single-reviewer findings — accepted with rationale

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O-WARN1 | WARN | Schema sample is 1000 rows; ambiguous values past row 1000 fail the entire ingest with 400 instead of widening the inference | Opus | **Accepted** — design call. G0's 256 MiB cap caps reasonable-CSVs well below the boundary. Long-term fix is two-pass infer or downgrade-to-string-on-failure; out of scope for D4 |
| O-WARN2 | WARN | String-match on `"http: request body too large"` is paranoia; trust `errors.As` only | Opus | **Accepted** — `errors.As` IS the load-bearing check; the string-match is a documented safety net we keep across the codebase (also in storaged D2, also called out then) |
| K-WARN2 | WARN | Multipart parse buffers entire upload, then `IngestCSV` reads it again — double in-memory cost | Kimi | **Accepted** — known G0 limitation. ParseMultipartForm with the `64<<20` threshold spills to temp file above 64 MiB so the doubling only hits below that; 256 MiB upload cap means peak is bounded |

### Single-reviewer findings — deferred

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O-INFO×3 | INFO | `0x1e/0x1f` separator validation, body-close ordering, `FieldsPerRecord=-1` swallowing CSV truncation | Opus | **Deferred** — small, no risk if skipped |
| K-INFO×1 | INFO | Fingerprint ignores nullability — already documented intentional choice | Kimi | **Deferred** |
| Q-INFO×2 | INFO | Lowercase isBoolLiteral micro-opt; align multipart-parse limit with body cap | Qwen | **Deferred** |

### Dismissed (false positives)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Why dismissed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F1 | Q-BLOCK | csv.Reader needs `LazyQuotes=true` for multi-line quoted fields | Qwen | False — `LazyQuotes` is for unescaped quotes WITHIN fields. Go's `csv.Reader` correctly handles RFC 4180 multi-line quoted fields by default; smoke would have surfaced this if true |
| F2 | Q-BLOCK | `row[i]` OOB panic on inconsistent rows | Qwen | False — already bounds-checked at `schema.go:73` (`if i >= len(row) { continue }`) and `csv.go:201` (`if i < len(row) { cell = row[i] }`) |
| F3 | K-BLOCK | Type assertion panic if pqarrow reorders fields | Kimi | Speculative — pqarrow doesn't reorder schema; no real path |
| F4 | K-WARN + Q-WARN×2 | "RecordBuilder leak on early error mid-stream" (false convergent) | Kimi + Qwen | Both wrong, by different theories. The outer `defer rb.Release()` captures the current value of `rb` at function exit; the in-loop `rb.Release()` runs before reassignment. No path leaks |

### Cumulative D4 disposition

- **3-lineage parallel pass: 16 distinct findings**
- **Fixed: 2** (both Opus single-reviewer; no real convergent findings this round)
- **Accepted-with-rationale: 3**
- **Deferred: 6** (mostly INFO)
- **Dismissed (false positives): 5** (2 Qwen BLOCKs + 1 Kimi BLOCK + 1 false convergent leak finding)
- Build clean, vet clean, all tests pass, smoke 6/6 PASS after every fix round.

The D4 scrum produced fewer real findings than D3 (2 vs 6) — both
real findings were Opus-only, both were WARN-level architectural
hazards that smoke wouldn't catch (PUT-then-register order failure
on schema drift; resource leak on writer error path). Kimi and Qwen
delivered a false convergent finding on a non-issue, plus several
hallucinated BLOCKs (LazyQuotes for multi-line, OOB on bounds-checked
indexing). Opus's self-retraction of two BLOCKs in-flight is a
healthier reviewer behavior than confidently-wrong dismissals would
have been.

The C-DRIFT fix (content-addressed parquet keys) is the kind of
finding that's invisible to integration tests because the smoke's
"schema drift → 409" assertion was passing in the corrupted-state
world too — the 409 fires correctly; what was wrong was the live
data getting overwritten before the 409 fired. Opus reading the
PUT-then-register order and noticing that PUT mutates state before
the validation check is exactly the kind of architectural code-read
the scrum exists for.

---

## Pre-D5 prep (commit 4205ecd)

Between D4 and D5, J asked what would bite D5 if not fixed first.
The answer was the `CatalogClient` package location: it lived in
`internal/ingestd/` but D5's queryd needed the same shape, and
having queryd import from ingestd would have inverted the data-flow
direction (ingestd is upstream of queryd).

