Four threads landing together — all driven by the audit J asked for before
production cutover.
(1) Gate 3b DECIDED: Option C (defer classifications). `BiometricCollection.classifications`
stays `Option<JSON> = None` in v1. `docs/specs/GATE_3B_DEEPFACE_DESIGN.md` status
flipped from "draft / awaits product" to DECIDED. Consent template + retention
schedule revised to remove all "automated facial-classification" / "deepface"
language so disclosed scope matches implemented scope.
(2) Endpoint-path drift reconciled across 3 docs. `PHASE_1_6_BIPA_GATES.md`,
`BIPA_DESTRUCTION_RUNBOOK.md`, and `biometric_retention_schedule_v1.md` had
references to legacy `/v1/identity/subjects/*` paths (proposed under a separate
identityd daemon, never shipped) — corrected to actual shipped routes
`/biometric/subject/*` (catalogd-local). Schema block in PHASE_1_6_BIPA_GATES
rewritten to reflect JSON `SubjectManifest.biometric_collection` substrate
(not the proposed Postgres `subjects` table).
(3) New operational artifacts:
- `scripts/staffing/verify_biometric_erasure.sh` — checks 4 things post-erasure
(manifest cleared, uploads dir empty, audit row matches, chain verified).
Smoke-tested live against WORKER-2.
- `scripts/staffing/biometric_destruction_report.sh` — monthly anonymized
destruction-event aggregation. Smoke-tested clean.
- `scripts/staffing/bundle_counsel_packet.sh` — tarballs the counsel-review
packet with per-file SHA-256 manifest.
- `docs/runbooks/LEGAL_AUDIT_KEY_ROTATION.md` — formal rotation procedure
operationalized after the 2026-05-05 /tmp wipe incident.
- `docs/counsel/COUNSEL_REVIEW_PACKET_2026-05-05.md` — cover note bundling
all eng-staged BIPA docs for counsel review with per-doc questions, sign-off
checklist, recommended review sequence.
(4) Double-upload file leak fixed in `crates/catalogd/src/biometric_endpoint.rs`.
`verify_biometric_erasure.sh` smoked WORKER-2 and surfaced a stranded photo
file. Investigation showed the file was 13-byte test-fixture bytes (zero PII,
no biometric content); audit timeline showed two consecutive uploads followed
by one erasure — the second upload had silently overwritten manifest.data_path,
orphaning the first file. Patched `process_upload` to refuse a second upload
with HTTP 409 + `error: "biometric_already_collected"` when
`biometric_collection.is_some()` on the manifest. Operator must explicitly
POST `/biometric/subject/{id}/erase` first.
Tests: new `second_upload_without_erase_returns_409` (asserts 409 + manifest
pointer unchanged + first file untouched on disk). Replaced
`repeated_uploads_grow_the_chain` with `upload_erase_upload_grows_the_chain_cleanly`
(covers the legitimate re-collection cycle: chain grows to 3 rows). Updated
`content_type_with_parameters_accepted` to use 2 distinct subjects (was
using 1 subject with 2 uploads to test ct parsing — would now 409).
22/22 biometric_endpoint tests + 59/59 catalogd lib tests green post-patch.
Production posture: gateway needs `cargo build --release -p gateway` +
`systemctl restart lakehouse.service` to pick up the new 409 in live traffic.
Counsel calendar is now the only remaining blocker for first real-photo intake.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
176 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
176 lines
6.6 KiB
Markdown
# Biometric Information Consent — v1
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**Spec:** docs/PHASE_1_6_BIPA_GATES.md §1 Gate 2 (BIPA §15(b)(1)-(3))
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**Status:** Engineering scaffold — ⚖ COUNSEL must author the binding text before deployment
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**Version:** v1 (initial; supersession requires a new version + new hash)
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**Updated 2026-05-05:** Disclosure 1 + plain-language summary revised to match the Gate 3b deferral recommendation in `docs/specs/GATE_3B_DEEPFACE_DESIGN.md` (Option C — defer classifications). Pending J's product confirmation of Gate 3b; if Gate 3b chooses Option A or B, this template needs counsel re-authoring.
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> This is the consent template a candidate signs (electronically or
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> on paper) BEFORE Lakehouse collects, stores, or processes any
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> biometric identifier or biometric information from that candidate.
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>
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> Without an executed consent under this template (or a counsel-
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> approved successor), the system MUST NOT accept a photograph from
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> the candidate. Enforcement lives at the photo-upload endpoint
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> (Gate 3) and at the SubjectManifest writer, which refuses biometric
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> writes when `consent.biometric.status != "given"`.
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---
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## Required disclosures (BIPA §15(b)(1)-(3))
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The disclosures below are MANDATORY content per 740 ILCS 14/15(b).
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⚖ COUNSEL — render this content into binding language appropriate
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for the candidate-facing UI. Engineering provides the structural
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content; counsel provides the legally-sufficient wording.
