docs: reconcile PRD + fix-wave with current code (ea0ba33)

The audit anchors had drifted from the implementation. Corrected against
the live source as of commit ea0ba33:

- PRD invariant #1: mode registry is now 24 handlers in _VALID_MODES,
  not "only extract". Added invariant #2: unknown modes fail with HTTP
  400 + valid_modes (was 200-with-error-body). Added SECURE to the
  session-cookie invariant.
- PRD known-gaps + change-axis: marked the mode-registration and
  unknown-mode items RESOLVED; flagged the live codereview-vs-code_review
  naming mismatch that still 400s lakehouse observer escalations.
- SCRUM_FIX_WAVE items 1-2 struck through as DONE; recorded the cookie +
  nginx security fixes under "Recently landed".

Machine-generated .memory/ state left untouched (regenerated by the
scrum pipeline, not hand-edited).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

docs/PRD.md

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+# LLM Team UI — Product Requirements (for scrum-master audits)
+
+This doc is the anchor the lakehouse scrum-master uses when auditing
+this codebase. It is the "ground truth" — every scrum finding is
+evaluated against what this doc says the system should be. Written
+2026-04-24 to give the scrum pipeline a target surface; keep it tight
+and aligned with what the code actually tries to do. Last reconciled
+2026-06-20 against commit `ea0ba33` — the mode registry and unknown-mode
+handling described below were verified against the live source on that date.
+
+## What LLM Team UI is
+
+Flask-based web UI that lets a user configure and run multi-model
+"teams" — pipelines of LLMs (OpenRouter + Ollama Cloud + local Ollama)
+that collaborate on a task with roles like executor, reviewer, critic,
+sentinel. Lives at devop.live:5000 behind nginx. Main file
+`llm_team_ui.py` handles HTTP routes, session auth, model orchestration,
+SSE streaming. Backed by PostgreSQL for users + runs + audit.
+
+## Core invariants (scrum should flag if violated)
+
+1. **Every mode accepted by `/api/run` must be in the `_VALID_MODES`
+   registry and have a matching `run_<mode>` handler.** As of 2026-06-20
+   there are 24 registered modes (brainstorm, pipeline, debate, validator,
+   roundrobin, redteam, consensus, codereview, ladder, tournament,
+   evolution, blindassembly, staircase, drift, mesh, hallucination,
+   timeloop, research, eval, extract, refine, adaptive, deep_analysis,
+   distill), each with a `run_<mode>` function. `run_team()` validates
+   `mode` against `_VALID_MODES` before opening the SSE stream and rejects
+   anything else with HTTP 400 (see invariant below). The registry is kept
+   in sync with the handlers manually — adding a `run_<mode>` without
+   listing it in `_VALID_MODES` (or vice-versa) is the hard fail to flag.
+2. **Unknown modes must fail fast with HTTP 400 + the valid-mode list.**
+   `run_team()` returns `{"error": "Unknown mode: X", "valid_modes": [...]}`
+   with status 400 *before* streaming. Returning 200-with-error-body (the
+   old behavior) is a hard fail — it forces callers to parse SSE to learn
+   the request was bad.
+3. **All authenticated routes must call `@login_required` decorator.**
+   The SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY + SAMESITE=Lax + SECURE defaults must hold
+   (SECURE added 2026-06-20; the app sits behind nginx TLS). Any route
+   that mutates state without auth is a hard fail.
+4. **Security logging goes to `/var/log/llm-team-security.log`** via
+   the `sec_log` logger. Fail2ban watches this file. Any new auth path
+   must emit there on failure.
+5. **PostgreSQL connections come from `DB_URL` env.** Direct literal
+   connection strings are a hard fail.
+6. **SMTP alerts via `send_security_alert(subject, body)`** — never
+   log secrets in the body.
+7. **SSE streams must flush incrementally** — if an endpoint returns
+   all-at-once, it should not claim SSE in the Content-Type.
+8. **Password storage: bcrypt only.** Any plain-text / SHA256 password
+   path is a hard fail.
+9. **Rate limiting enforced** on /login, /register, and model-invocation
+   endpoints. No unbounded loops that invoke paid APIs.
+
+## Known gaps (scrum can work on these)
+
+- **~~Only `extract` mode is registered.~~ RESOLVED (2026-06-20).** The
+  mode set grew from one handler to 24 (`run_brainstorm` … `run_distill`),
+  all listed in `_VALID_MODES` and dispatched by `run_team()`. Note the
+  mode named in code is `codereview` (not `code_review`); callers using the
+  underscored name still get a 400. Historical context: observer.ts in
+  lakehouse was escalating to `/api/run?mode=code_review` and silently hit
+  "Unknown mode" for weeks (see lakehouse memory
+  `reference_llm_team_modes.md`) — the underscore-vs-no-underscore mismatch
+  is the remaining footgun, not the missing handler.
+- **File is 13K lines.** Cohesive modules (auth, teams, runs, alerts,
+  SSE, templates) should be separated — but that's a refactor, out of
+  scope for individual scrum-master reviews.
+- **Audit log schema is thin.** The PostgreSQL `runs` table stores the
+  fact of a run but not fine-grained per-step outcomes. Downstream
+  correlation is manual.
+- **Templates inline in Python as `render_template_string(...)`.**
+  Makes HTML review impossible via the scrum pipeline — HTML is hidden
+  inside Python string literals.
+
+## Change proposal axis (what the scrum should optimize for)
+
+1. **~~Every Unknown-mode endpoint should either be registered or return
+   404/not-a-mode.~~ DONE (2026-06-20).** `run_team()` now returns HTTP 400
+   (not 404 — chosen so it reads as "bad request / wrong mode" rather than
+   "route missing") with a `valid_modes` list, before streaming. Callers
+   can now distinguish a wrong call from a missing mode. Remaining: see the
+   `codereview` vs `code_review` naming footgun in Known gaps.
+2. **Auth decorators should be typed** — `@login_required` is a
+   runtime check; adding an `Annotated[User, Depends(auth)]`-style
+   type hint (possible via Flask's `g` object) would make review
+   mechanical.
+3. **Security logging should be structured** — current `sec_log.warning(
+   f"...")` loses fields. Move to `logger.warning(msg, extra={...})`
+   so fail2ban and external tools can parse.
+4. **Secret handling** — `FLASK_SECRET` in env is correct, but the
+   fallback to `~/.llm-team-secret` means dev mode silently generates
+   a persistent secret. Not bad, but should log once.
+
+## How scrum-master audits this repo
+
+The lakehouse scrum pipeline is repo-agnostic via env vars. See
+`/root/llm-team-ui/CLAUDE.md` for the exact runbook.