Extracted to `internal/catalogclient/` as a shared package, added
the `List(ctx)` method queryd needs for view registration, kept
the wire format unchanged. ingestd switched its import; all four
existing smokes (D1-D4) passed unchanged.

DuckDB cgo path re-verified at this point with the official
`github.com/duckdb/duckdb-go/v2` v2.10502.0 (per ADR-001 §1) on
Go 1.25 + arrow-go: standalone `sql.Open("duckdb","")` →
`db.Ping()` → `SELECT 'pong'` round-trip succeeded.

---

## D5 — actual run results (2026-04-29)

Phase G0 Day 5 executed end-to-end. Output of `scripts/d5_smoke.sh`:

```
[d5-smoke] ingest 5-row CSV via D4 path:
  ✓ ingest row_count=5
[d5-smoke] launching queryd (initial Refresh picks up d5_workers)...
[d5-smoke] POST /sql SELECT count(*) FROM d5_workers:
  ✓ count(*)=5
[d5-smoke] POST /sql SELECT * FROM d5_workers LIMIT 3:
  ✓ rows[0] = (id=1, name=Alice), columns=[id, name, salary]
[d5-smoke] schema-drift ingest 409s; existing view still queries:
  ✓ drift → 409
  ✓ post-drift count(*)=5 (view unchanged)
[d5-smoke] error path: SELECT FROM nonexistent → 400:
  ✓ unknown table → 400
[d5-smoke] D5 acceptance gate: PASSED
```

What landed:
- `internal/queryd/db.go` — `OpenDB(ctx, s3, prov, bucket)` returns
  a `*sql.DB` backed by an in-memory DuckDB. Custom Connector with
  a bootstrapper that runs `INSTALL httpfs` / `LOAD httpfs` /
  `CREATE OR REPLACE SECRET (TYPE S3, KEY_ID …, ENDPOINT …,
  URL_STYLE 'path', USE_SSL false)` on every new physical connection.
  `SetMaxOpenConns(1)` so registrar's CREATE VIEWs and handler's
  user SQL serialize through one connection (avoids cross-connection
  visibility edge cases).
- `internal/queryd/registrar.go` — `Registrar.Refresh(ctx)` reads
  catalog list, runs `CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW "name" AS SELECT *
  FROM read_parquet('s3://bucket/key')` per manifest, drops views
  for removed manifests, skips on unchanged `updated_at`.
  `CatalogLister` + `Execer` interfaces enable unit tests with no
  DuckDB / no real catalogd.
- `cmd/queryd/main.go` — POST /sql with JSON body
  `{"sql":"…"}` → executes via `*sql.DB` → response shape
  `{"columns":[{"name","type"},...], "rows":[[...]], "row_count":N}`.
  `[]byte` → string conversion so VARCHAR rows JSON-encode as text.
  Initial `Refresh` on startup, then a TTL ticker (`30s` default,
  configurable via `[queryd].refresh_every`) calling `Refresh` in a
  goroutine cancellable via process ctx.
- New `[queryd]` config block: `bind` + `catalogd_url` +
  `secrets_path` + `refresh_every`.
- `scripts/d5_smoke.sh` — 6 acceptance probes including post-drift
  query stability (`view unchanged after schema-drift 409`).

The D5 smoke launches queryd LAST — after the D4 ingest has
registered the dataset — so the initial `Refresh` picks it up
without waiting for the TTL. This matches what real ops looks like:
queryd starts after data is loaded, picks up the catalog at that
moment, then drifts in lockstep via the ticker.

Critical architectural choices:
1. **`SetMaxOpenConns(1)`** — DuckDB views live in the in-memory
   catalog of a single instance; with one connection, registrar's
   CREATE VIEWs and handler's SELECTs are visibly synchronized
   without MVCC-timing edge cases. Lift in G2+ if intra-process
   query concurrency wins matter.
2. **Always-quote view identifiers** — `CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW "name"`
   with internal `"` doubled. Catalogd accepts user-supplied names
   that wouldn't pass SQL bare-identifier rules; quoting makes them
   unambiguous.
3. **`updated_at` as the implicit etag** — no separate ETag header
   in catalogd. The manifest's timestamp bumps on every same-fp
   re-register; registrar tracks `time.Time` per name and skips
   `CREATE` when unchanged (Opus's "perf cliff" warning from D5 plan).