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### Disclosure 1 — Notice of collection (§15(b)(1))
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Lakehouse will collect and store my **biometric identifier** (a
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photograph of me from which facial geometry is implicit). The
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photograph itself is the data we keep — we do NOT run automated
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facial-classification (gender / race / age inference) against it
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in v1. If at a later date we add automated classification, we will
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re-collect consent under a superseding template before doing so.
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### Disclosure 2 — Specific purpose and length of term (§15(b)(2))
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The biometric data will be used for:
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1. Identity verification at staffing job sites
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2. Internal record-keeping so coordinators can recognize me across
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placements
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The biometric data will be retained for a maximum of **18 months**
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from my most recent interaction with the staffing platform, after
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which it will be permanently destroyed per the
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[Biometric Retention Schedule v1](biometric_retention_schedule_v1.md).
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I may withdraw this consent at any time by contacting the operator
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(see §3 below). Withdrawal triggers permanent destruction of my
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biometric data.
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### Disclosure 3 — Written release (§15(b)(3))
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I provide a written release authorizing Lakehouse to collect, store,
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and use my biometric identifier and biometric information for the
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purposes stated above and for the term stated above.
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---
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## 1. Plain-language summary (non-binding)
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⚖ COUNSEL — the section above is the binding legal disclosure.
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The summary below is provided for candidate comprehension and is
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NOT a substitute for the binding disclosure. Both should appear
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together in the consent UI; counsel determines whether this summary
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is appropriate to include or whether a different plain-language
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section is preferred.
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> **What you're agreeing to:** if you upload a photo of yourself,
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> we'll keep that photo so your staffing coordinator can recognize
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> you when you arrive at job sites. We don't run automated guesses
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> about your age, gender, or race against the photo.
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>
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> **How long we keep it:** at most 18 months after your last
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> placement or interaction with us, then it's permanently destroyed.
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>
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> **What we DON'T do with it:** we don't sell it, we don't share it
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> with anyone outside the staffing operation unless legally compelled,
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> and we don't use it to decide what jobs to recommend to you.
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>
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> **How to take it back:** contact us (§3 below) at any time to
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> withdraw your consent. We will permanently destroy your biometric
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> data within 30 days of receiving your request.
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---
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## 2. Withdrawal procedure
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I may withdraw biometric consent at any time. Withdrawal:
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- Is free of charge
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- Does not affect my ability to remain on the staffing platform
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(only my biometric data is removed)
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- Triggers permanent destruction of all biometric data within
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30 days, per the destruction runbook
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- Is recorded as an append-only audit row in my per-subject
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audit log, providing me with tamper-evident proof of withdrawal
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if I subsequently exercise my BIPA right of action
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⚖ COUNSEL — confirm 30 days is the right destruction SLA. Some
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deployments use 7 or 14 days. The runbook (Gate 5) currently
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references this template's number, so changing it here updates
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both.
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---
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## 3. Contact for withdrawal / questions
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⚖ COUNSEL — supply the candidate-facing contact channel for
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biometric-consent withdrawal. Examples: a dedicated email
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(`biometric-consent@<deployment-domain>`), a postal address, a
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named operator. The contact must be functional from day one of
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deployment.
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---
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## 4. Consent acknowledgment
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By signing below (electronically or on paper), I acknowledge that:
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1. I have read and understood the disclosures in §1-3 above
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2. I am providing this consent voluntarily and free of coercion
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3. I have received a copy of this consent template (or have been
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provided a means to retrieve a copy at any time)
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| Field | Value |
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|---|---|
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| Candidate name | _______________________________ |
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| Date | __________ |
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| Signature | _______________________________ |
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| Consent template version | v1 (SHA-256: _generated at deployment time_) |
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---
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## 5. Operational integration
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The structured fields the consent UI must capture and post to
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identityd:
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```json
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{
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"candidate_id": "<token>",
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"consent_version_hash": "<sha256 of this file at deployment>",
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"consent_given_at": "<ISO-8601 timestamp>",
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"consent_collection_method": "<electronic_signature|paper|click_acceptance>",
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"consent_collection_evidence_path": "<path to signed artifact, if applicable>"
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}
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```
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These fields write to `SubjectManifest.consent.biometric.status='given'`
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and the corresponding `SubjectAuditRow` (see
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`crates/catalogd/src/subject_audit.rs`).
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---
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## 6. Versioning
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This consent template is version v1. Per Gate 1's versioning rules,
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any change to the binding disclosure language requires a new version,
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and existing subjects retain their original consent_version reference
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unless they re-consent under the new version.
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⚖ COUNSEL — confirm whether existing consent under v1 carries forward
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when the schedule is updated, or whether re-consent is required.
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This affects the deployment workflow.
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---
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## 7. Authority
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| Role | Name | Signature | Date |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Operator | J | _______________ | _____ |
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| Outside counsel | _____________ | _______________ | _____ |
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