docs/SCRUM_FIX_WAVE.md

@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+# LLM Team scrum-master fix wave
+
+Concrete changes the scrum-master should propose when auditing this
+repo. Evaluated at ~confidence level per item. Keep focused — only
+things that are safely landable per review, not the full refactor.
+
+Last reconciled 2026-06-20 against commit `ea0ba33`. Items 1–2 below have
+shipped since this list was written; they're kept (struck through) so the
+numbering of 3–8 stays stable.
+
+## Recently landed (verified 2026-06-20)
+
+- **Session cookie hardening** — `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE` added (was only
+  HTTPONLY + SAMESITE=Lax). Commit `ea0ba33`.
+- **nginx ban IP validation** — `_nginx_ban` now validates the IP via
+  `ipaddress.ip_address()` before writing the `deny` rule, closing a
+  config-injection path. Commit `ea0ba33`.
+
+## High priority (start here)
+
+1. ~~**Register the missing modes** — `run_code_review`, `run_patch`,
+   `run_refactor`.~~ **DONE.** The mode set is now 24 handlers
+   (`run_brainstorm` … `run_distill`) in `_VALID_MODES`. NB: the code mode
+   is `codereview`, not `code_review` — lakehouse observer escalations
+   using the underscored name still 400. Closing that naming gap is the
+   only remaining work here.
+
+2. ~~**Mode-dispatch should 404 when mode is unknown.**~~ **DONE (as 400).**
+   `run_team()` validates `mode` against `_VALID_MODES` and returns HTTP
+   400 + `valid_modes` before streaming. Implemented as 400 rather than the
+   proposed 404 (reads as "bad request", not "route missing").
+
+3. **Structured security logging.** Replace `sec_log.warning(f"...")`
+   with `sec_log.warning("event", extra={"fields": ...})` so the log
+   format is JSON-parseable by fail2ban + external tools.
+
+## Medium priority
+
+4. **Rate-limit decorators on login/register.** Currently an attacker
+   can hammer /login at full request rate. Add per-IP + per-user rate
+   limits via `flask-limiter` or a simple in-memory sliding window.
+
+5. **Audit log gains per-step fields.** Extend the `runs` table with
+   per-phase timestamps and outcomes so downstream analysis can
+   reconstruct what happened without replaying the full run.
+
+6. **Templates → separate files.** Extract `render_template_string(...)`
+   HTML into `templates/*.html` so HTML/CSS review can happen
+   separately from Python logic.
+
+## Low priority (nice to have, not urgent)
+
+7. **Type hints on all public routes.** Adds IDE completion + makes
+   auditor pattern-match easier.
+
+8. **Split llm_team_ui.py into modules.** 13K lines in one file makes
+   scrum-master reviews expensive (must tree-split). Modules: `auth.py`,
+   `teams.py`, `runs.py`, `alerts.py`, `sse.py`, `templates.py`.