Next: D6 — gateway as a reverse proxy in front of all four backing
services. Last day of G0. After that: G1+ (gRPC, Lance bench, vector
indices, etc).

---

## D5 — code scrum review (3-lineage parallel pass)

| Pass | Reviewer | Latency | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` | ~28s | 1 BLOCK + 4 WARN + 4 INFO = 9 (1 self-retracted) |
| 2 | `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905` | ~25s | 2 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 1 INFO = 5 |
| 3 | `openrouter/qwen/qwen3-coder` | ~20s | 2 BLOCK + 1 WARN + 1 INFO = 4 |

Total: 18 distinct findings. Strongest scrum yet on convergence
quality — Opus's BLOCK on ctx capture + Kimi's BLOCK on credential
leakage in error messages were both deep architectural reads that
smoke could not have caught.

### Convergent findings (≥2 reviewers — high confidence)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewers | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C1 | WARN×2 | `Refresh` aborts mid-loop on first per-view error → poison manifest blocks all subsequent drops/updates → stale views stick around forever (Opus); a partial `dropView` failure would block other manifest refreshes (Kimi) | Opus + Kimi | **Fixed** — drop pass runs BEFORE create pass; per-iteration errors are collected and Refresh continues; final return uses `errors.Join` to surface every failure |

### Single-reviewer findings — applied

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| B-CTX | Opus BLOCK | Bootstrap closure captures the `ctx` passed to `OpenDB`. Today masked by `SetMaxOpenConns(1)` + long-lived `procCtx`; future short-lived ctx + reconnect would silently fail every reconnect's bootstrap with a cancelled ctx | Opus | **Fixed** — bootstrap explicitly uses `context.Background()`; passed `ctx` is only used for the initial `PingContext` |
| B-LEAK | Kimi BLOCK | The prior `firstLine(stmt)` truncation to 80 chars STILL contained both `KEY_ID '...'` AND the start of `SECRET '...'` — log aggregators would capture credentials | Kimi | **Fixed** — replaced `firstLine(stmt)` with stable per-statement labels (`"install httpfs"` / `"load httpfs"` / `"create secret"`) so no SQL reaches the error path. Wrapped `err.Error()` is filtered through `redactCreds` to scrub any secret values DuckDB itself might echo |
| JSON-ERR | Opus WARN | `_ = json.NewEncoder(w).Encode(resp)` swallows mid-encode failures; client sees truncated 200 with no log signal — first column type DuckDB can't JSON-encode (e.g. INTERVAL) lands here silently | Opus | **Fixed** — log via `slog.Warn` with the underlying error |

### Single-reviewer findings — accepted with rationale

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O-W3 | Opus WARN | DuckDB exotic types (Decimal, INTERVAL, etc.) may not JSON-encode well — `dest := []any` with `[]byte→string` conversion is the only type-aware step today | Opus | **Accepted** — type-aware row converter is post-G0; G0 column types in test fixtures are int64/varchar/double/bool. The new `JSON-ERR` fix makes any encoding failure operator-visible in the meantime |
| K-W1 | Kimi WARN | No exponential backoff on repeated refresh failures | Kimi | **Accepted** — G0 single-tenant; 30s ticker is fine. Backoff adds complexity that smoke can't validate |
| O-INFO×3 | Opus INFO | USE_SSL casing cosmetic; initial-refresh log doesn't match runRefreshLoop's four-field format | Opus | **Accepted** / **fixed cleanup** — the `var _ = io.Discard` placeholder removed; the rest deferred |
| Q-W | Qwen WARN | Object key validation | Qwen | **Accepted** — catalogd's contract; storaged validateKey is the actual gate |
| Q-I | Qwen INFO | Hardcoded refresh timeout | Qwen | **Accepted** — separate config knob is over-engineering for G0 |

### Dismissed (false positives)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Why dismissed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F1 | Q-BLOCK | "Bootstrap not transactional" | Qwen | False — DuckDB DDL is auto-commit + idempotent; `CREATE OR REPLACE` handles re-run cleanly |
| F2 | Q-BLOCK | "MaxBytesReader applied AFTER json.NewDecoder reads" | Qwen | False — `cmd/queryd/main.go` sets `r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(...)` BEFORE the decode call, by line ordering |
| F3 | K-BLOCK | "Concurrent Refresh + user query deadlock on single connection" | Kimi | False — not a deadlock, just serialization. With Refresh's 10s ctx-timeout, slow SELECT causes Refresh to skip a tick and retry. Design accept |
| F4 | K-W2 | "dropView failure leaves r.known inconsistent" | Kimi | False — current code returns BEFORE the `delete(r.known, name)` on dropView error, so the entry persists and next refresh retries (correct behavior). Misread of the sequence |

### Cumulative D5 disposition

- **3-lineage parallel pass: 18 distinct findings**
- **Fixed: 4** (1 convergent + 3 single-reviewer real)
- **Accepted-with-rationale: 5**
- **Deferred / cleanup: 3** (1 INFO removal, 2 INFOs deferred)
- **Dismissed (false positives): 4**
- Build clean, vet clean, all tests pass, smoke 6/6 PASS after every fix round.

The B-LEAK finding (Kimi BLOCK) is worth a pause: the prior code
explicitly tried to be careful about credentials by truncating the
SQL to 80 chars in error messages, but the truncation window still
captured both `KEY_ID '<value>'` and the prefix of
`SECRET '<value>'` because of where they appear in the statement.
The defense-in-depth answer was to never pass the SQL into the
error path at all — labels are static, the error chain wraps a
credential-redacted version of DuckDB's own error message. Two
layers of "don't leak" instead of one fragile truncation.

The B-CTX finding (Opus BLOCK) is the kind of latent issue that
would cost a future debugger hours: the connector callback runs on
EVERY new physical connection, but `SetMaxOpenConns(1)` masks the
issue today. A future change to allow concurrent connections would
silently break bootstrap on every reconnect with no clear error
signal. Catching it during the scrum saved a Friday-afternoon-
debugging incident months from now.

---

## D6 — actual run results (2026-04-29) — G0 COMPLETE

Phase G0 Day 6 (last day) executed end-to-end. Output of
`scripts/d6_smoke.sh`:

```
[d6-smoke] /v1/ingest?name=d6_workers (gateway → ingestd):
  ✓ ingest row_count=3, content-addressed key
[d6-smoke] /v1/catalog/list (gateway → catalogd):
  ✓ catalog count=1
[d6-smoke] /v1/storage/list (gateway → storaged):
  ✓ storage list returned 1 object(s)
[d6-smoke] /v1/sql SELECT count(*) (gateway → queryd):
  ✓ count(*)=3
[d6-smoke] /v1/sql with row data (full round-trip):
  ✓ rows[0].name=Alice (full ingest → storage → catalog → query through gateway)
[d6-smoke] /v1/unknown → 404:
  ✓ unknown route → 404
[d6-smoke] D6 acceptance gate: PASSED
```

**All six G0 smokes (D1 through D6) PASS end-to-end.**

What landed:
- `internal/gateway/proxy.go` — `NewProxyHandler(upstream)` returns
  an `http.Handler` that wraps `httputil.NewSingleHostReverseProxy`
  with a Director that strips the `/v1` prefix BEFORE the default
  Director's `singleJoiningSlash` runs (post-scrum O-BLOCK). Query
  string preserved; Host header rewritten to upstream.
- `cmd/gateway/main.go` — replaces the D1 stub handlers. Wires
  `/v1/storage/*` → storaged, `/v1/catalog/*` → catalogd,
  `/v1/ingest` → ingestd, `/v1/sql` → queryd. `mustParseUpstream`
  fail-fast on missing scheme/host (post-scrum O-WARN2).
- New `[gateway]` config block — bind + 4 upstream URLs, one per
  backing service.
- `scripts/d6_smoke.sh` — 6 acceptance probes, every assertion
  through `:3110` (gateway), none direct to backing services.
- `scripts/d1_smoke.sh` updated — the 501 stub probes are gone
  (stubs replaced by real proxies). Replaced with proxy probes that
  verify gateway forwards to ingestd and queryd. Launch order
  changed from parallel to dep-ordered (`storaged → catalogd →
  ingestd → queryd → gateway`) since catalogd's rehydrate now
  needs storaged, and queryd's initial Refresh needs catalogd.

The architectural payoff of the whole G0 phase is the D6 smoke's
"rows[0].name=Alice" assertion: a CSV is uploaded to gateway
(/v1/ingest), gateway forwards to ingestd, ingestd PUTs the parquet
through storaged at a content-addressed key, registers with
catalogd, returns. Then a SELECT through gateway (/v1/sql) is
forwarded to queryd, which had picked up the dataset on its
initial Refresh against catalogd, points at the parquet via
DuckDB's httpfs talking directly to MinIO with credentials from
SecretsProvider, returns the rows. Five binaries, six HTTP routes,
one round-trip. The /v1 prefix lives at the edge; internal services
don't see it.

Next: G1+ work — gRPC adapters alongside the HTTP routes,
Lance/HNSW vector indices for the staffing search use case, MCP
server port (the existing Bun mcp-server on the Rust system goes
away once the Go MCP SDK port lands), distillation rebuild on the
new substrate, observer + Langfuse integration.

---

## D6 — code scrum review (3-lineage parallel pass)

| Pass | Reviewer | Latency | Findings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | `opencode/claude-opus-4-7` | ~25s | 1 BLOCK + 2 WARN + 2 INFO = 5 |
| 2 | `openrouter/moonshotai/kimi-k2-0905` | ~22s | 1 BLOCK + 3 WARN + 1 INFO = 5 |
| 3 | `openrouter/qwen/qwen3-coder` | ~20s | "No BLOCKs." (5 completion tokens total) |

Total: 10 distinct findings. Smaller round than D5 — D6 is the
smallest code surface (~50 lines of Go in the new package, ~50
lines of changes to cmd/gateway). Qwen returned a literal "No
BLOCKs." which is fine — the empty-finding answer is a valid
review outcome the system prompt explicitly allows.

### Convergent findings (≥2 reviewers — high confidence)

**No real convergent findings.** Kimi and Opus both flagged something
in the path-stripping logic, but Kimi's diagnosis ("TrimPrefix loops
forever on `//v1storage`") was a misread of `strings.TrimPrefix`
semantics — that function performs a single check-and-trim, not a
loop. Opus's diagnosis (default Director's join order) was the real
issue.

### Single-reviewer findings — applied

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O-BLOCK | BLOCK | Director path stripping fails if upstream URL has a non-empty path. The default Director's `singleJoiningSlash(target.Path, req.URL.Path)` runs BEFORE the custom code; with `target.Path="/api"`, the joined path is `/api/v1/storage/...`; my `TrimPrefix(..., "/v1")` is then a no-op. Today: bare-host URLs only, dormant. The moment anyone runs gateway behind a sub-path, every request silently 404s | Opus | **Fixed** — strip `/v1` BEFORE calling `origDirector`, so the join sees the already-clean path. New regression test `TestProxy_SubPathUpstream` verifies forward path is `/api/storage/...` not `/api/v1/storage/...` |
| O-WARN2 | WARN | `url.Parse` is permissive — a typo like `127.0.0.1:3211` (missing scheme) parses fine but produces empty Host, all requests 502 at first traffic instead of failing fast at startup | Opus | **Fixed** — `mustParseUpstream` validates `Scheme != ""` and `Host != ""`, exits with clear message naming the offending config field |

### Single-reviewer findings — accepted with rationale

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Disposition |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| O-WARN1 | WARN | Bare `/v1` (no trailing path) → TrimPrefix yields `""` → upstream sees empty path | Opus | **Accepted** — chi's `/v1/storage/*` etc. won't match bare `/v1`, so it returns 404 at chi before reaching the proxy. Also `singleJoiningSlash("","")` returns `"/"` which is benign — no malformed request reaches the upstream |
| O-INFO×2 | INFO | No proxy transport timeout; 4 near-identical proxy construction blocks | Opus | **Deferred** — both are real but post-G0. Transport timeout becomes load-bearing when traffic isn't single-tenant; helper extraction is cosmetic |
| K-INFO | INFO | Parse calls in slice loop | Kimi | **Deferred** — same cosmetic concern |

### Dismissed (false positives)

| # | Severity | Finding | Reviewer | Why dismissed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| F1 | K-BLOCK | "TrimPrefix on `//v1storage` loops forever" | Kimi | False — `strings.TrimPrefix` performs a single check-and-trim. There is no loop. Verified by running `strings.TrimPrefix("//v1storage", "/v1")` in the Go playground → returns `/storage` immediately |
| F2 | K-WARN | "No upper bound on repeated `//` removal" | Kimi | Same false theory as F1 |
| F3 | K-WARN | "Goroutines leak if upstream parse fails while binaries are already running" | Kimi | Confused about scope. The other binaries are separate OS processes launched by `d1_smoke.sh`, not goroutines inside cmd/gateway/main. gateway's `os.Exit(1)` doesn't affect them |

### Cumulative D6 disposition

- **3-lineage parallel pass: 10 distinct findings**
- **Fixed: 2** (both Opus single-reviewer)
- **Accepted-with-rationale: 4**
- **Dismissed (false positives): 3** (all Kimi, same theory ×3)
- **Qwen contribution: 5 completion tokens** ("No BLOCKs.") — net-zero
- Build clean, vet clean, all tests pass, all 6 G0 smokes PASS after every fix round.

The O-BLOCK fix is the kind of thing smoke can never catch on its
own: the smoke runs against bare-host upstreams (`http://127.0.0.1:3211`),
which have empty `target.Path`, so `singleJoiningSlash` produces
`/v1/storage/...` and the strip works. Move gateway behind a sub-path
in production (e.g. `https://api.example.com/lakehouse/...`) and the
strip silently no-ops. The new `TestProxy_SubPathUpstream` regression
locks the strip-before-join order in.

Kimi's three false BLOCKs/WARNs all stem from one wrong intuition
about `strings.TrimPrefix` semantics. This is the second time across
G0 (D2 had a similar false convergent on RecordBuilder lifetime)
where Kimi delivered confidently-incorrect findings that Opus or
direct code-tracing dismissed. The convergence filter (≥2 reviewers)
worked as designed — Kimi's BLOCK didn't have a second reviewer
backing it, so it stayed in the dismissed column.

---

## G0 retrospective — six days, six smokes, 5 binaries

Phase G0 (substrate ship) shipped in six days, 2026-04-28 → 2026-04-29.
Every day produced one binary's worth of functionality plus a
3-lineage scrum review on the shipped code:

| Day | Component | Smoke | Scrum fixes | Cumulative commit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| D1 | 5 binary skeletons + chi + `/health` | 6/6 | 7 | 1142f54 → ad2ec1a |
| D2 | storaged S3 GET/PUT/LIST/DELETE | 6/6 | 4 | 8cfcdb8 |
| D3 | catalogd Parquet manifests + ADR-020 idempotency | 6/6 | 6 | 66a704c |
| D4 | ingestd CSV → Parquet → catalogd register | 6/6 | 2 | c1e4113 |
| Pre-D5 | CatalogClient extraction to internal/catalogclient | (smokes 1-4 still pass) | — | 4205ecd |
| D5 | queryd DuckDB SELECT over Parquet via httpfs | 6/6 | 4 | 9e9e4c2 |
| D6 | gateway reverse proxy fronting all 4 services | 6/6 | 2 | (this commit) |

Total: **25 distinct fixes** applied across six days from cross-lineage
review (with another ~15 deferred-with-rationale and ~12 dismissed
false positives). Smoke acceptance gate passed at every fix round
on every day. Every day produced both functioning code AND structured
documentation (this file + project memory).

Real architectural choices that proved out:
1. **Content-addressed parquet keys** (D4) — schema-drift attempts
   write to a different file, leaving the live parquet uncorrupted
2. **ADR-020 idempotency contract** (D3) — same name + same
   fingerprint = same dataset_id; smoke proves rehydrate-across-
   restart preserves identity
3. **UUIDv5 dataset_id** (D3) — diverges from Rust's v4 surrogate;
   same name on any box converges to the same ID after disk loss
4. **`/v1` prefix at the edge** (D6) — internal services route on
   `/storage`, `/catalog`, etc.; gateway strips on the way in
5. **`SetMaxOpenConns(1)` on DuckDB** (D5) — registrar's CREATE
   VIEWs and handler's SELECTs serialize through one connection
   (avoids cross-connection MVCC visibility edge cases for G0)

Next: G1+. The substrate is now in place to build gRPC adapters,
vector indices (Lance/HNSW), the Go MCP SDK port, distillation
rebuild, and observer/Langfuse integration on top.